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ABSTRACT
Most noteworthy among the developments in Epistemic Logic
during the last five years are Hintikka’s proposed semantics for
perception (modelled after his 1$6Z semantics for knowledge) and
his revised (1970) semantics for knowledge. Crucial to both of these
systems is the employment of two sets of quantifiers. Part One of
this dissertation explores the role of multiple quantifiers in
Hintikka-tjrpe semantics. Chapter One is an investigation of Hintikka’
s
semantics for perception; Chapter Two is a critique of a recent (1973)
variation of Hintikka’ s semantics for perception (which makes use of
multiple quantifiers) proposed by R. Thomason; And in Chapter Three
Hintikka* s 1970 semantics for knowledge is explored and criticized.
Part Two of this dissertation deals with the much-critic!zed
Restricted Range feature which characterizes all of Hintikka*
s
systems. Chapter Four is an examination of problems Restricted
Range has been thought to create and a survey of some attempts to
create Hintikka-type systems which lack the featui’e. Finally* in
Chapter Five a new variation of Hintikka* s semantics for knowledge is
proposed which both lacks Restricted Range and avoids a number of
troublesome theorems \diich show up in the other systems.
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VPREFACE
In 1962, -with the publication of Knowledge and Belief , Jaakko
Hintikka introduced formal model set theoretic semantics for both
knowledge and belief. The technique he employed consists of intro-
ducing a series of rules determining membership of well-formed
formulas in model sets in such a way that model sets can be thought of
as (possibly partial) descriptions of possible worlds. By intro-
ducing the notion of * compatibility* among model sets, he was able to
treat the symbols 'Ka* (road "a knows that") and *Ba’ (read "a
believes that") as modal operators, Ihus, the formula ’Kap’ belongs
to a model set (is true in a world) just in case *p* belongs to
every compatible model set (is true in every compatible world)
relative to agent a. Duo largely to Hintiklca* s proposal to treat
epistemic terms as modal operators and at the same to allow quanti-
fying in, Hintikka’ s systems have been the objects of widespread
controversy and discussion ever since they first appeared.
Much of the early criticism of these systems wiiich appeared
was either mistaken or based upon mi s\mdorstanding of Hintikka’
s
proposals, but genuine defects of Hintikka’ s semantics for knowledge
(called "KB") were uncovered by Castaneda and Sleigh during the years
1964-1967. A good deal of criticism, both genidlne and mistaken, was
leveled at the so-caJ-led "Restricted Range" feature of KB, In his
1967 paper, ’Individuals, Possible Worlds, and Epistemic Logic’,
Hintikka proposed a significant revision of KB to avoid certain ob-
jections raised by Castaneda and Sleigh, The resulting system, IPE,
however did not lack the Restricted Range feature; in the same paper
Vi
Hintikka defended Restricted Range and argued that it* s unavoidable
in his systems.
At about the same time Hintikka began to formulate a model
set theoretic semantics for perception significantly more complex
than his previous systems. Like the logics of knowledge and belief,
the logic of perception is believed by Hintikka to be a "branch of
modal logic", but he feels that to capture the complexities of the
logic of perception it is necessary to employ two sets of quantifiers
in the language of the system. In this system tvjo independent methods
are employed according to which individuals are traced across
possible worlds. Hintikka’ s semantics for perception was first
presented in his 19^9 paper, ’On the Logic of Perception’.
The next year, 1970, Hintikka made the proposal (in the face
of continued criticism by Castaneda) that two sets of quantifiers
likewise be employed in his semantics for knowledge. Convinced that
the logic of knowledge is more complex that his previous systems
indicated, Hintikka dropped IPE and outlined a new system KBC in
his paper ’On Attributions of Self-Knovrledge* . As in his semantics
for perception, there are two independent methods employed in KBC
to trace individuals across possible worlds.
The present study divides into t'vro parts. The first three
chapters deal with multiple quantifiers in Hintikka-type systems.
Chapter One is an investigation of Hintikka’ s semantics for perception;
Chapter Two is a critique of a recent (1973) variation of Hintikka’
s
semantics for perception (which makes use of multiple quantifiers)
proposed by R. Thomason; And in Chapter Three Hintikka’ s 1970
semantics for knowledge, KBC, is explored and criticized. The
last
vii
two chapters deal with Restricted Range. Chapter Four is an examin-
ation of problems Restricted Range has been thought to create and a
s\irvey of some attempts to create Hintikka-type systems which lack
the feat\ire. Finally, in Chapter Five a new variation of KB is
proposed •vrf'iich both lacks Restricted Range and avoids a number of
troublesome theorems which show up in the other systems.
iCHAPTER I
In his papers »0n the Logic of Perception' and 'Information,
Causality, and the Logic of Perception'
,
Jaakko Hintikka suggests
ways in vrfiich a model set theoretic semantics for perception might be
formulated. Like its counterparts in the semantics for knovrledge and
belief introduced in Hintikka' s Knowledge and Belief
, the semantics
for perception is based upon the concept of a model structure con-
sisting of model sets, or "complete novels" as they're called in 'On
the Logic of Perception'
. These model sets are for Hintikka sets of
sentences in a specified language whose membership is subject to
conditions (set forth in Knowledge and Belief ) designed in such a
way that they may intuitively be regarded as descriptions of
possible states of affairs.
A 'complete novel' is defined by Hintikka as "a set of
sentences in some given language which is consistent but w^hich
cannot be enlarged without making it inconsistent", and a 'world' is
"precisely vdiat such a complete novel describes".^ At any given
time the totality of complete novels belonging to a model structure
may be divided into the set of those which are compatible with
everything an agent perceives and those which are not compatible with
everything the same agent perceives (a complete novel w is compatible
with everything S perceives relative to some specified language if ana
only if for no p is it the case that (i) S perceives that p, and (ii)
—p is a member of w). And it is on the basis of this distinction
that the door is open for 'perceives that' to oe treated as a modal
2
operator.
Assuming, for the sal^e of simplicity, that our concern throughout
2is limited to -what is perceived by a single agent Jones, the formula
'Jones perceives that p' will belong to a complete novel w if and only
if the formula 'p' belongs to every complete novel compatible ;^th
everything Jones Perceives. And a formula is to be regarded as true
in a vrarld just in case it belongs to a complete novel which describes
it. Therefore, we may think of a state of affairs as being perceived
by Jones if and only if it holds in every possible vjorld compatible
with everything Jones perceives.
To vastly complicate matters, it is allowed (as in Hintikka'
s
system of knowledge and belief) that variables occur free within the
scope of the modal operator 'perceives that’ and get bound from the
outside. To put it another V7ay, there are circumstances in which one
is alloT-jed to "quantify in" past the occurrence of one or more 'per-
ceives that' operators. VAiat these circumstances amount to are
not specified in either 'On the Logic of Perception’ or 'Information,
Causality, and the Logic of Perception' (vjhich we’ll henceforth
refer to as 'OLP' and 'ICLP', respectively), but they may be formu-
lated on the basis of rules Hintikka gives in a number of different
places for quantifying past knowledge operators. This we shall do
shortly.
There are essentially tx-jo crucial differences between the
semantics
Hintikka develops for knowledge in Knox^rledge Belief and
the semantics
for perception he sketches in the two perception papers.
In the
foimer, reqxiirements are placed upon the compatibility
relation between
model sets: Ilie relation must be reflexive and
transitive. Mo such
requirements are placed upon perceptually compatible worlds.
Thus no
success presuppositions are incorporated into the
concept of perception
3vTith which the development of the formal semantics is concerned. One
could easily incorporate reflexivity, but the resulting system would
be substantially less interesting. "If we assume the success
condition we cannot discuss such epistemically interesting problems
as illusions, hallucinations, perceptual mistakes, impossible
4
objects, etc."
The second of the differences is of more fundamental importance,
and it'
s
here that we shall concentrate our attention. It is
alleged that the logic of perception is really a bit more sophisti-
cated than anything which can be captured in an ordinary semantics for
quantified modal logic (as in Knowledge and Belief ) « Added machinery -
in the form of a second set of quantifiers — is needed to capture
the complexities inherent in the logic of perception. And so
Hintikka' s semantics for perception is equipped with a second set of
quantifiers '(3 x)' and '(\/x)', in addition to the ordinary quanti-
fiers *(Ex)' and '(x)'.^
In this chapter we shall (i) Indicate how a formal semantics
without the extra quantifiers may be characterized, (ii) Determine
the role in Hintikka' s system of the extra quantifiers, (iii) Argue
that one of the major advantages Hintikka cites for the adoption of
the new quantifiers -- giving rise to the formal expression of English
"direct object" locutions — is not an advantage gained by adding the
new quantifiers, and (iv) Try to determine precisely the areas of
increased expressibility afforded by the new quantifiers.
*
We shall adopt the convention of designating
the perceptual
modal operator as 'Perceives'. Since we shall
speak merely of what a
4single agent (Jones) perceives, there will be no need to make use of
a subscript identifying the agent in question. It might be thought
that we are dangerously oversimplifying matters by concentrating
upon what only a single agent perceives, but Hintikka points out
(correctly, I believe) that it is a rather straightforward matter to
generalize the system to provide for tw or more agents.
A semantics of the sort Hintilcka has in mind for a system
involva.ng a single agent and no epistemic operators other than
•Perceives’ may be roughly characterized in the following way. Let
a domain of complete novels be given together with a two-place
relation R taking complete novels as arguments. Assign to each
complete novel a domain of individuals in such a way that these
individuals are allowed membership in more than one domain (an
individual b can be said to belong to the domain of a complete novel
if and only if ’(Ex) (b=x)’ belongs to the novel). Let a member of
the set of complete novels be chosen as the actual novel. And to
complete the basic picture, choose appropriate free singiilai* terms
(constant terms), predicate terms, the identity sign, variables, and
the usual connectives.
To this we add the model operator ’Perceives’ defined in the
manner already indicated and the standard quantifiers ’(Ex)’ and
’(x)’ defined in such a way as to rule out unrestricted Universal
Instantiation and Existential Generalization.
In particular, let ’Perceives’ be an operator such that
’Perceives A’ is a member of a complete novel w if and only if the
formula ’A’ is a member of every complete novel w’ suda that Rww'
.
Roles governing the use of the standard quantifiers go as
follows:
5Let ’A' be a well-formed formula and w any complete novel,
(i) Case One - Ihe variable *x' does not occur free inside an
occurrence of ’Perceives*. Iben if *(Ex)Ax*€w, *A(b/x)*€
w and *(Ex) (b=x)*e w, for some *b*. And if *(x)Ax»^ w,
then if » (Ex) (b=x) * <£ w, then *A(b/x)»€w.
(ii) Case Tvro - Ihe variable *x» occurs both within and without
the scope of a single occurrence of ’Perceives*. Then if
’ (Ex)Ax’ e w, *A(b/x)’
€w and *(Ex)(b=x & Perceives b=x)’
6 w, for some ’b*. And if ’(x)Ax’ew, then if * (Ex)
(b=x & Perceives b=x)*6. w, *A(b/x)’ e w.
(iii) Case Three - The variable ’x* occurs only x*n.thin the
scope of a single occurrence of ’Perceives*. Then if
’ (Ex)Ax’ e w, *A(b/x)’^ w and * (Ex) (Perceives b=x)*6w, for
some ’b*. And if ’(x)Ax’ e w, then if * (Ex) (Perceives b=x)
' <s-w, * A(b/x)’ e w.
In addition we have the follovdng r\iles:
(i) If ’-Perceives A’ 6 w, then ’-A’ e w*, for some w* such
that R&tw*
(ii) If ’(Ex)(b=x & Perceives b=x)’ t vt, then ’(Ex) (b=x)’ e w.
(iii) If ’A(b/x)’ <= w, and *b’ occurs free within the scope of
’Perceives’, then if ’Perceives b=c* e w, *A(c/x)’^w.^
These rul.es may be easily generalized to handle formulas in
vrfiich the variable bound by ’(Ex)’ or ’(x)’ occurs vjithin the scope of
mul-tiple occurrences of ’Perceives*. For example, if ’(Ex) (Perceives
(Perceives Ax))’ belongs to a complete novel w, vre will be allowed to
infer both ’Perceives (Perceives Ab))’ew and ’ (Ex) (Perceives(Perceives
b=x) ) ’ ^ w, for some ’b*. An attempt is made by Hintikka in ’Existential
6and Uniqueness Presuppositions’ to codify the general requisite
conditions for quantifying in any context containing any number of
epistendc operators. For our purposes, hovrever, it is sufficient to
concentrate upon single modality contexts.
It may seem puzzling just vihy cases tv;o and three above are
given separate formal treatments. It may seem strange, for example,
that ’ (Ex) (Perceives Ax)’ and ’(Ex)(jo=x & Perceives Ax)’ fail to be
equivalent in the system have just described. 1i/hy does Hintikka
not treat all cases of quantifying in alike?
Hintikka’ s reasons for and defense of this particular formal
7
distinction are quite complex and cannot be examined here in detail.
Suffice it to say that this move makes it possible, Hintikka believes,
to formally capture English "perceives vjho" constructions involving
non-existent entities. We might, for example, viish to say of a man
experiencing a hallucination of a person that he perceives vjho the
person is vdthout thereby implying that the person exists. By
separating cases two and three in the manner indicated it is
possible to distingaiish between those instances in vrfiich perceiving
who implies existence and those instances in vdiich it does not.
Our account of Hintikka’ s semantics for perception must be
accompanied by an important vrord of caution. It is alleged by
Hintikka both in ’The Semantics of Modal Notions and the Indeterminacy
of Ontology’ and ’Objects of Knowledge and Belief’ that difficulties
arise in connection with the notion of "prefabricated possible
individuals".
I am not convinced that the domain of possible
indi-
viduals is anything w^e can start from in the sense
of
take for granted, at least not in some of the most
7important philosophic applications of modal logic.
I am not sure, either, that all the possible indi-
viduals xce in some sense have to deal viith can
eventually be pooled into one big happy domain.
Suppose. . .that one begins by postulating a fixed
supplj’- of prefabricated individuals. Ihen one
obtains a semantics which could function as an
actual means of communication, it seems to us, only
if one could assume that there are no problems in
principle about re-identifying one’s individuals as
they occur in the several possible worlds we are
considering. Once this presuppositions is made
explicit, however, it is also seen at once how
gratuitous it is for most philosophically interest-
ing pui'poses.
My own attitude indicated there ’The Semantics of
Modal Notions and the Indeterminacy of Ontology’
can be summed up as a deep suspicion of those "pre-
fabricated possible individuals" which have recently
become so popular.^
Given these suspicions it may seem puzzling that each complete
novel in Hintikka’ s semantics comes equipped from the outset with
a domain of vrell-defined individuals. Does this mean that his
system comes equipped with "prefabricated possible individuals"?
The answer is "no", and it is here that must draw an
important distinction between those individuals which inhabit domains
of model sets, on the one hand, and fmctions which map model sets
to these individuals on the other. These functions are referred to
by Hintikka as "individuals”, and it is this latter categoi*y which
includes vriiat Hintikka refers to as "possible individuals". For our
own purposes, let us henceforth refer to individuals inhabiting
domai-ns of complete novels as "individuals^^" and functions from
model sets to individualsj^ as "individuals2" whenever there is apt
to be any confusion. VJe can then say that Hintikka has in mind
individuals2 and not individuals^ when he expresses suspicion of
"prefabricated possible individuals". Thus, by introducing a
8model structure, part of which involves domains of prefabricated
individuals^ we do not thereby introduce prefabricated individuals2»
One final word before moving on. It seems qvdte clear that to
tell whether a vrorld is compatible vdth another all that needs to
be done is to look for logical consistency between tvio sets of
formulas. A world w is compatible with (or an alternative to) a
world w’ (Rw’w) if and only if the conjunction of the members of
the complete novel describing w is logically consistent with the
conjunction of the set of formulas 'A* such that ’Perceives A’ is
true in vj' . This gives us the hoped for results that no world w
is compatible with w’ if v?hat is perceived in w’ happens to entail a
contradiction and that every world is compatible with w’ if the
9
agent’s only perceptions in w’ are tautologies.
Nonetheless, Hintikka expresses a reluctance to accept
this account;
It is to be noted that the notion "compatible vdth
\^at a perceives" is to be taken as luianalyzable.
To know vrfiat someone, say a_, perceives in a world w
is to know vihat-is-compatible-with-what-he-perceives
among other possible xrorlds w' , and the latter notion
— it is a relation betv;eon the possible worlds w’
and w — turns out to be the more powerfvil one for
the purposes of semantical analysis. Attempts to
analyze it have turned up nothing useful. If one can
list all the facts that a perceives in w one can of
course define the perceptual alternatives to w as
those worlds vriiich are logically compatible ijith
those lists in the sense in which all the members of
the list are true in the vrorld in question. But this
does not accomplish anything new, and it rules out
those perceptual situations in vrhich vre cannot
specify in some particular language all the facts &
perceives. In short, it does not allow for un-
verbalized perceptions.^'^
Be that as it may, nothing in the present study turns, I
believe on
the distinction between verbalized and unverbalized perceptions.
So
9for purposes of simplicity -we assume that our agent Jones is eloquent
enough to verbalize all he perceives. This will then insure that the
notion of compatibility we make use of is precisely the one described
above
,
*
We move now to consider Hintikka' s introduction of a second
pair of quantifiers.
The great interest of perceptual concepts for a
philosopher of logic is due precisely to the fact
that we all as a matter of fact use two different
methods of individuation. One of them is the method
of physical individuation indicated above, but the
other is essentially different from it...VJhen presented
with descriptions of two different states of affairs
compatible with what S sees, and with two different
individuals figuring in these tx-;o respective descrip-
tions, we ask whether they are identical as far as S*s
visual impressions are concerned, and often can
ansvjer this question. The ouestion therefore gives
us another method of individuating objects in contexts
in which we are talking of vriiat someone sees at a
given moment of time...we shall call individuals so
cross-identified "perceptually individuated objects".
Ihere may, for instance, be a man in front of a of
whom a^ does not see who he is. T5ien descriptively
speaking the man in front of a is a different (de-
scriptively individuated) person in different pos-
sible worlds compatible vdth everything a sees. But
in each such world there will have to be a man in
front of a ...Obviously we can in principle use
this fact for the purpose of cross-identification and
as though it were a trans world heir ^jne through all
these men in their respective worlds.
The introduction of the new quantifiers is now quite simple. Having
introduced these new perceptually individuated objects (called
"perceptual individuals" or "perceptual objects" for short) Hintikka
permits variables to range over them. And in order to bind these
variables special new "perceptual quantifiers" are added to the
language.
10
Vfliat is the nature of these perceptual individuals? The
clearest indication Hintikka gives us is that they can be envisaged
as functions vriiich from each world over \rfiich they’re defined pick
out one individual from its domain (or less formally described in
I CLP as V7orld lines drawn through individuals in the different
compatible worlds; notice, then, that perceptual individuals are
individuals2) • These individuals so picked out are said to be
the ’’same” as far as the agent in question's perceptions are
concerned. Suppose, for example, that Jones perceives that the man
in front of him is bald. Suppose further that there is no man of vhon
Jones perceives that he is the man in front of him. Then the locu-
tion 'the man in front of him' picks out different physically
individuated objects (called 'physical objects' for short) in
different vrorlds compatible with everything Jones perceives.
V/e may suppose, for example, that it's compatible vdth every-
thing Jones perceives that the man in front of him is Y.A. Tittle.
Then in at least one compatible world Y.A. Tittle really is the man;
and perhaps in another world Telly Savales is the man in front of
Jones. "Because of this," Hintikka urges, "we may say that from the
point of view of Jones' s perceptual situation they are after all one
12
and the same man — the man in front of him."
Physical individuals, by contrast, are described by Hintikka
as those functions whose value at each complete novel w coincides
vjith the reference at w of some constant term ’b' which is such that
(at the actual world) Jones perceptually recognizes b or perceives
who b is. Therefore, if Jones perceives who the man in front of
him is, the term ’the man in front of him’ picks out the same
11
individuated object in each world compatible with every-
thing Jones perceives. This means that we now have two different
criteria for determining trans-world identity. If two individuals,
X and y, both turn up in the range of a physically individuated
object they are the "same" in one sense, and if both turn up in the
range of a perceptuaJ.ly individuated object they are the "same"
in another sense.
Whereas physical and perceptual individuals are both to be
thought of as functions which map worlds to members of their respective
domains, it vdll be intuitively helpful, I believe, to think of
physical individuals as constant functions and perceptual individuals
as (in general) non- constant functions. Alternatively, we may (in
the spirit of ICLP) think of them as "rigid" and "wobbly" vrorld lines,
respectively. There is, of course, nothing in the formal semantics
which gives us any more reason to conceive of physical individuals
as constant functions than to conceive of perceptual individuals as
constant functions. But we shall establish this convention for the
purposes of our own discussion to aid us in better picturing the way
in which the two kinds of quantifiers relate to one another. To be
explicit, if the value of a physical individual at a world w is an
individual]^ x, then x is the value of the physical individual at every
world compatible with w. From this, of course, it does not follow
that every constant function defined over a set of worlds compatible
with w is a physical individual.
Occasionally perceptual individuals do, the way we are nov?
viewing the situation, behave as constant fiinctions, and this phenomenon
occurs precisely in those cases T<jhere there is a perceptual individual
12
b such that Jones happens to perceive \;ho b is. If Jones correctly
perceives of the man in front of him that he is Y.A. Tittle, it is
no longer compatible vdth everything Jones perceives that Savales or
anyone else is the man in front of him. The perceptual individual
now picks Tittle from every compatible world.
Suppose we let »m» be short for ’the man in front of him
(Jones)’. Then to say that ’m’ designate a perceptual individual is
(formally speaking) to say that ’ (J x)(Perceives m=x)’ is the case; to
say that ’m’ designates a physical individual is to say that ’(Ex)
(Perceives m=x)’ is the case ("Jones perceives who m is"). Therefore,
'(3 x)(Ey) (Perceives s?=y & m-x)’ is true in precisely those cases
idiere ’ra’ picks out a perceptual individual which happens to coincide
with a physical individual. And by so coinciding the perceptual
individual is forced to become a constant function; in the case at
hand, it is now forced to choose Tittle and no one else at each
compatible world.
We tvim now to the task of finding a place for perceptual
individuals in the model set theoretic semantics sketched above. In
this regard Hintikka is of very little help. Nowhere does he speak
of mles governing the use of the new quantifiers. Nor does he give
any indication as to how we might begin to decide just which fvinctions
definable over worlds coiint as perceptual individuals and which do
not. Nevertheless, we are given a couple of important clues relating
to the behavior of perceptual individuals.
First, every individual^ chosen by a perceptual individual at
any v;orld w must belong to the domain of vr; no individualj^ failing to
exist in a given world may be the assignment of a perceptual indivj.dual
13
at that world. If an agent m perceives that there is a man in front
of him but does not perceive who he is, then, says Hintikka, "The
man in front of him (let us call him m) is a different individual
(different person) in some of the relevant possible states of affairs
...In all of these different states of affairs, however, there has
to be a man in front of him. (Othervdse the state of affairs in
13
question would not be compatible with what m sees)." Hintikka makes
the same point in ICLP in a passage we have already quoted
(page 9 above).
Second, there is a need to restrict the domains over which
perceptual individuals are defined; they cannot be defined arbitrarily
over members of W. For suppose that no limits at all are placed
upon the worlds vriiich may qualify as members of domains of perceptual
individuals. Then suppose that each of two perceptual individuals
map each compatible world to exactly the same individual S]_. But
suppose that the mappings diverge when they come to some world not
compatible with everything the agent in question perceives. Then we
are forced to admit that the perceptual individuals are distinct,
even though they seem to fulfill every conceivable requirement for
being considered the same perceptual individual. An example will
probably make this clearer.
Suppose that Jones perceives that there is a man in front of
him, that there is a man aiming a rifle at him, and that the man in
front of him is identical to the man aiming a rifle at him. Suppose
further that he fails to perceive just who this man is. It seems
clear in this example that the perceptual individual designated by
•the man in front of him’ and the perceptual individual designated by
14
*the man aiming a rifle at him’ should turn out to be identical. And
it seems equally clear that their identity should not be called into
question by the possibility that the perceptual ftinctions extend to
a non-compatible world where, as it turns out, the man aiming the
rifle is distinct from the man in front of Jones. To avoid all this
it seems q\iite necessary to restrict perceptual individuals to vrorlds
compatible with what is being perceived.
Hintikka seems to have been aware of the need for this
restriction:
By cross-identification we of course mean here telling
which individual in one possible world is identical
with which individual in another (identification
across the boundaries of possible worlds). The
possible worlds involved here are of course those
compatible with what a perceives."^
Yet we are going to find that Hintikka allows for one exception to
this restriction: Under certain conditions the perceptual individual
under consideration may be defined at the actual world even when it is
not an alternative to itself. We return to this matter later. For
the time being we shall assume that perceptual individuals as a general
rule never extend beyond the set of compatible worlds.
Given these clues relating to the nature of perceptual individuals,
it may seem pertinent now to try to specify the formal conditions
vjhich suffice for the formation of a perceptual individual. Under what
circumstances does a function defined over the set of compatible
worlds count as a perceptual individual? At first approximation it
may seem sufficient that there exist a f\mction which (i) Assigns to
each compatible world some member of its domain, and (ii) Is undefined
elsewhere. However, there are a great many bizarre functions which
15
must surely be ruled out as perceptual individuals, functions which
manage to pick out entirely random objects from the various com-
patible worlds. Some restriction must be placed upon these functions
to choose those suitable to qualify as perceptual individuals. And
some criterion must be made to make that choice.
Unfortunately, I knovj of no simple way in vihich such a criterion
may be spelled out, and I shall not attempt to arrive at one.
Nevertheless, I shall argue in this section that a formal semantical
characterization of perceptual individuals is not required in order
to formulate truth-conditions for at least one important subclass of
formulas containing perceptual quantifiers. Thus, we shall bypass
entirely the notion of a perceptual individual for the time being.
So far vre have said nothing about v/hy a second set of quanti-
fiers is required in Hintikka’s system. Presumably there are English
sentences (describing Jones’s perceptions) viiich can be formally
captured in Hintikka’s system only by making use of special
quantifiers vrfsich in effect range over intensions. If so, it is
certainly a question of major interest to determine vMch sorts of
sentences these might be. Surprisingly, Hintikka does not have much
to say about the increase in expressive powers which results by employ-
ing perceptual quantifiers; with one exception, he almost completely
ignores the issue.
That one exception, however, seems to be regarded by Hintikka as
quite crucial. It is the set of English sentences vrhich contain what
he calls ’’direct-object constructions”.
Perceptual cross-identification is presupposed in
the truth-conditions of such direct-object con-
structions as ’a sees b’ . The point is perhaps ex-
plained most quickly by pointing out that for a to
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see b (direct object constr-uction) is for b to find
a place among a* s visual objects, that is to say,
among the individuals v/hich a can locate in his
visual space. A simple argument shows that this is
the case when we have
(3) (^x)(a sees that (b=x))
with a quantifier *3 ’ relying on perceptual
cro ss-identi fication . ^^
Here the appearance of perceptual quantifiers is used to give
expression to locutions (in English) of the form ‘a perceives b» or
•a sees b‘, where *b» is a singular term. To say "Jones perceives
Smith" is simply to say that (for Jones) Smith is a perceptual
individual, and we can easily translate this sentence into the language
of Hintikka’s system as ’(3 x) (Perceives Smith=x)’. And so it is that
"we have nov7 found an analysis of the direct-object constructions in
terms of quantifiers and of 'Perceives that*".^^ As Clark observes,
"Hintikka exploits the two types of quantifiers to give expression to
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direct-object constructions".
It is Hintikka’s claim, therefore, that it is the addition of
perceptual quantifiers to his system vrfiich makes it possible to
formally render English direct-object constructions. Suppose we
investigate this claim by turning to consider formulas of the form
*( 3 x) (Perceives Ax)'. Assuming we have made sense of what it means to
say that an open formula of one variable is 'satisfied' by an
individual ]_ in a world, it is clear that ’(3 x) (Perceives Ax)' is true
in a world w if and only if there is a perceptual individual which
assigns to every world compatible \ri.th w a member of its domain in such
a way that 'Ax' is satisfied by that member in that vrorld.
Given this characterization of '(3 x) (Perceives Ax)' it should be
clear that '(3 x) (Perceives Ax)' virtually implies 'Perceives (Ex)
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(Ax)' in Hintikka' s system. If there is a perceptual individual
making assignments in each compatible world, the members of its range
must show up in the various vrorlds. For suppose that 'Perceives (Ex)
(Ax)' is false in w. Then in some vrorld w' compatible with w '(Ex)
(Ax)' is false. So nothing in the domain of w' satisfies 'Ax' in w'
.
Hence there can be no function assigning each compatible world an
element from its domain satisfying 'Ax' . In particular, no perceptual
individual caji do this. So '(3 x) (Perceives Ax)' is fase in w.
And this should seem reasonable. If a man perceives an apple,
then it ought to be the case that there is at least one apple to be
found in every vrorld compatible with everything he perceives. It is
not compatible with everything he perceives that there are no apples
if he really does perceive an apple. Therefore, as long as we
specify that perceptual individuals map each world to an individual]^
which exists in that vrorld, it is quite easy to see that ' x)
(Perceives Ax)' virtually implies ' Perceives (Ex) (Ax) '
.
Having shown that 'Perceives (Ex) (Ax)' is a necessary condition for
the truth of '(3 x)(Perceives Ax)', the question arises whether
' Perceives (Ex) (Ax)
'
is at the same time a sufficient condition. Does
the existence of apples in every single world compatible with every-
thing Jones perceives enable us to conclude that Jones perceives an
apple? Again, the answer seems to be "yes". And this can be shown
as follows.
Suppose, first of all, that '( 3 x) (Perceives Ax)' is false in w.
We shall argue that ' Perceives (Ex) (Ax)
'
is than false. If '(3x)
(Perceives Ax)' is false in w, then o\ir agent (Jones) fails to perceive
that something satisfies 'Ax' in w. So by W-completeness (see
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footnote 12) there is some world w’
,
compatible with everythj.ng Jones
perceives, such that »Ax» fails to be satisfied by something v:hich
exists in w* . Hence »-(Ex)(Ax)» is true in w» . So it is not the
case that »(Ex)(Ax)' is true in every world compatible with w. But
if not, then by the v?ay we set up truth-conditions for 'Perceives*,
’
-Perceives (Ex) (Ax) ' is true in w; and so 'Perceives(Ex) (Ax)
'
(because the novels are complete novels) is false in w, which was
to be shoT^m.
Intuitively, the idea is this. If something red shows up in
every compatible world, there must be a red perceptual object. For
if nothing in Jones' s perceptual field appears red, then it'
s
com-
patible with vAiat he perceives that nothing at all is red, and so
there must sooner or later come a compatible world in vrfiich nothing at
all is red. Thus, the presence of red things — idiatever they are —
in each compatible world ins\ires the presence of a red perceptual
individual. We have no idea where the perceptual vrorld line goes
from world to world, but we know there must be one. And so truth
conditions for formulas of the form » (3 x) (Percei\res Ax)* may be given
independently of specifying necessary and sufficient conditions for
a given function's qualifying as a perceptual individual.
In short, we have shown that ’(3 x)' in its most basic role
(binding variable occurring inside an epistemic operator) may be
characterized entirely in terms of the ordinary quantifier '(Ex)'.
A formula of the form *( 3 x) (Perceives Ax)' is true in a world w if
and only if '(Ex) (Ax)' is true in every world w* such that Rww*
.
A
man perceives an apple if andonly if there exists at least one apple
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in every compatible world.
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It now looks as though the employment of Hintikka' s perceptual
quantifiers is quite unnecessary to formually capture English direct-
object locutions. If sentences of the form "Jones perceives b" are
to be symbolized by formiulas of the form ’ (3 x) (Perceives b=x)',
and if formulas of the form ’(3 x) (Perceives Ax)' are virtually
equivalent to formulas of the form 'Perceives (Ex) (Ax)', then
sentences of the form "Jones perceives b" may equally well be sym-
bolized by formulas in which no perceptual quantifiers occur. It may
well be the case that '(3 x) (Perceives b=x)' in some way gives us more
insight into the logic underlying English direct-object constructions
than something like ' Perceives (Ex) (b=x) ' . But the point of the matter
is that, given everything we have shown, perceptual quantifiers are
not required in the formal expression of English direct-object
constructions. If there are English sentences whose formal trans-
lation requires perceptual quantifiers, these sentences require the
quantifiers for reasons apart from the need to capture direct-object
constructions
.
Vfe now move to consider some objections which might arise in
connection with our argument that ' (3 x) (Perceives Ax)' and 'Perceives
(Ex) (Ax)* are virtually equivalent. From an ordinary philosophical
point of view there appear to be counter-examples to such an eq\iiva-
lence. Suppose, in the first place, that Jones perceives a dagger,
and suppose that the dagger is a perceptual object. Then *(3 x)
(Perceives(x is a dagger))' is true. But suppose Jones is
hallucinating and that there really is no dagger. Suppose, moreover,
that Jones realizes full well that he's hallucinating and that no
dagger is present. Gi\^en these circumstances it seems a mistake to
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conclude that Jones perceives that a dap;g:er exists
. That is,
’Perceives(Ex) (x is a dagger)’ seems false.
The appropriate response here is that if ’Perceives (Ex)(x is a
dagger)’ seems false, then more is being read into the concept of
perceiving than is warrented. We have been operating throughout
viith an especially vieak notion of perceiving, and to suppose that
’Perceives A’ and ’Knows not-A’ are inconsistent is at this point
xanjustified. These are inconsistent if and only if we are in general
guaranteed some state of affairs compatible both with what is perceived
and vath what is knovm. 3y making R reflexive we guarantee such a
mutually compatible state of affairs (the actual world), but in the
system under consideration R is not reflexive. Hence there’s no
reason to conclude that just because Jones knows there’s no dagger
out there, he doesn’t perceive there is one,
A second counter-example to the equivalence involves the
inference going in the opposite direction. Imagine a situation where
Jones is observing the gasoline gauge in his automobile. By
noticing that the gauge indicates a half-full tank Jones perceives that
there is gasoline in his tank. Yet from ’ Perceives(Ex) (x is gas)’ it
is supposed to follow that ’ (3 x) (Porceives(x is gas))’ is true. But
f (3 x)(Perceives(x is gas))’ is certainly not true; at no time
does
Jones ever perceive gasoline. He perceives that there is gasoline
VTithout ever perceiving gasoline. And so the inference does not
seem
valid after all.
The trouble here comes with interpreting the English
sentence
"Jones perceives that there is gasoline". It is assumed in
the example
that 'Perceives(Ex)(x is gas))' correctly captures this
sentence, but
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a closer examination of the facts reveals that this is not so.
*Perceives(Ex)(x is gas)’ is true just in case there is gasoline in
every world compatible with vriiat Jones perceives. But although
there is a fuel gauge in every world, there are vrorlds in which
no gasoline is present in his tank (otherwise he’d be perceiving
gasoline directly). Strictly speaking, it is only inferred from vmat
he perceives that gasoline is present, and since ’(Ex)(x is gas)’ is
not a logical consequence of what is perceived, there are complete
novels compatible with what is perceived of vrtiich ’-(Ex)(x is gas)’
is a member.
Perhaps the real motivation behind this counter-example is the
desire for a modified notion of ’compatibility’, according to which
that which may be ’’reasonably inferred” from what is perceived is
true in each compatible world. As Kant abserves.
Since \je have constantly to make use of inference,
and so end by being completely accustomed to it,
v/e frequently. . .treat as being immediately per-
ceived v?hat has really only been inferred.
Such a modification might indeed produce a semantics more in line with
our common usage of ’’perceives”, but its implementation depends upon a
precise account of what English speakers vrould consider a reasonable
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inference. And such an account is certainly not obvious.
It may be objected, finally, that under our interpretation of
'(3 x)’ the formula '(3 x) (Perceives -(Ey)(x=y))’ turns out to be
self-
contradictory (indefensible). It ascribes to Jones an inconsistent
perception: that something both does and does not exist. Yet
surely Jones is able to perceive that something in his visual
field
fails to exist; he may perceive a dagger and, observing
that it appears
transparent and wave-like, conclude that it’s not really
present.
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To this we reply that Jones siirely can perceive that something in
his visual field fails to exist; but when he does he simply perceives
that something he perceives fails to exist. He perceives that
something fails to exist, and this something is just one of the things
he perceives. Iherefore, one of the things perceived by Jones is
perceived by Jones not to exist. And this is easily symbolized as
’Perceives-(Ey)((Ex)(x=y) A Perceives (Ex)(x=y))', a formiila vihich,
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unlike (3 x)(Perceives -(Ey) (x=y) ) ’ , is perfectly consistent.
So far we have argued that formulas of the form ’(9 x) (Perceives
b=x)* are (i) Einployed by Hintikka to capture English direct-object
constructions, and (ii) Can be reduced to formulas which do not
contain occurrences of perceptual quantifiers. From this vre
cannot, however, conclude that all formulas employed by Hintikka
to capture direct-object constructions can be reduced to formulas
lacking perceptual quantifiers without knowing in addition that
(iii) Form\ilas of the form » (3 x) (Perceives b=x)' are the only
formulas employed by Hintikka to capture direct-object constructions.
And v/e shall now discover surprisingly that (iii) is actually false.
The truth of the matter is that Hintikka makes a distinction
in both of his papers between two senses of the English sentence
’’Jones perceives b". In OLP the two senses are described as follows:
According to one sense of ’’Jones perceives b” Jones perceives ’’the
individual in question”, while according to the second Jones perceives
b ’’whoever he is or may be”; the first is symbolized by Hintikka as
I
( ^ x) (Perceives b=x)’ and the second as *(3 x)(o=x &
Perceives (Ey)
(x^y))'. Suppose we let »b» be short for ’the man on the horizon
carrying a flag’. Then by saying ’’Jones perceives b” we may
be
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saying either of two things. First, we may be saying that Jones
perceives that there’s something on the horizon, that it’s a man,
and that he’s carrying a flag; this is the stronger sense of "Jones
perceives b" and is expressed by ’(,5 x) (Perceives b=x)’. Bnt according
to the weaker sense of "Jones perceives b", Jones perceives only
that the individual, who in fact is b, exists. He perceives some-
thing but fails to perceive either that it’ s a man, it’ s on the
horizon, or that it’s carrying a flag; this weaker sense is expressed
by ’(^x)(b=x & Perceives(Ey) (x=y) )’ . He perceives b but fails to
perceive that vrfiat he perceives is b. In ICLP Hintikka refers to
this distinction as a "contrast between statements 6b dicto and 6b
re" ; on the ^ dicto reading of "Jones perceives b" Jones perceives
that what he perceives is in fact b, i-riiile on the ^ re reading
Jones simply perceives an individual which happens to be b.
The upshot of this distinction is that, ^-Thile Hintikka employs
formulas of the form ’ (3 x) (Perceives b=x)’ to give formal ex-
pression to sentences of the form "Jones perceives b", it is not tx*ue
that formulas of the form ’(3 x) (Perceives b=x)’ are the only formulas
employed in this capacity. In particular, the ^ re reading of "Jones
perceives b" is captured instead by a formula in which variables bound
by a perceptual quantifier occur both within end in.thout the scope of
the epistemic operator. And so far we have shown nothing to the
effect that formulas such as these can be reduced to formulas which
contain only ordinary quantifiers. Therefore, we have not really
shovm at all that perceptual quantifiers are not required to give
formal expression to sentences of the form "Jones perceives b". We
have shown that perceptual quantifiers are not required to express
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fomally direct-object constructions, provided they are given a
de dicto reading. It may still well be the case that, given a de re
reading, sentences containing such constructions really do require
the powerfiil resources of quantifiers ranging over intensions.
I shall now state q\iite categorically that, so far as I can
see, formulas of the form *(3 x)(Ax <§: Perceives Bx)' really cannot
in general be reduced to formulas in viiich perceptual quantifiers are
eliminated. Therefore, the ^ re sense of sentences of the form
"Jones perceives b" does indeed seem to require the use of perceptual
quantifiers in order to be formally expressed. Nevertheless, in the
remainder of this section I shall argue that formulas of the form
'(3 x)(Ax & Perceives Bx)' t\irn out on Hintikka' s approach to bring
with them certain difficulties of interpretation; they turn out to
defy any sort of clear interpretation (relative to possible viorlds)
required to understand what they assert. Hence we shall conclude that
the formal expression of direct-object constructions is not an advan-
tage gained by the addition of perceptual quantifiers. On one reading
of such constructions the quantifiers appear unnecessary, and on the
other reading the quantifiers are employed in a vray that fails to
make clear sense relative to a possible worlds interpretation of
the formulas in which they appear.
We begin by asking precisely what formulas of the form ' ( 3 x)
(Ax & Perceives Bx)
'
are supposed to assert (where we assume there are
no occurrences of 'Perceives' in 'A'). The answer, presumably, is
that '(3 x)(Ax & Perceives Bx)' asserts that there is a perceptual
individual which (i) Picks out of each compatible world some member of
that world's domain which satisfies 'Bx' in that v/orld, and (ii)
Picks
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from the actual world something satisfying 'Ax’ in the actual world.
The formula asserts that, in other words, something perceived by Jones
to be B is as a matter of fact A. VJhat could possibly be problematic
in interpreting a formiila such as this one?
The problem arises entirely out of the failure of Hintikka’
s
complete novels to be governed by reflexivity. Since it is not always
the case that the actual world numbers among its ovm alternatives (that
is, is not always compatible with itself), it t\ims out that a per-
ceptual individual making assignments in the manner required by
’(3 x)(Ax & Perceives Bx)’ forces us to violate the rule that per-
ceptual individuals never extend further than the set of compatible
worlds. Of course, there is nothing sacred about this rule; but
by extending itself to the actual world even when it fails to be one
of the compatible worlds, the perceptual individual is forced to
choose something in the actual world. And this does cause problems;
for when the actual world is not one of its own alternatives it is
often extremely difficult to see what, if anything, this something
is to be.
Consider the sentence, "What Jones perceives to be a fat man
in front of him is really not a man at all." Letting * (3 x) ((Perceives
(FMx & Fx)) & -Mx)' be the formal expression of this sentence, it is
clear that we are face to face with a difficult puzzle. It is easy
to trace the perceptual world line through the set of compatible worlds;
we simply pick up whoever happens at each world to be the fat man in
front of Jones. But at the actual world there is no such man, and
yet we are required to choose something. What, therefore, are we to
choose? And how can we draw up a criterion according to which we
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can in any given situation decide which element of the actual world
is the value of the perceptual individual at the actual world?
Hintikka realizes this difficulty and offers the following
solution. Suppose we let w be the actual world.
How then do we cross-identify between w and its al-
ternatives? This question is crucial for the truth-
conditions for such propositions as (3 x)(x=d &
Perceives x=c).
The trans vrorld heir lines which are (go together
with) values of ’x’ here must be extended to the
actual world in order for us to be able to say, as
we are attempting to do in Cthe above formula!]
,
that in the actual world one of them is (picks out)
d. From this we can see what the problem is in-
tuitively. The question concerns the principles
according to which vje say that one of a' s perceptual
objects is or is not identical with an object in the
actual world... The ‘trans world heir lines’ con-
necting these several worlds are as it were dra^-na
differently when it comes to connect the actual world
with its perceptual alternatives than v;hen it is re-
quired to weave together these alternatives. Since
these world lines are involved essentially with the
truth-conditions of quantified statements, it is seen
that the truth-conditions of statements in which one
quantifies both into a perceptual context and outside
it (thus requiring the alternatives to be compared
with the actual world) involve considerations es-
sentially disparate from those involved in the truth-
conditions for statements in v?hich one merely quan-
tifies in. The former turn also on causal consider-
ations. ... Grice. . .registers some of the difficulties
in spelling out precisely what the causal connection
is which has to obtain betvjeen one of a' s perceptual
objects and an actual object in his environment before
we can tie them together with the same world line.
It seems to me that the problem of giving a precise
characterization of this connection is due more to
general difficulties in analyzing causal notions than
to the special features of causal connections relied on
in perception.
Consider once again the sentence, "I^/hat Jones perceives to be a fat
man in front of him is not a man at all”. The problem is to determine
which object in the actual world is picked out be the perceptual
individual, there being no fat man in front of Jones in the actual
2?
world. Hintikka’ s solution is to determine vihat exactly in w caused
Jones to perceive a fat man and simply tie the loose end of the world
line to it. If it' s a large stump, then the world line extends to
the stump. And surely there is something reasonable about this; if
a stump really caused Jones to perceive a fat man, then we'd be
inclined to say that what he perceives is really not a fat man but
rather a stump. In other vzords, '(3 x) ( (Perceive s(FI'Ix & Fx)) & x is
a stmp)' seems agreeable. The stump is part of the same v7orld line
that picks out fat men in each compatible vjorld. If nothing more,
all of this accords remarkably well viith our ordinary perceptual talk.
Hintikka' s solution is intuitively appealing, but how might
all of this be captured in the formal semantics? Hovx can we analyze
this causal connection needed to join the actual world to its alter-
natives? Hintikka certainly leaves us in the dark here; he speaks of
the "difficulties in analyzing causal notions" and seems to regard
them lightly as though an exact characterization of a semantics for
'Perceives' is no longer his concern.
Yet there really seems to be no way to take Hintikka' s solution
seriously until we can analyze the notion, 'x causes y to perceive
that p' in terras formally specifiable in Hintikka' s system. Obviously,
the prospects of cooking up such an analysis are not encouraging. But
notice that even if x^e are able to find an analysis of 'x causes y to
perceive that p' vje are still hard pressed to account for hallucina-
tions. There are times, it would seem, that no actually existing
object can be cited as the cause for Jones's perceiving certain things
to be the case (excepting, of course, indirect causes such as
alcohol).
Thus, the sentence "What Jones perceives to be a mountain
lion is
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actually nothing at all" would resist the type of treatment
Hintikka offers.
By all indications, therefore, it seems that Hintikka’
s
system (by virtue of lacking reflexivity) is incapable of providing
a satisfactory, intuitive possible worlds interpretation for
formulas of the form ’(3x)(Ax & Perceives Bx)’. There simply are
no clear guidelines for deciding the value of the perceptual indi-
vidual at the actual world. Permitting perceptual individuals to
extend beyond the safety of the set of compatible vrarlds creates
nothing but chaos in the formal semantics.
We conclude that it is not at all clear vhat, with a particu-
lar possible worlds interpretation in mind, formulas of the form
* (9 x)(Ax & Perceives Bx)' are supposed to assert. While we can
develop clear intuitions as to what is asserted by '(9 x) (Perceives
Ax)' by studying its truth-conditions relative to a possible worlds
interpretation, we can do nothing analogous in the case of '(3x)
(Ax & Perceives Bx)'. Thus, while there is potentially much to be
gained by formally rendering certain English constnictions by
formulas of the form '(^ x) (Perceives Ax)', there seems to be
little or no point in doing the same with ' (^ x)(Ax & Perceives
Bx)' as long as reflexivity fails to hold. ^ re direct object
constructions may not be adequately handled in a system vri.thout
perceptual quantifiers, but there is certainly nothing to be gained
by dealing with them in a system with the extra quantifiers in such
a way that a perceptual quantifier is forced to bind variables
occurring both within and without the scope of the epistemic operator.
The difficulties with ’(^x)(Ax<S: Perceives Bx)', incidentally.
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do not arise vrith formulas of the form ’(Ex) (Ax & Perceives Bx)*,
With ‘(Ex) (Ax & Perceives Bx)‘ we are guaranteed the existence in
the actual world of the individual^ picked out by the physical
individual at the actual world (something we are not guaranteed with
* (Ex) (Perceives Ax)’, as we pointed out earlier). Thus, if there is
an actual flesh-and-blood person with respect to whom Jones perceives
that he B’ s, and if as a matter of fact this person A's, then no
matter what vre fill in for ’A’ or ’B', still we are guaranteed someone
in the actual world to which we tie the loose end of the world line,
reflexivity or no reflexivity. V^e can take hold of this flesh-and-
blood person and say of him that is the person of whom Jones per-
ceives that he B’s. And v/e have no trouble finding this flesh-and-
blood person or mistaking vriio this person is. By the very nature
of physical individuation Jones perceives who he is, vjhich
individual^^ in the domain of the actual world he is. We do not
have to fuss with finding whatever physical thing (if any) happened
to cause Jones’ s various perceptions.
We discovered earlier that an important subclass of formulas
containing perceptual quantifiers — those where * (iJ x)’ binds variables
occurring strictly within the scope of ’Perceives’ — can be reduced to
formulas lacking perceptual quantifiers. A reduction of this sort
naturally raises the question wiriether further reductions of percep-
tually quantified formulas may be made. Most exciting of all perhaps
is the question whether perceptual quantifiers can be done away
vath
altogether in favor of ordinary quantifiers alone, and whether
be said in the language of Hintikka’ s systemeverything that can
30
oil
could be said without employing the extra quantifiers. In the final
section we shall explore the question of formal expressibility and
point to some specific instances viiere the new quantifiers really
do seem to add to vjhat can be said in Hintikka’s system.
In his paper ‘Reply' Romane Clark has a good deal to say about
what he calls "Hintikka' s double quantifier theory". It is ostensibly
Clark's view that the perceptual quantifiers can be altogether
eliminated from the system; he writes that the standard quantifier
is "apparently adequate to the distinctions Hintikka wishes to
25draw" and goes on to suggest in rx>ugh fashion how in a certain number
of instances this is the case. It is my belief, however, that wore
Clark to attempt to offer a completely general account, he would
discover that there really are distinctions which can be made only
by means of employing two sets of quantifiers.
Consider first the set of formulas in which a perceptual
quantifier is directly followed by an ordinary quantifier of the
opposite sort (* ...(^x)(y)...' and ' . .
. ( V x) (Ey) . . . ' ), both binding
variables occurring within (but not without) the scope of 'Perceives'.
We take this set to include all formulas equivalent to ' . . . (3 x) (y) . . .
'
and » ...( \/x)(Ey)...' constructions (' ...-(^x)-(Ey)...' , etc.). Let
us refer to formulas belonging to this set as "P-formulas". It
shall then be my first contention that P-form\alas cannot be reduced
to formulas which contain no occ\irrences of perceptual quantifiers.
Suppose Jones perceives a number of people standing \uider a
bridge. Each of the people is such that Jones perceives who he is,
but suppose he fails to perceive what it is they are standing under.
All he perceives is that a group of persons, each of which he recognizes.
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is standing under a structure of some sort. Then there is a per-
ceptual individual x such that for any physical individual y which
picks up a person at the actual world, Jones perceives that x is
over y. This we symbolize by the P-formula ’(3x)(y)(y is a person
Perceives(x is over y))' (for simplicity let’s just consider ’(3x)
(y) (Perceives (x is over y))’).
It is my belief that '(5 x) (y) (Perceives(x is over y))’ cannot
be rewritten in terms of ordinary quantifiers. Ihe formula '(Ex)
(y)(Perceives(x is over y))', for example, makes the bridge a physical
individual which by hypothesis it is not; it says, in other words,
that Jones knows what it is the people are standing under. This
particular difficulty may be remedied by trying something like ' (y)
(Percoives(Ex) (x is over y))’, but this formula allows for the
possibility that over each person there appears a struct’ore but
that there are different structures appearing over different people.
Finally, ’ Perceives(Ex) (y) (x is over y)' fails to report that each
person in the crowd is perceptually recognized by Jones.
The problem, crudely put, is this. In order to guarantee
that persons in Jones’s perceptual field are physically individuated
objects, the '(y)’ must remain outside the modal operator and bind
free variables occurring within. And to guarantee that the bridge is
not a physically individuated object, the ’(Ex)’ must occur inside the
modal operator. But to preserve the sense of the original formula it
is necessary that ’(Ex)' precede ’(y)’» It’s hard to see how all of
this can be done at once, and so quantifying over perceptual
individuals does seem unavoidable to capture what needs to be said
here. The perceptual quantifier seems to get trapped outside ordinary
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quantifiers in cases such as these, and once they are trapped in
this way they cannot be eliminated. The situation is the same in
the case of all P-formulas.
Consider next the class of fonnulas in which a universal per-
ceptual quantifier binds variables occurring within but not without
the scope of * Perceives’. Suppose we refer to this class as the
class of "0-fonnulas" (and include ’ . . .-(9 x)-. . . ’ constructions, etc.).
It shall then be my second claim that Q-formulas too contain per-
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ceptual quantifiers v;hich cannot be translated out.
Suppose that Jones visits a brickworks and that everything on
which he lays eyes is covered with orange dust. Tnen to say in the
language of Hintikka’s system the English sentence, "Everj'thing per-
ceived by Jones is perceived by Jones to be orange", \ie simply
employ the Q-formula ’ ( x) (Perceives(x is orange))'. Novr it may
seem like an easy move from ' ( V x)(Perceives(x is orange))' to the
formula 'Perceives(x) (x is orange)' in the same way vje argued
earlier that *(3 x)(Perceives Ax)' can be reduced to 'Perceives(Ex)
(Ax)'. Yet this is certainly not the case.
According to ' ( V x)(Perceives(x is orange))', every perceptual
individual assigns to every compatible world w something in the
domain of w v:hich satisfies 'x is orange* (in w). But although
' Perceive s(x) (x is orange)' also guarantees that everj’’ member of every
compatible world w chosen by a perceptual individual satisiies 'x is
orange' in vj, it says more. It guarantees in addition that those members
of any compatible irorld w which are not chosen by any perceptual
individual also satisfy 'x is orange' in w. Thus, 'Perceives(x)(x is
orange)' virtually implies '(V x) (Perceives(x is orange))', but the
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reverse does not hold. Everything Jones perceives he perceives to be
orange, but Jones certainly does not perceive that evei^hinr^ is
orange; he does not perceive, for example, that his parents (back
home in Ohio) are orange. It's compatible vri.th eveiything he
presently perceives that his parents are not orange. And so 'Per-
ceives(x)(x is orange))' is much to strong. V/e want only to assert
that the things he perceives are perceived to be orange.
The remedy seems clear. Find an antecedent 'Ax' to insert
within the scope of '(x)' in 'Perceives(x)(x is orange))' (yielding
'Perceives(x) (Ax->x is orange)') which simply asserts that Jones
perceives x. Then instead of saying that Jones perceives that
everything is orange we'll be saying that Jones perceives that only
a certain number of things are orange, namely the things he per-
2.3
ceives, and this is presumably idiat we want. To follow through on
this suggestion we might try something like 'Perceives(x) (Perceives
(x=x)-?x is orange)' or else ' Perceives(x) (Perceives(Ey) (x=y)->x
is orange)'. \'fi.ll either of these do the trick?
Unfort\mately not. For we now have a situation vxhere an
ordinary quantifier binds variables occurring within the scope of an
occurrence of 'Perceives', and this means that we are suddenly now
dealing with physical individuals. * Perceive s(x) (Perceive s(x=x)-^ x
is orange)' does not say that Jones perceives that everything he
perceives is orange; rather, it says that Jones perceives that
everything he perceptually recognizes is orange. And now vxe have
something vxhich is too weak , for presumably there are plenty of
people at the brickworks Jones perceives but fails to recognize
(he does not perceive who they all are). So we still haven't been
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able to find a way to symbolize what we set out to symbolize without
making use of the perceptual quantifier '(V x)».
Formally speaking, the difficulty is this. A Q-formula involves
talking about a system of worldlines each of v;hich vreaves its way
through the set of compatible worlds. Now since there are individuals^
in each compatible world v/hich may be untouched by these lines, we
must find some way to disting\iish between the individuals^^ of a
given world that are picked up by a perceptual individual and the
individuals^ vihich are not. This is essentially what we tried to do
by specifying the antecedent ’Ax’ in ’Perceives(x)(Ax->x is orange)’.
Hoviever, there does not seem to be a way to symbolize ’Ax’.
And so we conclude that Q-formulas too are really irreducible to
formulas in the language of ordinary quantifiers. VJhen we want to talk
about a vrtiole group of perceived individuals at once we really seem
to require the resources of Hintikka’ s new quantifiers. In this way,
the same as with P-formulas, the quantifiers do appear to increase the
expressibility of Hintikka’ s system. The value of employing per-
ceptual quantifiers does not seem to lie, as Hintikka believes, in
the expression of direct-object constructions. But in order to
formally captvire those English sentences whose symbolizations are
either P-formulas or Q-formulas, the new quantifiers appear to be
impossible to eliminate.
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FOOTNOTES
^Hintikka, ’On the Logic of Perception', p. 143,
2As Hintikka puts it, "...to specify what someone, say a, perceives isto desc^be v;hat the world is like according to his perceptions.Since these perceptions do not fix the world uniquely, this descrip-lon IS logically speaking not unlike a disjunction of several
alteratives concerning the world, 'fhe most systematic way ofgelling out th^e several alternatives is to make each of them aslull a description of the woi'ld as we can give by means of the
rsourer we are using. Sxvitching to an obvious semantical jargon.It IS obvious that what such maidmal (consistent) descriptions
describe is a possible world." Hintikka, 'Information, Causality,
and the Logic of Perception'
,
p. 4,
q
r model set w' can be said to be compatible with a model set w justin case w' is compatible vo.th everything Jones perceives in w.
'Information, Causality, and the Logic of Perception'.
p. 14.
^^fcat we say about ’( 3 x)' and '(\/x)' is not intended to bear upont^ similar role these quantifiers play in a semantics for 'Knows'
Hintikka has suggested in recent years (see chapter 3 ),
^e assume as given rules governing non-modal formulas. For these
see Knowledge and Belief (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, I962 ).
"^See Hintikka, 'Reply', pp. 194-196 .
%intikka, 'The Semantics of Modal Notions and the Indeterminacy
of Ontology', p. 409; pp* 410-411; 'Objects of Knowledge and Belief,
p. 870 .
^Of course, worlds are not strictly speaking a part of Hintikka'
s
system, but vrfiat this comes to in tenns of complete novels is obvious.
^^Hintikka, 'Information, Causality, and the Logic of Perception',
pp. 4-5.
^%intikka, 'On the Logic of Perception', pp. 162-163; Hintikka,
'Infoimiation, Causality, and the Logic of Perception, pp. 10-11.
^^intikka, 'On the Logic of Perception', p. I63 . Nothing so far
guarantees the presence in the model structvire of every complete
novel vrfiich (relative to a given language) can be formed. Hox^rever,
Hintikka seems clearly to assume that this guarantee holds ("to
specify vrfiat a perceives is to specify the set of all possible worlds
compatible with his perceptions", 'Information, Causality, and the
Logic of Perception, p. 4). To avoid confusion let us say of a model
structure that it'
s
"W-complete" just in case the set V/ of complete
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novels it contains is maximal in this respect. Only now are \re
justified in asserting that there really is a compatible vjorld in
which Tittle is the man in front of Jones.
^%intikka,
^^Hintikka,
p. 9«
'On the Logic of Perception', p. I63 .
'Information, Causality, and the Logic of Perception',
^%bid
.. p. 11.
^^intikka, 'On the Logic of Perception', p. I66 .
Clark, 'Comments', p. I80 .
1 ft formala ' virtually implies' another in a Hintikka-type semantics
just in case their conditional is 'self-sustaining'. A formula is
'self-sustaining' just in case it belongs to every model set.
Two formulas whose biconditional is self-sustaining are 'virtually
equivalent'. A formula is 'indefensible' just in case it belongs
to no model set. We shall employ this terminology throughout the
dissertation.
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This accords well with Montague's treatment of 'seems to see'. The
sentence "Jones seems to see a unicorn" is translated into the formal
language vjith an operator 'seems' binding the clause 'there exists a
unicorn...'. ('On the Nature of Certain Philosophical Entities',
p. 179 )
^^ant, A Critique of Pure Reason , p. 303»
^Terry Parsons has suggested there still might be problems vjith
sentences like "Jones perceives that there is something moving" in
connection with the recently expressed belief of some scientists that
visual perception of movement operates independently of visual
perception in general. I have no idea what to say about cases such
as these.
^^This formula too would be inconsistent were the relation R in
Hintikka's system to be transitive and reflexive.
^\intikka, 'Information, Causality, and the Logic of Perception',
pp. 15-lS*
^^We speculated that formulas of the form '(5 x)(Ax & Perceives Bx)'
resist the sort of reduction which eliminates '(3x)', and we may
certainly be right. Yet these formulas are incapable of providing a
satisfactory formal reading for English sentences, as we have seen,
and so it may still well be the case that Hintikka's new quantifiers
fail to increase the expressibility of Hintikka's system in any
profitable way.
^^Clark, cit ., p. 184.
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As Thomason points out, "It is not possible to eliminate the
quantifications of
^
a many-individuated logic in favor of predicates
and a single quantifier," Thomason, ‘Perception and Individuation*
p. 279.
27Notice that the class of P-formvilas and the class of Q-formulas
are not mutually exclusive.
28
T^here as a minor difficulty here that we shall ignore. There is
a difference between (i) Jones’s perceiving that ^at he perceives
is F, and (ii) What Jones perceives being such that Jones perceives
it to be F. What Jones perceives might well be different from
what he perceives that he perceives since R is not transitive and
not reflexive. Since the suggestion fails for other reasons we’ll
pass over this difficulty.
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CHAPTER II
A formal semantics for the Logic of Perception bearing con-
siderable similarity to Hintikka’ s system is proposed by Richmond
Thomason in his recent study ’Perception and Individuation’. Like
Hintikka’ s two papers on the Logic of Perception, ’Perception and
Individuation’ leaves many details of the formal semantics un-
specified and makes only the barest mention of such crucial issues
as quantifying in and the construction of world lines. Yet the
system that does emerge is a fascinating varient of the model set
theoretic semantics for perception Hintikka has proposed. In this
chapter Thomason’s semantics for perception (which we’ll refer to
as ”T”) will be presented and discussed, with particular attention
paid to the ways in which it differs from Hintikka’ s system and the
desirability or undesirability of these novel features.
* *
It will perhaps be easiest to approach Thomason’s paper by
beginning with some remarks of an informal nature and then preceding
to a detailed presentation of the formal semantics. This preliminary
discussion can be divided into a series of informal remarks.
1, General structure of T . We have seen that Hintikka' s semantics
for perception is based upon the notion of a model structure con-
sisting of model sets. Something was perceived to be true
just in
case it turned out to be a member of every compatible complete
novel.
With T the situation is different; model sets and complete
novels
play no part in the system. Rather than defining truth in
terms of
set membership and rules of deduction in terms of
simultaneous
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satisfaction, Thomason employs a valuation function which maps well-
formed fomulas to truth-values. In particular, formulas are mapped
to truth-values relative to possible worlds, or "situations" as
Thomason more frequently calls them. Formulas are true relative to
situations.
Nothing in the way of a radical departure from Hintikka-type
semantics seems to hang on this structural feature. Situations bear
the compatibility relation to one another and (like Hintikka's complete
novels) give us the means to tell what an agent perceives in a given
state of affairs. To find out, we simply observe which, of all the
situations there could be, are compatible and which are not.
2. The modal operator . The modal operator employed in T constitutes
a slight point of departure from Hintikka (although we shall later
discover that the point of departure is not as slight as it first
appears). Thomason confines his semantics to visual perception and
adopts the notion of * seeing that’ as the fundamental perceptual
concept in T. An agent ’sees that’ such-and-such is the case if
and only if such-and-such is the case in every compatible situation
(or possible world). The letter "S" is taken to be the modal
operator designating the locution ’ sees that’
.
Thomason nowhere employs the use of subscripts identifying
agents. Nor does he introduce more than a single compatibility
relation between situations. And hence it looks as though T is a
system whose concern is that which a single agent visually perceives.
To capture what each of two agents visually perceives two compati-
bility relations are required to distinguish exactly v;hich states of
affairs (since they shall differ) are compatible with what each perceives.
4o
3 - Deductive closure . A feature shared in common by T and
Hintikka' s system (perhaps an xanfortunate one) is this; As a result
of the general strategy employed in the semantics, every logical
consequence of what is perceived turns out itself to be perceived.
This may easily be shovm as follows. Let ’A’ and »B’ be well-
formed formulas. ’Jones sees that A’ is true if and only if ’A’ is
true in every situation compatible with everything Jones sees. But
suppose ’A' logically entails ’B’. then 'B' is true in every situ-
ation logically compatible vn.th everything Jones sees; othei^vdse in
some possible world ’A’ is true and ’B' false, which is impossible.
But if ’B’ is true in every compatible situation, it follows that
Jones sees that B.
This phenomenon has been a much-criticized feature of Hintikka-
type semantics. But it is admittedly a feature which is not nearly
as objectionable in a semantics for perception as in a semantics
for knowledge or for belief. To say that a man knows the logical
consequences of everything he knows, or believes the logical conse-
quences of everything he believes seems more objectionable than to
say a man perceives the logical consequences of vhat he perceives.
Perceiving logical consequences does not seem to involve the extent
of mental effort or calculation required to knovr or believe logical
consequences. At any rate, deductive closure is a phenomenon which
occurs in T as well as Hintikka’ s various semantics for propositional
attitudes.
4, Direct-object constructions. Like Hintikka, English direct-
object constructions (like "Schvzartz sees the footstool") are
handled by Thomason in terms of the propositional ’seeing that’
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construction. Also like Hintikka, they are eventually found to be
capable of ambiguity. In one sense Jones can be said to see an
alligator only if he sees that the object he sees is an alligator;
but in a weaker sense Jones sees an alligator \jhen he sees something
(that turns out to be an alligator) but does not see that it’s an
aligator. These seem to correspond (respectively) to Hintikka’
s
de dicto and ^ re types of direct-object constructions. However,
as we shall see later, the formal treatments of these two construc-
tions in T differ significantly from Hintikka’ s distinction between
'( 3 x) (Perceives b=x)’ and ’(3x)(b=x& Perceives(Ey)(y=x))’
.
5 . Constraints on the compatibility relation . Perhaps the most
striking feature found in T which is absent in Hintikka’ s Logic of
Perception is the introduction of a compatibility relation R which
is both reflexive and transitive. As far as transitivity goes,
Thomason has no strong feelings. He makes R transitive only
"provisionally", claiming that "there are few intuitive resources
to mobilize in resolving the question vhether this is desirable
or not". The reflexivity of R, on the other hand, appears to be
a more serious matter.
We’re asking vhether seeing s-that are always suc-
cessful, so that if SA is true then A is true. As
long as vre don’t confuse ’seeing that’ with
’seeming’, English usage supports a positive an-
swer to this question; one can’t see that a thing
is so without it actually being so. If someone
claims that he sees that there are pumpkins in
the field, he will be forced to withdraw this
claim once he has been shoT-m that there aren’t
pumpkins in the field. In this respect ’sees that’
resembles ’knows that’, ’realizes that’, ’is
surprised that’, and ’forgets that’.
It will be valid to conclude in T, therefore, that whenever
an agent sees that such-and-such is the case, such-and-such
is
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indeed the case. The actual world is guaranteed to be compatible
with itself. And by transitivity it turns out that whenever an
agent sees that such-and-such is the case, then he sees that he
sees that such-and-such is the case.^ Together these conditions
insure the equivalence in T of 'S(A)’ and >SS(A)’, for any well-
formed formula ’A’.
6. Perceptual individuation and perceptual domains . The most
significant feature of all which Thomason’ s semantics for percep-
tion shares in common with Hintikka' s is the presence of two inde-
pendent methods of individuating what is perceived by the agent in
question. There are objects which are physically individuated, and
there are objects which are perceptually individuated (as with
Hintikka, an object b is physically individuated for Jones just in
case Jones percept\ially recognizes b). And corresponding to these
two methods of individuation are two kinds of quantifiers, physical
quantifiers and perceptual quantifiers. Notationally, Thomason
writes an existential perceptually quantified formula as
^(3^) Q^’ (where variables are Greek letters) and an existential
physically quantified formula as ’(9 x) Qx’ (where variables are
Roman letters). For the sake of simplicity, however, we shall
throughout use Hintikka’ s symbols for quantifiers and thereby hope
to avoid confusion in comparing the systems.
The two methods of cross-identifying individuals from world to
world nevertheless take on an added complication in T. Each situation
(world) has not one, but two domains of individuals (or "individuals^^"
as \je called them in Chapter One); A domain of physical individuals^^
and a domain of perceptual individuals^. There are two modes of
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existence in T; something can exist physically in a situation w, or
it can exist visually. The Buckingham Fountain, for example,
exists physically in the actual world, vriiile the Fountain of Youth
does not. Yet the latter may very easily become a visual object
(i.e,
,
perceptual individualx) in the actual world. It often
happens, of course, that a given individual may at the same time be
both a physical and visual object in the same situation. Yet each
domain is independent from the other; some objects may be physical
but not visual objects, and some visual objects may fail to be physical
objects. As we shaill see later, some interesting difficulties stem
from this distinction between modes of existence, difficulties which
do not arise in Hintikka’s semantics for perception.
It might appear at this point as though Thomason’s semantics
for perception, by virtue of distinguishing physical and visual
objects in each situation, will turn out to be suspiciously suggestive
of a sense-datum theory. This impression is strongly encoiiraged by
passages like the follovring:
In a way MacBeth sees something — he has an impres-
sion of a dagger — and yet there is no physical
object with which the dagger can be identified. Here
it’ s plausible to say that MacBeth sees the dagger, so
thatC ’(5 x)(x=b)’J will be true, but to deny that
the dagger is to be identified vath any physical
object, so that C
’
(Sx)(x=b)’J will be false.
^
Whereas Hintikka’ s semantics vath its perceptual individuals
(individuals2 ) mapping worlds to individuals^^ may have
looked to a
certain extent (as Hintikka himself admits) like a sense-datum theory,
there was nothing in the way of "dual domains" in each v^orld. T,
on the other hand, looks as though visual sense-data are part of the
furniture of each situation, functions or no functions. MacBeth’
s
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dagger just sits in the actual world, as much a member of the visual
domain as MacBeth himself is a member of the physical domain.
Thomason, in section VIII of his paper, readily agrees that his
may be regarded as a sense-datum theory but not in what he calls the
'•strong sense”. To be a sense-datum theory in the strong sense T
must be able to capture the validity of ’ (x) (Y y) (x^y) ' . In every
situation in every model structure it must turn out that nothing
qualifies simultaneously as a physical object and visual object.
But, as we‘ve already seen, ’ (x)( V y)(x^y)’ is not valid in T;
hence, if T is a sense-datum theory at all, it is one only in an
innocent sense,
?• The nature of perceptually individuated objects . World lines
are formed in T as they are in Hintikka's system. Thomason describes
them as "rules” which assign to each situation a member of the
viniversal domain ' D* . D is defined as the union of all objects,
physical or visual, found in any situation in the model structure
(D may even — if it seems desirable — contain individuals^ which
do not exist in any situation). The member of D assigned to some
situation a by some v/orld line is said to be the "perspective pre-
sented by the Cvrorld linej
,
viewed from the situation a”.-^ A vrorld
line d may assign to a situation a any member of D whatever, but for
d to be a physically individuated object the actual situation must
be assigned a member of its physical domain, and for d to be a
perceptually individuated object the actual situation must be assigned
a member of its visual domain. Mo such restrictions, hovjever, apply to
situations other than the actual one. We'll examine this interesting
feature shortly.
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Physical and perceptual cross-identification over situations
comprise vihat Thomason calls the tvjo "modes of individuation". We
shall refer to the modes of individuation as "n" and "m", for the
physical and perceptual modes, respectively (Thomason uses the Greek
letters "nu" and "mu"). Formally speaking, the modes of individuation
are classes whose members are the set of world lines which qualify
as individuals^* Thus, m is the set of all and only perceptual
individuals^ and n is the set of all and only physical individuals^* V/e
then refer to the physical domain of a situation a as ’ and the
visual domain of a as ’ . D itself may then be formally defined
U m n
as U ^a where "K" denotes the set of situations in
the model structure.
We are now ready to offer a formal specification of T. The
perceptual model structure consists of a septuple <^K, R, D'^, D^, m, n,
of elements. We have had occasion already to introduce most of
these elements. K is the set of situations, R is a two-place
compatibility relation taking situations as arguments, and m and n are
the modes of individuation (sets of world lines). V/e let and
name functions which map to each situation its visual and
physical domains, respectively. And ’V’, finally, names a function
>jhich assigns values to individual variables and constants and
truth-values to well-formed formulas.
Almost nothing is said of the assignments made by V. It is
not clear, for example, how truth-values come to be assigned to atomic
foimulas.^ The only truth-value assignments specified are the
assignments to quantified formulas. Once again using Hintikka's
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notation, these quantifier rules for T come to the follovTing;
Va((Vx)(Ax)) = T if and only if (V^/x)a(A) = T
for all d belonging to m, such that d(a) belongs to tP(a)
Va((x)(Ax)) = T if and only if (V^/x)^(A) = T
for all d belonging to n, such that d(a) belongs to C^(a).
Here we let the expression "V^/x" denote the function which is exactly
like V except for the assignment of d to x« And "d(a)" stands for
the member of U assigned a situation a by the world line d.
What these rules say intuitively is this. A perceptual
universally quantified formula '(Vx)(Ax)’ is true in a situation a
just in case 'Ax' is satisfied by every world line which belongs to
the set m and which assigns to a a member of its visual domain. A
physically universally quantified formula '(x)(Ax)' is true in a
situation a just in case 'Ax' is satisfied by every world line
which belongs to n and which assigns to a a member of its physical
domain. From these rules we may immediately derive rules for the
existential quantifiers as follows;
V.((Ex)(Ax)) = T if and only if (V^/x)„(A) = T
for some d belonging to n, such that d(a) belong to d (a)
VJG x)(Ax)) = T if and only if (V^/x) (A) = T
for some d belonging to m, such that d(a) belongs to ET(a).
There is much that is interesting about these r\iles. In the
first place, the truth of a formula like ' (Ex)S(x=Smith) ' is dependent
not only upon the world line picking Smith out of each situation but
upon the presence of Smith in the actual world. In Hintikka'
s
7
semantics, we may recall, no such restriction was present. One
could perceive who an individual is even though no such individual of
4?
h&pponBd. "to ©xist in ths actna.! woi*l.d.» H©nc6 ths rules lor ordinaj^y
quantification in T are in an important way different from Hintikka's.
This difference, it should be noted, stands independent of reflexivity,
Hintikka’ s system could lack the restriction even with the reflexivity
feature added.
Interesting too is the absence (-vrfriich we alluded to earlier) of
a requirement that the world line pick from each situation (over which
it's defined) a member from a specified domain in that situation.
For example, the formula ' (Ex)S(x=Smith) ' is true in a if and only
if there is a world line d which (i) Satisfies 'S(x=Smith)'
,
(ii)
Is a member of n, and (iii) Assigns a a member of it's physical domain.
But there's no req\:d.rement to the effect that d pick out from each
situation a member of its physical domain. Only in a must Smith be a
physically existing object. Similarly, the world line vhich satisfies
'S(x=Smith)' vriien Smith is not perceptually recognized (namely, a
member of m) must assign a a member of its visual domain but may
conceivably assign other situations member of their physical domains.
Moving novr to a more detailed consideration of the modes of
individuation m and n, we find two rather fascinating requirements
concerning their membership (see 5*2 on page 272). Since Thomason
decides in the end to reject the second, we'll concentrate our attention
upon the first, viz . , no two members of the same mode of individuation
may assign to the same situation the same element of D. That is, if
a is a situation, and if dj_ and d£ are both elements of either m or
n, then if di^d2 , dj_(a)^d2(a) . "These objects," Thomason writes
in
reference to world lines in either m or n, "must be chosen systematically,
so that they do not intersect; two different objects of the same mode
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individuation cannot present the same perspective in the same situation.”®
IMs restriction is rather interesting and on the surface appears
to be quite reasonable. Suppose that Jones sees that two men are
standing in front of him but sees who neither man is. Suppose in
addition that it’ s compatible with everything he sees that either is
his father. Then in at least one compatible situation the one man is
his father, and in at least one compatible situation the other is his
father. But according to the restriction there is no situation in
vihich both are his father. In no situation are the two men identical,
and this result seems to square well vdth our intuitions.
As a matter of fact, the restriction Thomason introduces here is
a very strong one. Not only does it guarantee the validity of ’ (x)
(y) (3C=y -^S(x?=y) ) ’ and * ( V x) ( Vy) (x=y~;^S(x=y) )' in T, but much more
surprising, the validity of ’ (x) (y) (x/y-7S(x/y) ) ’ and ’(l^x)(l/y)
(x^y-7S(x^y) ) ' . We shall demonstrate informally the validity of each.
First, suppose ’-(x)(y)(x=y->S(x=y))’ is true in some situation a
(relative to some model structure "Ck, R, , iP
t
m, n, ). Then
» (Ex)(Ey)(x=y & -S(x=y))' is true in a. So Vg^((Ex)(Ex)(x=y & -S(x=y))
= T. And by t''.'ro applications of the quantifier rules, ((V ^/x) ^/y)a
((x=y & -S(x=y))) = T, for some d^^ and &2 in n, such that dj_(a) and
d (a) belong to l/^(a). But from this it follows that both ((V^^/x)
d-i do
®2/y) (x=y) = T and ((V ^/x) "^/y), (x?^y) = T, for some b such that Rab.
a b
But this violates the restriction that distinct world lines may not in-
tersect anywhere (as they do here in ^). Thus, ' (x)(y)(x=y->o(x=y))’
is val3.d. Tlie proof of the validity of ' (/x) ( j/y) (x=y'^S(x=y) ) ’
is nearly identical.
Now suppose ’(x)(y)(3q4y-oS(xj^y))’ is false in some situation a
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(relative to some model structure). Then V^((Ex)(Ey)(x?^y & -S(x^y)) =
T. So, like the above, ((v'^l/x)^2/y) ^ -S(x
5^y)) = T, for some d,i
and d^ in n, such that d^(a) and d^Ca) belong to D’^(a). But then
((V^^/x)^2/y)^(3^y) =: T and ((V'^l/x)^2/y)^(x=y) = T, for some b such
that Rab. And again Thomason's restriction is violated, Tito
distinct world lines merge when they reach b, and so we conclude that
'(x)(y)(x^y S(x/y))* is valid in T with the restriction added.
Likevdso, ' ( V x) ( \/y) (xj^y-^S(x^y) ) ' is valid.
The formulas ’ (x) (y) (x=y-^S(x=y) ) » and ' ( 1/ x) ( \/y) (x=y-^S(x=y) )
»
guarantee that no vrorld line may split when it extends from a world
to its alternatives. And the formulas ' (x) (y) (x^y-?S(x^y) ) ' and
' ( V x)( Vy)(^y~^S(x^y))
'
guarantee that no distinct pair of world
lines may merge when they extend from a vrorld line to its alternatives.
It is interesting to see what Hintikka has to say about this particu-
lar sort of phenomenon.
The structure formed by the relations of cross-vrorld iden-
tity may be so complex as to be indescribable by speaking
simply of partial identities betvroen the domains of
individuals of the different possible worlds. Above, it
was said that in the case of many propositional attitudes
an individual cannot ' split' when we move from a world
to its alternatives. Although this seems to me to be
the case vdth all propositional attitudes I have studied
in any detail, it is not quite clear to me precisely
why this should alv;ays be the case. At any rate, there
seems to be reasons for suspecting that the opposite
'irregiilarity' can occasionally take place v/ith some
modalities: individuals can 'merge' together when vro
move from a world to its alternatives.^
Starting with the no- splitting condition, vje find that in
Hintikka' s (revised) semantics for knowledge the formvJ.a '(x)(y)
(x=y-5>Knows(x=y))' is valid (self-sustaining).^^ But the no-merging
condition is provable in none of Hintikka' s systems. A Hintikka-
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type semantics having a symmetric compatibility relation as well
as a rule like
(Ex)Knows(b=x) w
(Ex)Knows(c=x) w
b=c ^ w
Knows (b=c) w
would suffice to capture the no-merging condition, but none of his
systems have symmetry. In a system with symmetry it turns out that
anything compatible with vrfiat is 5^ *d, where ^ is the propositional
attitude in question, is true; and to avoid this result symmetry is
never considered.
Merging is a phenomenon which, Hintikka believes, can occasion-
ally take place in semantics for propositional attitudes. By this
Hintikka appears to be saying that in actual situations (real-life
situations) a no-merging condition sometimes appears to be violated;
in knowledge, for example, it seems dubious to conclude that an
agent always knows that two individuals x and y are distinct just
in case (i) He knows who x is, (ii) He knows who y is, and (iii)
x^. And if the formal semantics for knowledge is to reflect
ordinary knowledge, it’
s
not clear that world lines should not be
allowed to merge.
What about perception? Is Thomason’s restriction going to be
at odds with ordinary perceptiial circ\imstances? Can a man see 1.^0 x is,
see who y is, and fail to see that x?^y when x and y are in fact
distinct? At first it seems as though this is impossible. If x and
y are both before Jones’ s ©yes, and if Jones sees who each is,
and
if X5^, it seems that Jones cannot possibly fail to see that they’re
distinct. But the matter is not quite so simple. As we shall see
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later, it is not the case in Thomason’s semantics that if Jones
sees who x is, Jones sees x. To see who a man is it is not necessary
for him to be present to your immediate senses, according to
Thomason, and from this fact it does begin to look as though the no-
merging restriction may be overly restrictive after all from the
point of view of ordinary perception. We shall return to this matter
in the next section.
Judging from what both Hintikka and Tnomason have to say about
physically individuated objects (namely, that to be physically indi-
viduated an object must be perceptually recognized) it would not seem
unreasonable to conclude that in both of their systems the set of
physically individuated objects will turn out to be a proper subset
of the set of perceptually individuated objects. The reason is
simple. If a man perceives vrho Smith is, then surely the man must
be perceiving Smith. A man cannot perceptually recognize Smith, it
would seem, if he fails to perceive Smith in the first place. Thus,
it would appear that to qualify as a physically individuated object
an object must already be a perceptually individuated object.
Interestingly, it is just this sort of reasoning Thomason
wishes to attack.
Suppose we’re at a cocktail party and there is someone
across the room you’re tr3ring to point out to me...
Suppose that from your description I realize vjho he
must be; he’s a person well knovm to me vriiom I know to
be at the party. But the light is bad, people are
milling around, and I haven’t been able to pick him
out from the crowd. The natural thing to say in these
circumstances is
52
(3»1?) I see -who you mean but I don't see him
....The formalization of (3»17) is
(3.19) (Ex)S(x=a) & -{3 x)S(x=a)
ZT vjhere 'a* stands for 'the person you mean'l .
In this example the agent perceives who a is without perceiving a, and
this looks like a counter-example to the claim that perceiving who
implies perceiving.
At first glance this example does not seem convincing at a31..
It seems rather clear in the example that I know who a is. There is
someone of T-jhom I knovj that he's the person you mean. But do I
visually perceive viho he is? Is there really someone of whom I
perceive that he's the person you mean? It's hard to see that there
is. On the face of things there seems to be a confusion here between
my knoid.ng who a is and my visually perceiving vjho a is in this
example. It'
s
not clear that because I know who a is I thereby see
sho a is.
It nonetheless becomes clear later in the paper that Thomason
is not confusing 'knovdng vrfio' vdth 'seeing who' at all. The whole
matter is actually much more subtle than vrfiat it appears to be.
(6.1) (3 x)(x=a)
(6.4) (Ex)S(x=a),
and suppose that we are concerned with what is seen by an agent p.
Notice that 6.4 can be true when p is not looking at
the object referred to by 'a': that is, 6.4 does
not imply 6.1. All that is needed for 6.4 to be true
is that the object should exist and be physically the
same in all situations compatible with v;hat p sees.
Since in English we commonly use locutions such as
'seeing what' or 'seeing vjho' to express 6.4, this
fact helps to explain how 'seeing' can take on non-
visual overtones akin to 'knowing'. For me to see who
the man is, it is not necessary for me to be looking
at him; the realization may strike me xdiile m^^back is
turned to him. Thus, 6.4 does not imply 6.1.
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To this Thomason adds by way of footnote;
For some reason, many philosophers with whom I
have discussed this claim have found it peculiar
and somehow objectionable. Nevertheless, it’s the
way vje all use the language; 'seeing that' and
'seeing who’ are conditioned by knowledge, without
regard to how this knowledge was obtained. Someone
who is blind can "see that" and "see who" as well
as anyone else, and no metaphors are involved here,^^
It comes as rather a shock to advance to this point in
'Perception and Individuation' and suddenly learn that the 'secs that'
locution vre have been discussing all along is to be understood in such
a way that a blind man can 'see that' such-and-such is the case.
Small vjonder then that I can see who someone is without actually
seeing him at a given moment, A whole semantics for knowledge has
suddenly eased its vray in the back door. As far as the cocktail party
is concerned, I see who you mean just insofar as I knovr vrfio you mean.
If I know who someone is, then I automatically see viho he is in some
sense of the vjord "see". And if I know something is true, then I
automatically see that it is true in that same sense of the word
"see".^^ Apparently it's just this sense vdth which Thomason has
been concerned all along, and vjere mistaken to have ever thought
otherwise.
There is, of course, nothing objectionable about offering a
semantics for a sense of "sees that" which is such that knowing that
entails seeing that. It may even prove advantageous in reflecting
more accurately the actual use of English expressions (an area in
which Hintikka is often criticized). But whatever is gained in
paralleling everyday discourse is lost, I believe, in the failxire to
present a clear and unified account of a single, unambiguous concept.
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For T nov; looks as though it combines into a single system a
semantics for visual perception and a semantics for knox^rledge, and
it does so with the use of a single modal operator. Precisely the
same system is supposed to elucidate the use of "sees" in "Smith sees
a woodpecker" and "Smith sees now that he’ll soon lose his job".
Suppose we say that an agent "visually perceives" that something
is the case if and only if his eyes actually report to him that it’s
the case. Then "visually perceives that" is the meaning of "sees
that" which we oi*iginally took to be the interpretation of the modal
operator ’S’. \A/hat vie seem to have learned since is that in reality
an agent "sees that" something is the case if and only if either he
visually perceives that it is or else knows that it is. ’Sp’ is
true if and only if either ’p’ is compatible with everything the
agent visually perceives or with everything the agent knows.
This interpretation of "seeing that" brings with it an
important disadvantage. Every formula having modal operators will be
systematically ambiguous betvreen vihat’ s known and what’s immediately
perceived; and, as a result, there appears to be no way in which
immediate perceptions can be captured in the formal semantics. If
Jones visually perceives that a man is standing in front of him, it
vion’t do to suppose ’S(Ex)(Mx & Fx)’ is the correct symbolization.
This is too vieak. It says that Jones sees that a man is standing in
front of him, and this leaves open the possibi3-ity that Jones might
only know it. The formula might better be read, "Jones either knows
or visually perceives that a man is standing in front of him". There
just seems to be no formula in T capable of expressing "Jones visually
perceives that a man is standing in front of him".
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Having seen that Thomason has chosen to interpret "sees that"
in this VTider fashion, we return to Hintikka* s suspicions in 'Semantics
for Propositional Attitudes* that it may be unrealistic to impose a
no-merging restriction on world lines of a semantics for certain
propositional attitudes. Earlier we noted that a no-merging
restriction is not clearly desirable to impose upon a system of know-
ledge, It now begins to look as though "sees that" is no different.
The reason is very simple.
If Jones knov;s who each of two people b and c are, then
* (Ex)(Ey)S(b=x &c=y)* is true even when neither b nor c call T-dthin
the field of Jones's vision. But if b and c are really distinct it
follows by the no-merging restriction that 'S(b^c)' is true in T.
But 'S(b^c)' is true just in case Jones either visually perceives
that b^c or knows that b/c. Since the former is impossible when b and
c are not vdthin his visual field, it follows that if 'S(b^c)' is to
be true in T, Jones must knovr that b^c. But concluding from all of
this that Jones really does know that b^c seems rash, as we've already
indicated. And so if there is uncertainty (as there surely seems
to be) in imposing the no-merging condition upon a semantics for
knowledge, precisely the same uncertainty extends to T.
But one ought to go on to ask vThether the no-merging condition
I (x) (y) (x=y -?S(x=y ) ) ' is any more unrealistic in this regard than
the no-splitting condition. Is there anything more \inrealistic in
insisting that Jones know that distinct individuals known to him are
distinct than to insist that identical individuals known to him are
identical? It's hard to see any difference here. It has in effect
been suggested by Casteneda (See Chapter Three) that the no- splitting
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condition is violated in ordinary epistemic circumstances. An amnesiac
may be the famed War Hero wounded 100 times in a recent war, he may
know who the War Hero is (through research), he knows who he himself
is, and still he may fail to know that he is in fact the War Hero
(no one knows what became of the hero). Casteneda* s may not be as
convincing as hosts of other examples one might devise, but it
seems to show that ' (x)(y)(x=y-^Knovrs(x=y))« is at least as question-
able a validity to have in one’s system as ' (x)(y)(x^y-?Knows(x/y))«
.
Neither seems desirable.
Then why does Hintikka not fuss over splitting? No doubt be-
cause it cannot be avoided in his system (as we shall demonstrate in
the next chapter ).^^ There is no corresponding compelling reason to
make ’ (x) (y) (x^y->Knows(x^y) ) ’ a validity, however, and so Hintikka
hesitates incorporating anything along the lines of a no-merging
restriction. All things considered, it seems to me that Hintikka
is not much better off than Thomason. Both employ restrictions on
world lines that do not clearly reflect the way people actually know
or perceive things to be.
It was mentioned earlier that a major departure from Hintikka'
s
semantics for perception was the presence of reflexivity in T. If
an agent sees that something is the case, then it follows that it
is indeed the case. Every situation in the model structure has itself
as an automatic alternative. In Hintikka' s semantics, on the other,
hand, it is often the case that a world fails to be compatible with
itself. An agent can perceive that something is the case without it'
s
being the case.
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We recall from our discussion of Hintikka, however, that re-
flexivity coiild just as well have been employed in his sytem. It
wasn’t employed for the reason that it would have, according to
Hintikka, produced a system which would be substantially less
interesting. It would not have allowed reference to illusions,
hallucinations, perceptual mistakes, and the like. If someone can be
said to 'perceive* something to be true only if it's really true,
how can vre talk of perceptual mistakes without increasing the re-
sources of the language? It would seem that reflexivity precludes
expression of Jones* s illusions, hallucinations, and perceptual
mistakes.
Won't it be, then, that Thomason's system T will have troubles
of a similar nature capturing situations in which a person incorrectly
views his actual environment? If someone can be said to "see that"
something is the case only if it really is the case, it seems as
though illusions and incorrect perceptions cannot be handled by T.
In view of this, it is curious that Thomason discusses
examples which involve just these sorts of perceptual mistakes. He
considers, for example, a case in which a man looks at a cluster of
leaves and has an impression of a deer. And in another example (which
we've already mentioned) MacBeth hallucinates and has the impression of
a dagger when no dagger is present (and vriiere in addition there is
no physical object for which the so-called dagger could be mistaken).
What he says about these examples reveals that to a certain extent
perceptual mistakes can be captured in the system after all. They
cannot be captured in terms of the "seeing that" idiom, it is true,
but that Td.ll make no difference. For as v/e may well have forgotten
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by this time, we do have at our disposal a domain E^(a) of visual
objects in each situation a. And we finally have occasion to use
these resources.
The MacBeth case is quite straightforward. Although ’S(Ex)
(x is a dagger)’ is false in the case \mder consideration (and would
be true in Hintikka’ s system), ’ (^ x)(x is a dagger)’ is not. There
is a dagger found in the domain of the actual x</orld. Hence ’ (3 x)S
(x is a dagger)’ is true, and we have ’(Hx)(s(x is a dagger) & -(Ey)
(3c=y))’ as the correct symbolization of the Macbeth example. And
in the example where the cluster of leaves resembles a deer, we have
a situation in \diich a visual object, the deer, is identical to a
physical object, the cluster (see page 2?4 of Thomason’s paper).
And so ’(3 x)(S(x is a deer) & (Ey)(y is a cluster & x=y))’ is the
symbolization we are after.
There finally seems to be a worthwhile purpose served by
the presence in each situation of dual domains. I'Jhat appeared a
perhaps unnecessary complication in the system tums out in the end
to cleverly provide a means of capturing hallucinations. A halluci-
nation does not emerge in the system as a world line (as for Hintikka)
but as an element in the visual domain of a single situation. The
visual domain will then consist of three kinds of objects; Those
VThich satisfy an open foimiula of the form ’ S(Ex) (x=y) ’ , those (like
the deer) which satisfy ’(Ex)(x=y)’ but nothing of the form ’S(Ex)
(x=y)’, and those (hallucinations) which satisfy neither. The latter
two kinds of visual objects seem to provide the handle we need to
talk about perceptual mistakes in T.
vail this suffice to give formal expression to every kind of
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perceptual mistake an individual might commit? I am not convinced
that it does. Suppose that Smith is standing in front of Jones and
that Smith appears to Jones to have black teeth. But suppose that in
actuality Smith has very vriiite teeth and only happens to be chewing on
licorice. Can the sentence, "Smith seems to Jones to have black
teeth" be captured in T? IaRLII the presence of visual objects
enable us to talk about Smith’ s mistaken perception?
The natural move might be to suppose that our visual domain
includes a character v;e might refer to as "Black Tooth Smith", an
individual just like Smith except for the color of his teeth. We
can then perhaps s3nnbolize the sentence "Smith seems to Jones to
have black teeth" as ’(3x)(x=Black Tooth Smith & S(Bx) & (Ey)(y=
Smith & x=y))’. But this surely won’t do if the Indiscernibility of
Identicals is to be preserved in T, for Smith cannot be identical to
something whose teeth are of different color from his own. There
cannot be a member common to two domains in a world, it seems clear,
if it is supposed to have different properties in each domain.
For much the same reason Thomason’ s deer example seems \in-
settling. Is the physical object in question — the cluster of
leaves — supposed to be identical to a visual object, a deer? It’s
difficult to see in what sense the same object can be at the same time
a cluster of leaves and a deer. Perhaps, then, the cluster is to be
identified with an apparent deer. But what do we mean by "apparent"
here? If we vrere able to supply a formal account of "apparent" in
terms of the resources of T, the problem of capturing cases of
mistaken perceptions would never have been a worry in the first place.
6o
Perhaps the visual object in question is not the deer at all;
perhaps the cluster is both the physical and visual object. There
seem to bo grounds for this interpretation on the basis of Thomason'
s
claim on page that if ’a' names the cluster of leaves 'a' names
a visual object. Then maybe to say that Jones sees that this object
is moving, all we need is »0 x)(Ey)(x is a cluster & x=y & S(x is
moving))'. But this is obviously too vreak; it tells us nothing about
the agent's mistaking the cluster for a deer. It could just as easily
be true in a situation where the agent mistakes the cluster for a
misquito. How can we express the deer's role in this example as the
apparent object?
We can of course reverse tactics and admit the diversity of
Smith and Black Tooth Smith (as well as the diversity of the cluster
and the deer). We can imagine that vrtaile Smith is a member of D^(a),
Black Tooth Smith is a member of Ef”(a), and vjhile Smith and Black
Tooth Sinith share an almost uncanny resemblance, they are entirely
distinct (V7e can ever speculate that there may be a casual relation-
ship which holds between the two, but that sort of speculation goes
beyond the scope of anything the theory is able to handle). Unfor-
tunately, this solution seems to reduce Black Tooth Smith to the
position of a hallucination, much like MacBeth's dagger. He can no
longer be identified with some physical object. We lose the dis-
tinction between mistaking a real thing for something it is not and
seeing something where there is nothing.
It would be nice to say in the Smith example we mistake something
for something else, that Black Tooth Smith can be identified \'n.th a
member of the physical domain D*^(a). But what exactly do we mean by
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"identified vdth"? As vre have seen, the identity sign cannot be
used to identify physical with visual objects (in cases like these).
But it* s hard to find any clear alternative sense of "identify vrith"
expressible in T that will solve these puzzles. And so vje tenta-
tively conclude that T is a system which, unlike Hintikka’s, is in-
capable of accounting for certain types of mistaken perceptions.
Hallucinations work out beautifully in T, but nothing else seems to.
Cases in vrtiich a man mistakes one thing for another appears, on
IViomason’ s account, to create significant problems in the theory.
There seems to be no way to indicate in formal terms in vjhat
relation Smith stands to Black Tooth Smith or the cluster stands
to the deer.
Difficulties of this sort are not \mcommon in philosophical
theories of perception. It is convenient to postulate sense-data in
an effort to explain the similarity involved in perceiving a real
thing and perceiving a hallucination. But well-known difficulties
arise vrfien one tries to explain precisely the relation that obtains
between sense-data and real things. It is not at all clear vjhat
relation obtains between a real bear and my sensation of the bear if
we construe the latter as a sense datum.
None of this is intended to suggest that there are inlierent
problems in the postulation of separate domains in each situation.
Nor is there any obvious problem in regarding these domains as inter-
secting; if Jones sees Smith as he really is, then the physical Smith
and the visual Smith are supposed to be the same, and that does not
seem unreasonable. As we have already seen, the identity
botvreen members of D^(a) and D'^(a) shows that T, if it*s a sense-datum
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theory at all, is not a sense-datum theory in vjhat Thomason calls
the "strong sense". Visual objects need not be two-dimensional
discs or wave-like images but may be (and usually are) physical
objects.
Though there are no obvious inherent problems >7ith dual
domains, it does begin to look as though they are unnecessary com-
plications in the theory after all. If the presence of visual domains
was able to account for mistaken perceptions in a system whose
compatibility relation is reflexive, then they would serve a useful
p\irpose. If, however, they accoimt for some cases of mistaken
perceptions and not others, then the virtue of their presence is
questionable. A semantics for perception seems cumbersome enough
vdth perceptual world lines (members of m) and quantifiers I’jhich
range over them. Adding to this special visual domains seems to
create an \innecessary burden in the semantics.
Thomason does seem to suggest, however, another function which
visual objects are supposed to perform — to gi\'B expression to ;diat
we might call "accidental perceptions". Suppose Socrates sees the
man in front of him who is his father, but his father is wearing a mask,
and hence Socrates does not see that the man he sees is his father.
When Socrates denies that he sees his father there is
a sense in which what he says is true. Namely,
(6.9) -(3 x)S(b=x)
is true, v;here *b’ stands for ’Socrates’s Father’....
On the other hand there is also a sense in which vdiat
the sophist says is true when he claims that Socrates
does see his father;
Since we don’t vjish to say that Socrates both sees and does not
see his father, we turn to the formal semantics and find that we
is
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have the expressive resources to show that there is no contradiction.
And the sense in which Socrates does see his father is captured by
shovring that his father can be found in the visual domain of the
actual v7orld. Thus, visual domains do perhaps play a necessary role
in the system. They enable one to say that he sees an F but does
not see that it is an F.
Nevertheless, even here visual domains seem dispensible. This
weaker sense of seeing something is perfectly capable of being
expressed without appeal to visual domains. We need only lock as far
as Hintikka’s distinction between * (3 x) (Perceives b=x)’ and * ( 3 x)
(b=x & Perceives(Ey) (x=y) ) ’ to convince ourselves that perceptual
world lines are adequate to capture the distinction between the two
senses in which Socrates might be said to see his father. In the
weaker of these senses there is a world line which, whatever else
it does, picks from the actual world (out of the one and only domain
it has) Socrates’s father. And this allows us to say that Socrates
sees someone xdio turns out to be his father; ’(3 x)(b=x &S( (Ey) (x=y) ) ’
.
In this respect T is even better off than Hintikka’s system;
that is, perceptually quantified formulas which bind variables
occurring both within and without modal operators are much easier to
account for semantically in T. The problem we face in Hintikka’s
semantics, we recall, involves the failure of the actual world to be
its own perceptual alternative, and consequently in many cases a
puzzle arises as to v^ich element in the actual world we attach the
chain. Hintikka’s solution (find out vjhat caused our perception)
we found impossible to describe in the language of the formal
semantics. But no such difficulty arises at all in T. If Socrates
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sees his father, his father is guaranteed to show up in the actual
world. And in general, v^enever we have to evaluate the truth-
conditions for a fonc\ila of the form > (5 x)(Ax & S(Bx))», the pro-
cedure is straightforward. Formulas like » (3 x)(x is fat & S(x is
not fat))' are categorically false and no fuss need be made over them.
* * *
In this chapter I have discussed Thomason' s semantics for the
locution ''sees that". Though his system bears considerable similarity
to Hintikka' s semantics for "perceives", there are considerable differ-
ences. I have argued in some cases these differences represent
improvements over Hintikka' s system, but there are serious diffi-
culties in other respects. There seems to be no way to symbolize
such sentences as "Smith seems to Jones to have black teeth"; there
seems to be no way to indicate formally the distinction between
visually perceiving that something is true and knowing that it is;
there are visual domains in each possible world which seem to serve
no useful purpose in the system; and there are constraints on the
behaviour of world lines (that they may not intersect) which seem
much too restrictive
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CHAPTER III
We have already alluded to Hintikka' s move in recent years to
incorporate into his model-theoretic semantics for knowledge a second
set of quantifiers * (jJ x) « and ‘ ( \/x) '
.
In this chapter we shall
(i) Examine in some detail Hintikka’ s motivation for this change,
(ii) Discuss the nature of the expanded system (which we’ll call
KBC), and (iii) Point out a number of problems which beset KBC.
*
The matter of introducing additional quantifiers to Hintikka’
s
original semantics for epistemic logic (developed in Krov:ledge and
Belief ) has a rather unusual history. A nov7- famous and somewhat
bizarre imaginary example offered by Castaneda figures prominently
in this history, and in the end it is precisely this bizarre example
which drives Hintikka to the expanded system. There is thus no better
way, I believe, to examine Hintikka’ s motivations for introducing
new quantifiers than by starting from the beginning and tracing the
history of the problem; doing this vdll prove valuable too in
understanding the roles of the new quantifiers in KBC.
I propose to begin by going all the way back to Knovdedge and
Belief . It is a well-known feature of Hintikka’ s original model set
theoretic semantics for knowledge (KB) that ’ (Ex)Ka(b=x) ’ is
supposed to be a formal reading for knows v;ho (or what) b is"
or "Someone (or something) is known by a to be identical to b". How
the English locution "knows who" is notoriously vague and seems to
have a variety of uses in English. One is therefore inclined to
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feel suspicious from the outset when it is proposed that "a knows
who b is" be unambiguously rendered by the single fornvila * (Ex)Ka
(b=x)’ in the formal semantics. One wonders how a single formula
is supposed to capture at once all the ways in vdiich "knows who" is
employed in English.
Hintikka himself seems to anticipate this sort of reaction
arising among his readers. Although he writes on page I3I (of
Knowledge and Belief ) that "knows who" is "easy to translate into
our symbolism", he admits later that
The criteria as to when one may be said to knovr who
this or that man is are highly variable. Sometimes
knowing the name of the person in question suffices;
sometimes it does not. Often "acquaintance" of
some sort is required.^
Here he agrees that necessary and sufficient conditions for truly
saying of a person that a knows xdio he is do not remain constant from
situation to situation. We cannot offer an analysis of the locution
"knows who" which applies with complete generality to all our uses of
the expression. Yet Hintikka goes on in the same passage to say,
"Our discussion is independent of this difficulty, however". How he
came to this conclusion at the time I fail to understand, but his
addition of '(^x)’ and *(Vx)* to the system some years later is
testimony (for reasons we shall explain) that his position on the
matter has changed drastically. The very difficulty he speaks of in
the passage above turns out in the end to necessitate significant
changes in his semantics for knowledge.
Perhaps Hintikka was unhappy with his univocal treatment of
"knows who" as early as I962 (when Knowledge and Belief first
appeared). But it should be pointed out here that surely there
was never hope that Hintikka* s system would provide an exact parallel
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vdth the way in which English speakers use the word "knows". Such was
never his project. It was clear at the outset, for example, that de-
ductive closure characterized KB. Thus the English "Jones knows p but
not ((((p V (q & p)) & (P V q)) v (r & (p v q)))" has no consistent
form\ilation in KB even though the corresponding English sentence is
perfectly consistent.
In Castaneda' s 1964 review of Knowledge and Belief in the Journal
of Symbolic Logic the point is made that formxilas of the form ' (Ex)Ka
(a=x)' (a's knowing >dio a is) are particularly troublesome in terms of
symbolizing the English locution "knows -vdio".
In Hintikka' s epistemic system there just seems to be no way of
consistently formulating, e.£., the contingent statement
(A) There is a person x such that a knows that a=x but does
not know that he himself = x.
In the reviewer' s opinion the way of dealing with the logic of
self-knowledge is by means of a special descriptor operator
" 0" such that if a is an individual sign with no occurrences of
"d", then "da" is an individual sign. The desired interpretation
is shown by symbolizing (A) as ' (Ex) (Ka(x=a) & -Ka(x=da) )' .2
Castaneda argues here that ' (Ex)Ka(a=x) ' looks as though it is supposed
to symbolize two non-equivalent English sentences, "£ knows who a is"
and knows that he himself is a". But, if so, then there is no
conceivable way of rendering sentence (A) consistently in the formal
language. Hence Hintikka' s system is inadequate as it stands.
Curiously, Castaneda does not conclude from this inadequacy in
Hintikka' s system that there is anything inherently problematic about
Hintikka' s treatment of "knows who". He suggests remedying the problem
by introducing to the language of Hintikka' s system an (apparently primi-
tive) operator "d" to formally disting\iish between the two sorts of self-
reference at issue. Castaneda himself finds this particular remedy in-
effective in a later paper, ^ but what's important to note here is his ac-
ceptance of the open sentence schema ' (Ex)Ka(x=y) ' as properly capturing all
uses of "knows "idio". For Castaneda it was just a question of distinguishing
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between ’ (Ex)Ka(a=x) ’ and ' (Ex)Ka(cr a=x) '
.
At any rate, the apparent failure of KB to provide a consistent
symbolization of (A) -vjithout recourse to enriching the language
seemed to be a significant criticism of the system. Hintikka* s
1966 paper, * "Knowing Onesself" and Other Problems in Epistemic
Logic’, is a reply to this and other criticisms of KB raised by
Castaneda in his review. As far as the present difficulty is
concerned Hintikka had this to say:
Intuitively speaking, it might seen that an impli-
cation from "a’
s
knowing something about a vihile
knowing who a is" to "a* s knovdng something about
himself" is not unproblematic in that it is based upon
an implicit assumption. If the assumption is made ex-
plicit, however, it is easy to see that it is in fact
satisfied. VJhat one has to assume is, loosely speaking,
that if someone knov;s who a. is, and if he is in fact
himself a, then he knows that he himself is a. This
it seems to me is surely the case.... That there is some
confusion in Castaneda is shown by his comment that
in my system "there just seems to be no vray of con-
sistently formulating, £•£•» the contingent statement
(A)...." On the interpretation I have argued for, how-
ever, (A) is clearly inconsistent (indefensible).
Since the bound variable x occurs in (A) vrithin the
scope of the epistemic operator "Ka", it has to range
over such individuals only as are known to the referent
of ’ a’ — knox-m not merely in the sense that he knows
that they exist but also in the stronger sense that
their identity is known to him. But if the person in
question knows that a refers to one definite individual
of this sort, and if this individual is in fact himself,
how can he possibly fail to know that ’a’ in fact refers
to himself? Thus (a) is intuitively inconsistent, and
this fact is reflected by its being inconsistent on the
assumptions vrhich are made in Knowledge and Belief .
Here Hintikka replies to Castaneda’s objection by (i) Admitting
that (A) can be symbolized in KB only by an indefensible formula, and
(ii) Arguing that (A) is intuitively inconsistent and hence ought to
be symbolized only by means of an indefensible formula. Thus
knows who a is" and "a knows that he himself is a" are both
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symbolized ’ (Ex)Ka(a-x) ’
,
and this is as it ought to be. Neither
sentence can be true while the other is false; they are intuitively
eq\iivalent.
Castaneda replied to this in his I967 paper, »0n the Logic of
Self-Knowledge’. Taking issue to Hintikka' s claim that (A) is in-
tuitively inconsistent, he sets out here to produce a possible state
of affairs in which an agent a knows who a is and also knovrs vjho he
himself is but fails to know that he himself is And so we have
the famous War Hero example;
Suppose that X is brought unconscious to a certain
military tent; that on gaining consciousness X suf-
fers from amnesia and during the next months becomes
a war hero and gets lost in combat and forgets the
military chapter of his life, and that later X
studies all the accounts of the war hero and dis-
covers that the hero was, only one in the
war vrounded 100 times. For many normal situations,
£•£•1 passing a history examination, X knovjs who the
hero was. In many such situations "There exists a
man knovm to the war hero vrounded 100 times such
that the war hero wounded 100 times knovrs that such
a man is identical vrith the war hero wounded 100
times" is true. Yet in all such situations X may
fail to know that he himself is the vrar hero wounded
100 times.
5
In a later paper Castaneda refers to the imaginary war hero as
"Quintus" and adds that
Quintus studies all accounts of the war hero and dis-
covers that he (the hero) vras the only one wounded
100 times. Qviintus becomes fascinated by the hero’s
accomplishments and comes to vrrite the most author-
itative biography of the hero. . Clearly, for most
normal situations, regardless of shifts in the cri-
teria for identifying a person, Quintus knows vjho
the hero v;as much better than most people, even
though Quintus does not know that he himself is the
war hero.^
The point Castaneda makes here is very simple. We let ’h’ be short
for ’the war hero wounded 100 times’. Then although "h knovjs who h
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is" and "h knows who he himself is" are both true, it»s false that
h knows that he himself is h. Thus, the sentence "There is a person
X such that h knows that h=x but he does not know that he himself
=x" is true. Therefore, sentences having the same form as (A)
should not be treated as uniformly inconsistent, and so KB is in-
capable of properly handling sentences having the same form as (A).
At the root of the problem, of course, is Hintikka’ s univocal treat-
ment of "knows vrfio" contexts.
Realizing that Castaneda’s War Hero example refutes his claims
in '"Knowing Onesself" and Other Problems in Epistemic Logic' and
that his univocal treatment of "knows who" is indeed at the root of
the problem, Hintikka reverses tactics. In his I967 paper
'Individuals, Possible Worlds, and Epistemic Logic' Hintikka admits
that
(1) h knows who h is, and
(2) h knows that he himself is h
require translations different from one another in the formal lan-
guage after all. He doesn't discuss the sentence
(3) h knows who he himself is,
but clearly its translation can be derived from that given for (2).
What he proposes is the following. Continue to translate
sentence (1) as
(4) (Ex)Kh(h=x).
But now translate (2) as
(5) (Ex)(h=x & Kh(h=x)),
and presumably (3) will be ambiguous between (5)
(6) (Ex) (h=x & Kh(x=x) ).
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The first thing to notice here is that in KB (4) and (5) are
virtually equivalent. This is shown as follows:
(a) (Ex)Kh(h=x) w \
^ Redog
>
(b)
-(Ex)(h=x & Kh(h=x)) 4. W
(c) (x)(h^x V
-Kh(h=x)) 6 W (b),(C.-E),(C.-&)
(d) h^h V -Kh(h=h) 6 w (a),(c).(l09)
(e)
-Kh(h=h) 4 W (d),(C.Self.^)
(f) Ph(h/h) 4 W (e).(C.-K)
(g) h?^h 4 W* (f),(C.P*), for some
(h) h=h 4 W*
compatible w*
(C.Self.=)
(a) (Ex)(h=x & Kh(h=x)) 4. W^
(b)
-(Ex)Kh(h=x) 4 wy
Redog
(c) h=b & Kh(h=b) <4 W^
(d) (Ex)Kh(b=x) 4 W
(a),(108), for some
(e) (x)-Kh(h=x) 4 W (b).(C.-E)
(f)
-Kh(h=b) « w (d),(e),(109)
(g) Kh(h=b) e w (c), simp.
Now since Castaneda has demonstrated that (1) and (2) are not
equivalent, certain changes need to be made in the rules of KB to
prevent the inference from (4) to (5). and vice versa . Hintikka
recognizes this need but fails to indicate anyvjhere the specific
changes that must be implemented to block these inferences and still
make reasonable sense.
It seems to me that the req\iired changes can be made most
straightforwardly by a revision of (108) and (109) to:
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(108*) If » (Ex)p’ & w and x occurs free only within the
scope of a single epistemic operator Kb or Pb,
then for at least one free individual symbol *a'
we have «p(a/x)'<& w and ’ (Sx)Kb(a=x) w; if x
occurs free both within and without the scope of
a single epistemic operator Kb or Pb, then we
have «p(a/x)»^ w and «(Ex)(a=x & Kb(a=x) )
' w.
(109*) If »(x)p» wand X occurs free only within the
scope of a single epistemic operator Kb or Pb,
then for at least one free individual 'a*, if
’ (Ex)Kb(a=x) ’<£ w, then ’p(a/x)’t w; if x occ\ars
free both vjithin and -without the scope of a
single epistemic operator Kb or Pb, then if ’(Ex)
(a=x & Kb(a=x))’<i w, then ’p(a/x)’<E: w.
Having admitted for the first time that (1) and (2) require
different formal treatments, Hintikka in ’Individuals, Possible
Worlds, and Epistemic Logic’ argues that his change in strategy is
necessitated only by Castaneda’s employing queer standards in using
"knows vrfio" the way he does.
The standards of kno-vdng who presupposed by Casaneda
are such that although h knows who h is, he cannot
point to anyone and say: "That man is h" or even get
hold of h in other v;ays. This is precisely what is
queer about these standards. .. .Castaneda is presup-
posing a standard of knowing who on which one can
know who h is vdthout being able to locate him in
the actual world. A standard of this kind is logically
possible to have. I'ihether such kind of ’knovdng who’
deserves to be called by this name is to my mind very
dubious.*^
It appears that Hintikka wishes to distinguish here between at least
two standards (as he calls them) of knowing xdao. A man can know who
h is and be able to locate him in the actual world, or a man can
know -vdio h is and not be able to locate him in the actual world.
What it means to "locate h in the actual vrarld" is not clear, but
we can follow Sleigh’s lead and refer to the distinction as
8
between h's being "known strictly" versus h’s being "known weakly".
To say that h knows who h is -without being able to locate h in
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the actual world, Hintikka feels, one is presupposing a standard of
knowing vrfio >Mch »'is queer" and hardly deserving of the title ’knovdng
who*. He therefore seems to regard the truth of (1) in Castaneda’s
example as based on some sort of less than standard use of English.
If we admit this usage of "knows who", then certainly distinct
translations of (1) and (2) must be given, and the rxiles of KB must
be changed accordingly. As far as standard usage is concerned
(the implication seems to be) KB vras right all along, but to accom-
modate non-standard usage certain changes must be made.
It is ironic that Hintikka himself makes use of the expression
"knows who" in this same weak sense. On page 148 of Knowledg;e and
Belief he speaks of our kno^ding who the teacher of Antisthenes is.
And on page 132 we are asked to consider the sentence "a knovjs who
killed Toto", where the reference is to Toto de Brunei, a char-
acter of the auther Lawrence Durrell. Both characters, it seems
clear, would be impossible to track doi-m in the actual v;orld.
Each could at best be known weakly by an agent. And so it hardly
seems fair to accuse Castaneda of presupposing a standard of "knows
who" vrfiich is "queer" and hardly deserving of the name.
Castaneda’s I968 paper ’On the Logic of Attributions of Self-
Knowledge to Others’ is both a reply to Hintikka’ s ’Individuals,
Possible Worlds, and Epistemic Logic’ and a discussion of his rather
involved theory of indicators alluded to earlier (see footnote!).
In those parts of his paper relevant to his dispute vrith Hintikka he
elaborates further upon his War Hero example and discusses a number
of complexities in self-reference brought out by the example.
He seems to welcome Hintikka’ s abandonment of a univocal translation
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(1) 3.nd (2) but objscts to Hintilcka* s solution on othsr grounds*
Consider:
(7) a knows that b knows that c knows that he himself is F
and suppose that "he himself" refers to a. According to Hintikka*
s
new system IPE (7) is rendered
(8) (Ex)(a=x & KaKbKc(Fx)).
But if (8) belongs to a model set vi, then so do both
(9) a=h & KaKbKc(Fh), and
(10) (Ex)(h=x & KaKbKc(h=x))
for at least one constant 'h*. But (7) can be true even ^dien
(11) a knows that b knows that c knows that h is F is false
for every constant term 'h’ in the language. It may be false
simply because there is no particular way a, b, and c share in
common of referring to a. So since (7) does not imply (11) it ought
not be the case that (8) virtually imply both (9) and (10) in IPE;
hence it looks like there are serious difficulties with IPE,
This brings us to the final stage in the controversy,
Hintikka’ s response to Castaneda in his 1970 paper ’On Attributions of
Self-Knowledge’. Regarding Castaneda’s allegation that (8) virtually
implies (9) and (10) in IPE Hintikka writes:
According to my rule (C,E.), ’(Ex)f’ can be present in
a model set only if, for some individual constant a,
’f(a/x)’ is in X
.
Therefore (by Castaneda’s argument),
for some a the presence of ’(Ex)f’ in entails the
presence of ’f(a/x)’ in . This is an inference from
a statement of the form P'-^(Ex)q(x) to a statement of
the form (Ex) (p-»o(x)
)
^d.th r ' representing some
sort of entailment. It is clearly fallacious. .. .It is
a while since I have seen a competent philosopher being
taken in by the old operator- switch sviindlc as neatly
as Castaneda.
9
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According t.o Hintikka.* Castaneda is mistaken to have supposed that
the presence of (8) in a model set necessitates the presence of (9)
and (lO) in the same set. The relevant quantifier rule (see our
(108*)) tells us that if (8) is a member of w, then for at least one
free individual symbol — in this case »h» — (9) and (10) belong
to w. It does not tell us that for at least one free individual
symbol »h‘, if (8) belongs to w then so do both (9) and (10). And
so, presumably, Castaneda’ s argument turns on a scope ambiguity,
and (8) does not virtually imply (9) and (10).
VAiat is of interest here, I believe, is Hintikka’ s warning
that ’ ’ represents "some sort of entailment". For consider;
(a) If (8) is a member of w
.
then for at least one free
individual symbol ’h’, (9) and (10) belong to v;
(b) For at least one free individual symbol ’h’, if (8)
is a member of u, then (9) and (10) belong to w
Here we let the underlined portion in each case indicate what
Hintikka’ s "p" stands for. Clearly there is no problem inferring (b)
from (a) if what the "If . . .then. . ." represents here is material
implication (the symbol ’h’ never occurs in (8) ajnd hence not in p).
We can agree, however, that if the "If . . .then. . ." represents some
meta-theoretic entailment, then the inference from (a) to (b) is not
clearly legitimate. It is to Hintikka’ s discredit that he does not
explain more fully exactly vriiat’s wrong with the fallacious inference
and the nature of the entailment in question, but v;e can grant him
the point.
What I fail to see, though, is the relevance of Hintikka’
s
objection. Suppose that Castaneda may not make the move from (a) to
(b). Cannot Castaneda’s point be cast in terms which bypass this
restriction? Suppose once again that (?) is true. Then we let the
formal translation of (7)» (8), belong to the actual world w.
If (8) belongs to w, however, then by (a) we have
(c) For at least one free individual symbol ‘h», (9) and
(10) belong to w.
But isn*t this the very difficulty cited earlier, since if (c) is
true it follows that
(d) Agents b, and c share a common way of referring to al
As we've stated the argument there is no appeal to (b) either
explicitly or implicitly; the point Castaneda makes simply does
not depend upon the move from (a) to (b). Hintikka's argument seems
to be beside the point, and the serious difficulty Castaneda has
\incovered remains.
Be this as it may, Hintikka (in this same paper) nevertheless
rejects his proposal to translate (2) as (5) and to make a formal
distinction between (4) and (5). He doesn't explain this decision,
except to say that an attempt to distinguish formulas like these
(which are virtually equivalent in KB) "is doomed to remain fruit-
less".^^ Instead, Hintikka is now ready to propose a far grander
scheme for giving (1) and (2) separate formal readings.
We now move to the major area of concern in this chapter,
Hintikka' s proposal to introduce a second pair of quantifiers to his
semantics for Icnowledge to obtain the expanded system KBC. So far
we have seen that on account of Castaneda' s War Hero example Hintikka
has become convinced that (1) and (2) ought to receive non-equivalent
79
formal rsadings* Hintikka* s reaction to Castanedia’ s exampXe ranges
from calling it "ingenious" in ’Objects of Knovjledge and Belief’
(p» 880) to "so artificial as to sound like the parody of a philosophical
example" in ’On Attributions of Self-Knovrledge
’ (p. 76). But it is
clear that the example has had a monumental impact on Hintikka’
s
approach to formalizing a semantics for knovjledge.
The solution to the problem of formally rendering (1) and (2),
as Hintikka now proposes, goes in the following vxay;
It seems to me that the key to Castaneda’ s inter-
esting example is that in translating (1) and in
translating (2) we have to use different quantifiers.
To mark this formally, let me use the quantifiers
(Ex), (Ux) in the intended translation (4) of (1),
and let me use the other kinds of quantifiers —
say (3 x), (V x) — in the translation
(?) (3x)Kh(h=x)
or, possibly
(8) (3 x)(h=x & Kh(h=x))
of (2).ll
Consider once again the V/ar Hero. We can agree that h (the War Hero)
does indeed know who h is, but there are certain things h cannot
know about the V/ar Hero.
h cannot knovj very much about the hero’s physical
appearance; for othei*wise he vjould recognize him-
self as the hero, amnesia or no amnesia. .. .VJhen
confronted vdth the question: v;ho is h? he will
experience a peculiar embarrassment. He cannot
tell vjhere h is now, nor give the questioner any
other recipe that would show hovj to get in touch
vjith the hero. He cannot place the hero into any
cognitive Lebensvjelt of his ovm, nor can he help
anyone else to place the hero into his sphere of
personal acquaintance. Considerations of this
kind easily lead us to acknovjledge a sense of
"knovjing vjho" in vjhich it is false to say in
Castaneda’s example that h knovjs who the hero (=h)
is.... In this sense a. knox'js vjho b is if and only
if a can place b vjithin the range of his personal
cognitive experience, in other vjords, if he is
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(in a sense of the vrord devoid of social overtones)
acquainted \rith
We have therefore tvro sense of "knovrs vjho" to distinguish.
Taken in one sense ( 1 ) is true; h knows who h (the subject of his
extensive biography) is. But in another sense, Hintikka urges, ( 1 )
is false; h cannot place the hero into the range of his ovm "personal
cognitive experience". For purposes of convenience let us distinguish
these two English senses by subscripts. 'We shall say that "h knows
whoQ_ h is" is true in Castaneda’s example while "h knovrs \fa02 h is"
is not.^^ Clearly vre are in no position to offer criteria for
distinguishing these two senses, but we shall nevertheless recognize
that a distinction is being made and hope to become clearer on what
Hintikka has in mind in what follovzs.
Regarding "knovjs vrho2" Hintikka writes:
The second sense of "knot-ring who" is precisely
the sense expressions of the form C ’ (3 x)Kh(h=x) ’J7
have vThen the quantifier ’(^x)’ is based on those
methods of cross-identification which turn on the
knower’ s personal cognitive situation. .. .In analogy
to Russell’s "knowledge by acquaintance" vre might
speak here of "individuation by acquaintance".-^^
And so, as in the case of perception, Hintikka urges that there are
two methods used by people to individuate objects from world to
world in those vrorlds compatible with everything they know. And
corresponding to these two methods of cross-identification there are
two sets of quantifiers. One set ranges over world-lines determined
by one of these methods, and the other ranges over world-lines de-
termined by the other method. Variables bound by ’(Ex)’ and ’(x)’
range over individuals known^ by the agent, and variables bound by
'(3 x)’ and ’(Vx)’ range over individuals knovm2 t>y the agent.
^ Thus,
(17) h knows whoj^ h is
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is symbolized as (4), and
(18) h knows h is
is symbolized as
(19) (5x)Kh(h=x).
There is, however, still a crucial question remaining to be
ansT-rered, Hintikka has argued that (1) is ambiguous between (1?)
and (18) but that in Castaneda's story (1) is to be read as (1?).
Hence (4) is that proper formal reading of (1) as far as the story is
concerned. Now it would be nice to say that (19) is the proper formal
reading of (2). But so far nothing has been said regarding how
Hintikka' s new concept of cross-identification by acquaintance bears
upon the case of the War Hero. To explain the connection Hintikka
writes.
...Each use of the first-person pronoun "I" get its
reference from the context of utterance — v;hich for
the speaker normally is part of his immediate cog-
nitive environment. Thus, by the same token, the
reference of any occurrence of "he himself" is de-
termined by means of the personal cognitive situation
of the person in question — in terms of the frame of
reference constituted by his first hand acquaintance
of persons, things, places, etc. Thus when "he himself"
is identified ^/dth someone (presupposing that the
phrase is used in the way under consideration), the
identification usually makes no sense unless his
personal frame of reference is relied on. But this
means that-3 and V are to be used rather than E and
U, yielding precisely the translation L(19^ for (2).
And so everything is as it should be. (1) translates as (4) and (2)
translates as (19) • The War Hero knows vjho^^ the War Hero is but
doesn't knov; vjho2 the War Hero is. Hence (4) is true and (19)
false. Castaneda' s problem has been solved, but the solution has
required nothing short of a major overhaul of Hintikka' s semantics.
There is an interesting sidelight to Hintikka' s solution. We
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recall that Hintikka understands the sentence ' (5 x) (Perceives b=x)'
to capture the English direct-object construction "Jones perceives
b" in his semantics for perception. Likewise he now urges that a
formula such as
(20) O x)Ka(b=x)
can be xinderstood to capture "approximately" the English direct-
object sentence "a knows b". Thus we shall understand "a knows who2
b is" and "a knows b" as having approximately the same force. Again,
as in the case of perception, Hintikka distinguishes here betvjeen
two types of direct-object constructions. A man a can know b in
the sense indicated by (20) (Hintikka calls this a» s knowing b
"knov/ingly" ) , or a can merely know the individual who is in fact b.
This weaker sense is captured by the form\ila
(21) (^ x) (b=x & Ka(x=x) )
.
Presumably, the War Hero knows the War Hero in the weaker, but not
the stronger, of these sense (that is, although (19) is false,
'(3 x)(h=x & Kh(x=x))' is not).
Let us now press forward and try to become a little bit clearer
as to the nature of the two types of quantifiers and the world-
lines over which they range. Unfortunately, even Hintikka admits
that the distinction between knov/ing who^^ and knowing who£ cannot
17
be made perfectly clear. In a number of different places’ he
concedes that distinguishing one method of cross-identification from
another in the case of knowledge is less clear than in the case of
perception.
What can be said about the distinction between known^^ and
known2 individuals? Suppose we begin by cataloguing everything
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Hintikka says about knovdng who^ in order to focus in a bit more on
vrfiat he has in mind,
b is known^ by a just in case;
(i) a can place b in a cognitive LebensT^jelt of his
(P. 79);
(ii) a. can place b vn.thin the range of his personal cognitive
experience (p. 79);
^ is acquainted with b (in a sense of the vrord devoid
of social overtones) (p. 79);
(iv) The reference of 'b* is determined by means of the
personal cognitive situation of a (p. 82);
(v) The reference of *b' is determined by s firsthand
acquaintance of persons, things, places, etc. (p, 81).
It vjill at the same time be helpful for our purposes to notice vrtiat
Hintikka has to say about knovring who^^.
In our bookish and public ciilture, "knovdng vrfio"
is likely to be interpreted in terms that are in-
dependent of the history and situation of the
particular person or persons in question.
The V7ar Hero knovrs vAlo^ the V/ar Hero is solely through books, old
newspaper accounts, v;ar documents, and the like, and not through
anything he can remember personally vdtnessing.
On the basis of all of this it seems that vAiile Hintikka'
s
distinction may be impossible to specify in a general form, there are
some instances of "knox^rs who" that are reasonably easy to identify
vis-a-vis the distinction. It's reasonably clear, for example, that
knows vjho-j_ is the sense in wiiich x-ze know who Thomas Edison, Moses,
or the Prime Minister is. And in the sentence, "Jones knows who
the girl sitting on his lap is", there is little doubt that a
firsthand acquaintance has developed between Jones and the girl and
that knows who£ is the sense in x<7hich Jones knows who the girl is.
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In probably the majority of cases, however, it’s a toss-up
to determine which sense of "knows who" is being employed, given what
Hintikka has said. I know who the Mayor is, but even though most of
my knowledge of the Mayor is based on nevjspaper, television, and
general here say, I have actually seen him in person. Perhaps I
have seen him (from a distance) crown the winning contestant at a
beauty pageant. Does this count as first-hand acquaintance? Can
I place the Mayor vri.thin the range of my "personal cognitive experience"?
There seems to be no clear g'uidelines to decide.
It does seem safe to say, on the other hand, that known]_ and
known^ individuals stand in no subset/ superset relationship. In
Castaneda’s example h is known2 to h; that is, ’h’ picks out a vjorld-
line in such a way that makes (4) true and (19 ) false. It seems too
as though the opposite can take place, as in the case perhaps of a
man who rides the same bus every morning >dth a but >jith whom a has
never spoken. Although a knows next to nothing about the man, there
is a sense in xdiich a does know vriio the man is. This sense would
seem to be Hintikka' s knowing vdio^*
Another safe assumption to make concerning the distinction is
that formulas of the form
(22) (Ex)(3 y)Ka(b=x & x=y)
ought to be defensible in KBC. That is, Hintikka' s distinction looks
as though it allovj^s for a common ground between that vrfiich is
knovm]_ and known2 8y an agent. If I were a personal
friend of the
Mayor I might knov: who^ he is on the basis of this friendship, but I
might still know whoi he is on the basis of reading newspaper
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articles. Thus Hintikka’ s distinction may not be mutually exclusive.
Conceivably an individual b can be both known^^ to a and known^ to a
at the same time. World-lines formed by different criteria of
cross-identification vjould turn out to coincide in such a case.
^3-ct, it is tempting to suppose that ’’sudden recognition”
often consists in vrorld-lines established by different critera.a
suddenly coming together and forming a single vrorld-line. Our man a
might discover that the man vjho rides his bus every morning is the
General Manager of the hometown baseball team. Up until now the
General Manager has been known^ by a and the man at the busstop has
been knoxm^ by a, but _a failed to know that the man v;as the General
Manager. Hence the respective world-lines vintil now diverged and
only happened to intersect in the actual world. But by virtue of
_a* s discovery it woiild seem as though '(Ex)C3 y)Ka(x=the General
Manager & y=the man at the busstop & x=y)' is nov: true. This same
sort of phenomenon is noted by both Hintikka and Thomason in the
case of perception. A perceptual world-line often turns into a
rigid world-line ^dien the agent suddenly recognizes (perceptually)
something he*s been perceiving, and this yields something of the form
'(Ex)(^ y) (Perceives(b=x & x=y))'.
Like Hintikka’ s earlier systems, KBC has a restricted range
feature. In KB variables within the scope of ’Ka’ and bound from
the outside by ’(Ex)’ or ’(x)’ range over rigid world lines viiich
pick up individual
sj_ in the actual world only if a knovjs xdio or what
they are. Speaking loosely, xje might say that the quantifiers range
over individuals only if they are known by a* Mow having distinguished
formally two senses of knowing who and two sorts of quantifiers
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corresponding to these two sense, it turns out that in KBC restricted
range is a double-barrelled feature. Whle the standard quantifiers
range over individuals knovm^ by a, »Ox)‘ and •(V'x)* range over
individuals knovm^ by a.
Rules governing the new quantifiers are not stated by Hintikka,
but for the most part there would seem to be nothing difficult in
offering them. Suppose that «b« is a free individual symbol, and
suppose that »p» contains exactly one occurrence of *Ka' . Then
(3 x)r>(x) ^ w (1093) (Vx)p(x) e. w
(3 x)Ka(b=x) C. w (^x)Ka(b=x) w
p(b/x) 6: wp(b/x) 6 W
VTill be the desired quantifier rules. Ptules for more complicated
constructions can easily be formulated on the basis of general
guidelines found in Hintikka’ s paper ’Existential and Uniqueness
Presuppositions’
.
Hintikka is also not clear as to whether it is supposed to be
the case that if an individual b is known^ by a, it follovrs that
b exists? This is a question of considerable interest; ought we
adopt a rule
(C.3 K=) (3 x)Ka(b=x) 6 w
(Ex)(b=x) e. w
in KBC? Again, Hintikka offers no advice here; he has, of course,
repeatedly chosen to reject the corresponding rule (C.EK=) for
ordinary quantifiers. But there seem to be good grounds to accept
(C.3 K=) even if (C.EK=) is not accepted.
Though Hintikka never explains precisely why he dropped
(C.EX=) from his oidginal system KB, evidence suggests that the major
reason vi&s his desire to consistently symbolize such sentences as "a
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knows who murdered Toto de Brunei" and "a knows who puts toys in
children's stockings". In his semantics for perception, for example,
the move from » (Ex) (Perceives b=x)» to »(Ex)(b=x)' is ruled out pre-
cisely to allow one to say that Jones perceives vjho b is without
implying that b exists. With (C.3K=), however, the situation
seems different. It's extremely hard to imagine how something non-
existent could be knovm^ by an agent; how could a "firsthand ac-
quaintance" be the basis for a' s knovriing vriio something is if it
fails to exist? V7e'll leave open the question whether KBC has the
rule (C.3 K=) since Hintikka has said nothing on the subject; v/e'll
assume only that (C.EK=) does not seem to be a rule Hintikka accepts.
But (C.3 K=) certainly does seem reasonable.
We have already made mention of Hintikka' s rule (C.Ind. = )
in connection vdth Thomason's semantics for 'sees that'. There we
identified it as a no- splitting condition for -vrorld-lines over which
variables bound by '(Ex)' and '(x)' range. It goes as follows;
(C.Ind.=) (Ex)(b=x & Ka(b=x)) ^ w
(Ex)(c=x 8c Ka(c=x)) ^ w
b^C «£: w
Ka(b=c) e w.
If *b' and 'c' pick out world-lines over which variables bound
by '(Ex)' range, and if these world-lines intersect in the actual
world, then they must intersect everyvjhere.
Hintikka' s original semantics for knowledge failed to have a no-
splitting condition such as (C.Ind. = ), but it was shovm by Sleigh in
his 1967 paper 'On Quantifying Into Epistemic Contexts' that the
absence of a no-splitting condition created significant problems in KB.
There we are asked to consider:
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(a) Everj*-one known to a is known by a to be F
(b) Everyone is known by a to be F
(c) There is someone known to a v/hom a does not know to be F
(d) (x)KaFx
(e) (x)(Ey)(x=y & KaFy)
(f) (Ex)-KaFx.
Here (a)-(c) are the English readings for (d)-(f), respectively.
Therefore we would expect that since (b) implies (a), (e) should
imply (d); and since (b) and (c) are inconsistent, we should expect
that (e) and (f) are mutually indefensible. However, without (C,Ind,=)
or something equivalent it cannot be proven in KB that (e) implies (d)
or that (e) and (f) are mutually indefensible. Therefore, it is
absolutely essential that (C,Ind,=) or something equivalent be made
a rule; realizing this, Hintikka employed (C,Ind,=) in his I967
revised system IPE, Interestingly, there is no similar argument to
show that the comparable no-merging condition:
(Ex(b=x & Ka(b=x)) e w
(Ex)(c=x & Ka(c=x)) c w
£ W
Ka(b^c) £ W
needs to be a rule in Hintikka' s system, and consequently it is
never adopted.
Where does this leave KBC on the question of splitting and
merging? Unfortunately, there is very little to go on here; nothing
is clearly spelled out in papers written since adopting KBC, In
'Ihe Semantics of Modal Notions and the Indeterminacy of Ontology', for
example, he writes that a no-splitting condition is a limitation which
"seems in order", but ho fails to specify wiiich kind of world-lines
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he has in mind. And in ’Objects of Knowledge and Belief’ he remarks
that we have '’tacitely presupposed” that world-lines do not split,
but there is no clear indication whether he has presupposed no-
splitting relative to both kinds of quantifiers or to one. These
passages suggest that KBC has either (C.Ind.=) or
(C.Ind.9 ) (^x)(b=x & Ka(b=x)) e w
(3 x)(c=x & Ka(c=x)) w
b=c w
Ka(b=c) w,
but it’s not clear that KBC has both.
More important than the question whether Hintikka actually
intends to employ these rules in KBC is the question whether he oun;ht
to. In the final section of this chapter I argue that by a modified
version of Sleigh’s argument it is necessary for Hintikka to
accept both rules. Failure to do so will result in the failvire to
capture certain vital inferences in KBC.
Before moving on, it is worth pointing out that there is a
fiirther — and more interesting — reason why (C.Ind.=) should have
20
been employed in KB. According to Hintikka, quantifiers in KB
which bind variables occurring free in epistemic contexts range over
vrfaat he calls "genuine individuals". Using terminology we developed
in Chapter One, we can say that an individual^ b is a "genuine
individual", as Hintikka uses the term, just in case there is an x
such that X is an individual^^ and x is the value of b at every world.
In other words, an individual^ is genuine just in case it’s a constant
function
.
Now consider ’(Ex)(b=x & Ka(b=x))’ and ’(Ex)(c=x & Ka(c=x))’.
In each formula ’x’ occurs vithin the scope of an epistemic operator
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and is bound by »(Ex)» from the outside. Therefore, the first formula
asserts that b is a genuine individual, and the second that c is a
genuine individual. Thus, ’b» and ’ c‘ each denote a constant function
defined over worlds. And so if we suppose in addition the condition
•b=c’6 w, i«e. , that ’b’ and ’c’ happen to assign to w the same
individual^, it follows from everything we have said that »Ka(b=c)»6 w
is true. Constant functions sharing the same value somev/here share
the same value everyvrfiere. Therefore, if we take seriously the
notion of Hintikka’ s "genuine individuals", we should be able to prove
'Ka(b=c)’fe vr given that 'b’ and ’ c’ denote genuine individuals and
that ’b=c*€:w. Without something like (C.Ind. = ), hovjever, this
cannot be done.
We might put this argument as follows. Choose an intended
possible worlds interpretation D,W, for Hintikka’ s system in
such a way that ’(Ex)(b=x & Ka(b=x))’ is true in a world w<- if
and only if there is some element d6 D such that in every world w’
such that Rvm’ the term 'b' designates d in w’ . Then ’((Ex)(b=x &
Ka(b=x)) & (Ex)(c=x & Ka(c=x)) & b=c)-^ Ka(b=c) ’ vri.ll be true in
every world w€r W relative to <^D,W, even vAaen it cannot be proven
in KB. And so the rules of KB are not povjerful enough to prove for-
mulas true in every world in the intended model. The idea, of
course, is that (relative to <^D,W, R^ ) if both ’b’ and ’c’ each
denote the same element in every compatible v/orld, then if ’b=c'
is true in any world it’s true in every compatible world.
* *
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In this section v/e consider difficulties which beset Hintikka* s
expanded system KBC.
KBC cannot be expanded to a vjorkable system of knowledge + belief
.
One of the most attractive features of KB when it first appeared
vras the obvious way in v;hich it could be expanded to a system con-
taining both the epistemic operator 'Ka’ and the doxastic operator
'Ba»
.
In Knowledge and Belief Hintikka talks informally of such a
system and discusses some interesting applications it is seen to
have ("Moore«s Paradox", "Thinking that one might be mistaken", etc.).
We might similarly try now expanding KBC to a system containing the
belief operator ’Ba'.
The first thing to notice about such a system — let us call
it KBCB — is that while there are tvro methods by which objects are
cross-identified relative to vzhat is known, there is only one method
according to which world-lines are formed across doxastic alterna-
tives (vrorlds compatible to i-rfiat is believed). According to Hintikka,
there is no parallel in belief to the method of "contextual" cross-
identification according to which individuals are knovm2 by an agent.
^
A single set of quantifiers suffices to exhaust what Hintikka feels
to be the complexities in the logic of belief.
What happens vihen we actually set up a system in which vari-
ables in epistemic contexts may be bound by two sorts of quantifiers,
but variables in doxastic contexts may be bound only by ’(Ex)’ and
’(x)’? Trouble as far as I can see. Consider;
(33) Someone is knovm by a to be F
(3^) Someone is believed by a to be F.
It’s reasonable to suppose that (33) entails (3^)* but although (33)
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is translated by either « (Ex)KaFx* or ‘(9^x)KaFx«. (34) is unambiguous
and is translated ’ (Ex)BaFx*
. To make sure that the entailment of
(3^) by (33) is maintained in KBCB, therefore, it vrould seem that
both
_CEx)KaFx C w (^ x)KaFbc ^ w
(Ex)BaRx; 6 w (Ex)BaFx & w
ought to be provable in the system. Now consider
(35) Someone is knovin^^ by ^ to be F and knox-m^ by a to be G,
which is symbolized
(36) (Ex)(^ y)(x=y & KaFx & KaGy).
Given the derivations above it can be proven that ( 36 ) virtually
implies
(37) (Ex)(Ey)(x=y & BaFx & BaGy).
Now (37) reads
( 38 ) Someone is both believed by ^ to be F and believed by
a to be G,
and this seems to raise problems. For suppose a is the War Hero;
then (35) is true if ’ F’ is short for ’has been wounded 100 times’
and *G’ is short for ’is the War Hero’s biographer’. But it seems
wrong to infer from the truth of (35) that one and the same person is
both believed to be F and believed to be G. In short, KBCB ought to
formally reflect the entailment of (3^) by (33)» but mth two senses
of ”knoi-jn" and one sense of "believed” we run into difficulty. The
entailment of (3^) by (33) either fails for one sense of "known" or we
must countenance what appears on the surface to be a bad inference
(from (35) to (38)).
At this point I’m not entirely convinced that the inference
from (35) to ( 38 ) is bad. Nevertheless, this is not the end of the
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matter. Gail Stine argues in ’Hintikka on Quantification and Belief
that any Hintikka-type semantics for belief must contain the rule:
(Ex)(b=x & Ba(b=x)) 6 w
(Ex)(c=x & Ba(c=x)) 6 w
G w
Ba(b=c) 6 w.
With "Stine’s Rule" ( 36 ) virtually implies not only (3?) but
(39) (Ex)Ba(Fx 8c Gx).
Now this is clearly problematic. For it follows for some free
singular term ’d’ that ’Ba(Fd & Gd)» is true; that is, a believes that
the same person is both F and G. In particular, \-jhenever someone is
knownj^ by a to be b and known^ by a to be c, then if b=c it follovrs
that a believes that b=c. Our man at the busstop can’t fail to
believe that the General Manager is identical vdth the man he sees
every morning boarding the bus. And the War Hero cannot fail to
believe that he himself is the War Hero.
It would be easy to avoid this difficulty by deciding that
Stine’ s Rule ought not be incorporated in KBCB. This vrould certainly
be a heavy-handed way of dealing with an \mwanted inference; but,
more importantly, it would raise up a serious problem put to
rest by Stine’ s adopting her rule. Consider the belief version of
the argument of Sleigh’s we looked at earlier.
(40) Everyone is believed by a to be F
(41) Everyone of vjhose identity a. has a true opinion is believe cl
by ^ to be F
(42) There exists someone of vrfiose identity a has a true
opinion and of vriiom a does not believe that he’s F
(^3) (x)(Ey)(x=y & BaFy)
(44) (x)BaFx
(45) (Ex)-BaFx.
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Fomulas (43)-(45) are formal renderings of (4o)-(42). respectively.
Therefore, (i) One vxould expect that since (40) entails (4l), (43)
should virtually imply (44), and (ii) Since (4o) and (42) are
logically inconsistent, the conjunction of (43) and (45) should be
indefensible. However, (43) does not virtually imply (^l4), and (43)
and (45) can in fact be imbedded in the same model set. Hence
there is something wrong vdth the semantics for belief originally
proposed by Hintikka.
By adding to the semantics Stine’s Rule, hovrever, both diffi-
culties can be avoided. We prove that (43) virtually implies (44)
It), the system Stine advocates .22
(a)
(b)
(x)(Ey)(x=y & BaFy)
”1 Redog
-(x)BaFx 6 V
(c) (Ex)-BaFx & w (b),(C.-U)
(d) (Ex)(b=x & Ba(b=x)) &
1 (c), for some b(e) -BaFb wy
(f) (Ex)(b=x) & vr (d)
(g) (Ey)(b=y & BaFy) & w (a),(f)
(h) (Ey)(c=y & Ba(c=y))
(g), for some c
(i) b=c & BaFc wj
(j) b=c Q: w (i), Simp.
(k) Ba(b=c) e w (d),(h).(j)
(1) BaFc w (i),Simp.
Clearly, however, (e), (k), and (1) entail a contradiction, that in
some alternative w* of w both ’Fb' and ’-Fb’ belong to w*. In this
proof (d), (e), (g), and (h) are obtained via Stine’s rule (103)”,
(f) comes by vxay of her rule "II.", and the key step (j), upon vjhich
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the vrfiole proof depends, is inferred on the basis of "Stine's Rule".
The choice is clear. Either KBCB can incorporate Stine's
Rule and avoid this difficulty at the expense of enabling ( 36 ) to
virtually imply (39); or KBCB can reject Stine's Rule, thereby
blocking the move from ( 36 ) to (39) but at the same time blocking the
move from (43) to (44) and the proof that (43) and (45) are mutiially
indefensible. Either way there's big trouble; either way it appears
that KBCB is not a workable system. That KBC cannot be expanded to
a workable system of knowledge + belief seems to be a serious
23
disadvantage of KBC itself.
2. Problems mth (C.Ind. = ) and (C.Ind3 ) in KBC . Earlier we
remarked that a varient of Sleigh's first argument in 'On Quantifying
into Epistemic Contexts' could be used to show that both (C.Ind.=)
and (C.Ind^ ) must be rules in KBC.
Everyone is known^ by a to be F
(41>) Everyone vrfio exists and is knoi'm-i by a is knovm by a
to be F
(42') There exists someone knovm^^ by a \iho is not known by
a to be F
(43') (x)(Ey)(x=y & Kapy)
(44') (x)(((Ey)(x=y) & Ka(x=x) )—> KaFx)
(Ex)(Ey)(x=y & -KaEx).
As above, (40')-(42*) are formally rendered by (43')-(45'),
respectively. It should be the case in KBC, therefore, that (43'
)
virtually imply (44' ) and that (43' ) and (45' ) be mutually inde-
fensible. Hov/ever, this may be proven in KBC only with the use of
(C.Ind.=) or something equivalent to it. And a perfectly parallel
argument shows that (C.Ind^ ) must be likewise present in KBC.
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V7e must therefore assume that both conditions are rules in the new
system; vrorld-lines of neither type are allovred to split.
Formally speaking, there is nothing problematic in employing
both (C.Ind. = ) and (C.Ind3 ). But I believe that a serious question
arises v/hether these principles are too strong from the point of
view of ordinary knowledge. In ‘Existential and Uniqueness
Presuppositions’ Hintikka admits that what appear to be counter-
examples have been raised against (C.Ind.=), but all such examples,
he maintains, turn on the use of different criteria for knoxd.ng
who. Thus, for example, Castaneda’ s V7ar Hero case can be viewed
as a counter-example to (C.Ind.=); The War Hero knows xdio the War
Hero is, he knows vjho he himself is, but he fails to kno\-r that he
himself is the War Hero. This example, hovjever, depends upon differ-
ent criteria for knowing vAio; t\-ro different methods of cross-
identification are being employed, and in KBC these methods are
formally distinguished. Hence the War Hero example is not a coionter-
example to (C.Ind.=) in KBC.
In light of this, consider the foUoxang two examples. First,
Jones is an ardent basketball fan. He knows vjho V7alt Hazzard is, and
he knows iriio Abdul Rahman is; with respect to each he knovrs a
wealth of statistics. Jones has, however, never seen the man in
person. And as much as Jones knows about the man, Jones fails to
know that V/alt Hazzard is Abdul Rahman. Second, Jones knows vrfio his
father is. Jones also knows iidio the vjinner of the masquerade contest
is (it’s the gorilla, and Jones has just congratulated him). let
Jones fails to know that it is his father who has just won the
contest
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In the first example Jones knows v;ho both Hazzard and Rahman
are, but notice that he cannot know idi02 either of them are; neither
of them is knovm2 Jones. Therefore, either they are both knovmj_
to Jones and we have a counter-example to (C.Ind. = ), or our example
turns on employing "different criteria" for knowing vho, one of
which has so far been unaccounted for by Hintikka.
And in the second example both Jones's father and the winnter
of the contest are knov/n to Jones, but neither of them is known^ to
Jones. Tlierefore either both are knovm2 to Jones and x-^e have a
counter-example to (C.Ind.3 ) in KBC, or our example turns on
employing "different criteria" for knox^ring vjho, one of vjhich has
so far been unaccounted for by Hintikka.
Thus, either we have counter-examples to both (C.Ind.=)
and (C.IndH) in KBC, or there are methods of cross-identification yet
to be worked into the formial semantics. If the latter is true,
then there will no doubt have to be still more quantifiers added
to the system to captxire all that needs to be said. Either way the
situation does not look encouraging for KBC. Tiie very sort of
trouble the tvro sets of quantifiers were supposed to avoid has not
been avoided at all; making formal distinctions betvjeen different
senses of "knowing who" by introducing quantifiers does not seem to
be a promising line to pursue.
3 « KLgid and non-ripj-d world-lines in KBC . Much of the appeal
generated by Hintikka’ s original system KB lay in the obvious v;ay
in v;hich Hintikka' s model sets could be thought of in terms of
possible vTorlds over which could be defined a compatibility relation
determined by vrfiat is known by a given agent. We looked earlier at
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an account of such an intuitive interpretation of KB, according to
which a possible vrorlds semantics s;^W, D,I^ can be identified as the
intended model of the formulas of KB.
Central to the specification of vjas the set of
truth conditions for formulas of the form '(Ex)(b=x & Ka(b=x))>:
true in a world weW just in case there is an element d«=-D such that
in every world w* such that Ri-tvj*, (b,W*)=d.^^ An agent a knows
vdio someone b is only if in every state of affairs compatible vjith
everything a knows, *b» picks out the same person. Such a condition
has intuitive appeal. It would seem wrong to say that a knows vriio b
is if, so far as a' s knowledge is concerned, b could be any number of
people. To really know who the masked man is is to knovr vdth
respect to some one particular person that he*s the masked man.
In Hintikka’ s terms, the masked man must be a "genuine individual".
It is unfortunate, I believe, that such an intuitively appealing
interpretation of Hintikka* s system is forfeited by the move to KBC.
It is not the presence of two sets of quantifiers in the formal
language which necessitates the abandonment of this simple interpre-
tation. Rather, it is this: The truth-conditions for ’ (Ex)Ka(b=x)’
and ’ (^ x)Ka(b=x)* in<^W, D,^ are non-equivalent;
hence it must be
that *b* in either ’ (Ex)Ka(b=x) • or ’ x)Ka(b=x) ’ does not pick out
a rigid world-line. Hence the world-lines associated mth either
knov.vi^ or knoT-jn^ individuals (or both) are wobbly. In general, it
is no longer the case that if a knov;s who b is then b is a genuine
individual, an individual vrhich remains invarient over all worlds
compatible vrith vriiat a knows.
Perhaps (as in his semantics for perception) Hintilcka has this
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in mind: that both knovmj^ and knovai^ individuals are invarient over
the set of vrorlds but invarient in different respects. That is,
according to two different criteria of identity, the elements
chosen by the respective world-lines are identical vdth one another.
Hence if b is known^^ by a, b picks out the same individual in each
world according to one criteria of sameness, and is b is knovaip
by a, b picks out the same individual in each vrorld according to a
different criteria of sameness.
If this is the case then clearly D, is unable to model
the formulas of KBC. Something far more sophisticated and far less
intuitive is required, and vjhat that might be I have no idea.
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who^^ (knovjs vrfiOg) x is.
^^intikka, 'On Attributions of Self-Knowledge', pp. 80-81.
17see for example, 'Different Constructions in Terms of Basic
Epistem.ological Terms', p. 119
.
^^intikka, 'On Attributions of Self-Knov:ledge' , p. 81.
19
See Hintikka’ s brief paper 'Reply'.
101
20m, .Inis point is made by Sleigh in his I967 paper also, but his ex-
planation (involving talk of the "indiscernibility of identicals”)
I find somex-.iiat misleading. ^
^See ’Objects of Knowledge and Belief*, p. 80I, and ’Knowledge by
Acquaintance, p. 66 .
^^e same proof demonstrates the mutual indefensibility of ( 43 )
and (45).
^^Ihere are other problems irdth KBCB. There seems to be no way, for
example, to consistently symbolize sentences like, "There is some-
one X such that h believes that h=x but h does not believe that
he himself is x”, the belief version of Castaneda’s (A).
24 VThe ’p ’ function is explained by Hintikka in ’Semantics for
Propositional Attitudes’, p. 92 , as mapping pairs of constant terms
and worlds to members of a large domain.
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CHAPTER IV
There has been no single issue discussed in connection vrith
Hintikka’s semantics for propositional attitudes more than the so-
called Restricted Range feature (though not always luider this name).
Already vje have had occasion several times to make reference to this
feature, but so far vie have not addressed outselves to the question
•vriiether this feature is avoidable in a Hintikka-type semantics. In
this chapter and the next vre shall attempt to answer this question.
We shall proceed as follows: (i) Discuss what is meant by
•'Restricted Range" and vihy Hintikka holds that the feature is un-
avoidable in his systems; (ii) Take notice of several criticisms
of this feature vjhich have appeared in print; (iii) Present variants
of Hintikka' s system KB proposed by F?^llesdal, Tienson, and Sleigh
vrhich lack the feature; and (iv) Point out disadvantages in the
approach taken by each. Then in the next chapter v;e shall present a
variant of KB minus Restricted Range which avoids these disadvantages.
It shall be concluded that the Restricted Range feature is avoidable
in Hintikka-type systems.
In what follows, unless specifically stated to the contrary,
our remarks about Hintikka will be confined to his original system KB.
* *
There are doubtless a great many things one might mean by
speaking of "Restricted Range". Let us set the record straight by
explaining precisely hovT the term has been employed in connection
vTith Hintikka-tjrpe semantics for propositional attitudes. Informally
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the Restricted Range feature comes to the following. Consider an
agent a and a world w. In describing a’ s knowledge relative to w
quantifiers binding variables vjhich occur free inside the scope of
a single epistemic operator range over world-lines which do not
pick up eveiy individuali in the domain of w. Pother, they range over
world-lines which pick up only that subset of individuals in w‘ s
domain whose members are knov/n to Speaking loosely, we might
say that the quantifiers are restricted to that subset. Thus
'(x)KaFx* is not read "Everyone is known by a to be F" but "Everyone
who is knox^7n to a is known by a to be F" (supposing for the sake
of simplicity throughout that we’re talking about domains of
persons). In this way ’ (x)KaFx’ and ’ (x)(Ka(x=x)->'PCaFx)’ are virtu-
ally equivalent.
A formal definition of "Restricted Range" can be based in
part on this virtual equivalence. We shall say that a Hintikka-
type semantics for knowledge possesses the Restricted Range featxire
if and only if: (i) All instances of ’ (x) (Ka)^Fx^(x) ( (Ka)^(x=x)-^
(Ka)^Fx)' are valid, x^jhere ’ (Ka) • is short for n iterated occur-
rences of ’Ka’, for any positive integer n, and (ii)
(x)KaFx 6 vr
(x)Fx 6 w
is not valid. To extend this definition to systems for other propo-
sitional attitudes, replace ’Ka' throughout by ’Perceives’, ’Ea’, and
the like; and vrhere reflexivity fails in a system (such as with
•Ba’) replace (iii) by
(x)(Fx & BaFx) & w (x)(Fx & Perceives Fx) ^ v?
( 2c)(Fx) ‘S' w, (x)(Fx) w,
and so forth.
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Let us now examine Hintikka’ s reasons for holding that
Restricted Range is unavoidable in his systems. Those who have con-
sidered Restricted Range to be a drawback to Hintikka’ s approach
and have looked for ways to eliminate it have been confronted by
Hintikka vri.th a well-known "proof" that Restricted Range cannot
bo dropped from KB.
Castaneda thinks of the restriction as a dodge for
meeting some of Quine' s criticisms of quantified modal
logic. Hovjever, the restriction is not an hoc
device calculated to meet certain specific criticisms.
It can be shov/n that it has to be adopted by everyone
who countenances quantification into a context
governed by "Ka" or "Pa" in their normal sense and
who accepts the normal meaning of our epistemic
notions and of logical connectives as codified by
suitable semantic conditions.^
The proof goes as follows.
We begin by considering formulas in \-jhich quantifiers bind
variables occurring free inside the scope of a single epistemic
operator. For simplicity consider '(x)p(x)' and '(Ex)p(x)'. To
determine whether the quantifiers range over a mere subset of exis-
tent individuals it must be determined how rules governing these
quantifiers are going to be drawn up. In particular, under vjhat
conditions may we instantiate and generalize upon '(x)p(x)' and
» (Ex)p(x)’?
Suppose we let our quantifier rules take the following form:
(C.U.)» (x)p(x/b) 6w (C.E.)' (Ex)p(x/b) w
-Q(d) <g w Q(a) 6 w
p(d/b) e 1,7 p(a/b) e V7
,
where 'a' is a new constant and ' Q' is some yet unspecified formula
of one free variable. It can easily be proven, Hintikka maintains,
that ’ A(b)<r-^Ex)Ka(b=x) ’ is self-sustaining and hence that
' (Ex)Ka(b=x) ' or something logically equivalent must serve as the
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instantiating and generalizing conditions for *(x)p(x)» and '(Ex)p(x)'.
This is easily demonstrated;
(a) A(b) e
(b)
-(Ex)Ka(b=x) e
(c) (x)Pa(b^x) £ w (b),(C,-E,),(C,-K)
(d) Pa(b^b) £ w (c),(a),(C,U.)'
(e) b^^b £ w* (d),(C,P*), for some w*
such that Rww*
(f) b=b £ w* (C.self,=)
(a) (Ex)Ka(b=x) G "(
1
Redog
(b) -Q(b) G
(c) Ka(b=d) G s
1
(a),(c.E.)'
(d) Q(d) C w^
(e) Q(b) e w (e).(d),(97)
Redog
Supposing, then, that we let the quantifier rules of KB be
(C.E.)* and (C.U. )*, we are saddled with the Restricted Range
feature. According to Hintikka:
Hence we may conclude that, for the kind of *p* we
assumed vre were dealing with, "(Ex)Ka(b=x)'^ has to
be assumed as-a-prerequisite for quantifying with
respect to the term *b’ in *p’....Thus the restric-
tion of the substitution-values of bound variables
to such individual constants b as satisfy this con-
dition is not just an 'ingenious device' but a
necessity which I do not see any chance of
escaping.^
Therefore not only does KB have the Restricted Range feature, but
KB could not have lacked it.
Criticisms of various sorts have been levelled at Hintikka'
s
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proof, but for the time being we shall accept it at face value.
By eventually arguing that there exists a plausible modification of
KB Trrfiich lacks Restricted Range we shall in effect suggest that
Hintikka's proof is defective. At that point we shall argue that
the proof is defective and try to identify at exactly which point
it breaks dovm. But before vre do any of that, we turn to
criticisms of the Restricted Range feature,
*
Perhaps most interesting among the criticisms of the
Restricted Range feature which have appeared in print are those
raised by Castaneda. In his Review of Knovrledge and Belief Castaneda
charges that the English sentence
(1) There exists an object of which a does not know that it
exists
cannot, as a result of Restricted Piange, be consistently rendered in
the language of KB. For consider;
(2) (Ex)-Ka(Ey)(x=y).
Since the quantifier ranges over individuals knovm to a, (2) virtually
implies ' (Ex)Ka(b=x) ’ and ’-Ka(Ey)(b=y)’
,
for some constant ’b’
;
but
since » (Ex)Ka(b=x) ' virtually implies 'Ka(Ex) (b=x)
« , (2) virtually
implies a contradiction. Hence (2) cannot serve as a consistent
formal rendition of (1).
Hintikka replies in ’"Knovdng Onesself" and Other Problems in
Epistemic Logic’ that although Castaneda is correct in pointing out
that (2) is indefensible in KB, he (Hintikka) has meanx-rfiile come to
decide on independent grounds that the rule
(C.EX.=*) (Ex)Ka(b=x^
Ka(Ex)(b=x)
€ V
^ w
10?
ought to be given up. These independent gro\inds, as we have pointed
out elsewhere, apparently come to this: that (C.EK.=*) does not
allow one to symbolize such sentences as "a knows who puts toys in
children* s stockings'* and is therefore too restrictive. Giving up
(C.EK.=*) turns out to be especially convenient for answering
Castaneda* s objection, however, in that (2) no longer virtually
implies a contradiction.
In his 1969 paper *0n the Logic of the Ontological Argument*
Hintikka goes a step further and points out that even if (2) turns
out to be indefensible in KB, this does not show that (1) has no
formal counterpart in KB. For the formula
(3) (Ex)(y)(x=y^ -Ka(Ez)(y=z))
is both a formalization of (1) and perfectly consistent in KB (with
or without (C.EK.=*)).
Much the same can be said of the English sentence
(4) There exists someone of which a doesn*t know -who he is
(a slight variant of which is charged by Castaneda in *0n the Logic
of Self-Knowledge* to be untranslatable in the language of KB).
If quantifiers range over persons known to a, how can it be said of
someone that he fails to be known to a? That is, the formula
(5) (Ex)-(Ey)Ka(x=y)
is outright inconsistent in KB. And the presence or absence of
(C.EK.=*) is irrelevant to the indefensibility of (5)« How then do
V70 capture (4) in formal terms? The answer is easy given Hintikka*
s
proposal to translate (1) as (3); we simply translate (4) as
(6) (Ex)(y)(x=y-i- -(Ez)Ka(y=z)).
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And it may be easily demonstrated that ( 6 ). like ( 3 ), is perfectly
consistent in KB. It looks, therefore, as though Hintikka has
successfully defended KB against the charge that Restricted
Range brings with it an inevitable restriction on the powers of
expressibility.
Nevertheless this is not the end of the matter. Sleigh asks us
to consider
(7) There is someone such that a knows that he exists but not
vjho he is
in his paper ’Restricted Range in Epistemic Logic’. Making reference
to the points Castaneda has raised he writes:
Still there may be life in this line of criticism.
Ci3)J andL( 6 )^ are equivalent in KB. But the in-
ference from C(^)J to C(1)J may seem counter-
intuitive. An examination of a proof that C(3)^
implies C( 6 )Z/ suggests that KB utilizes conditions
which make it impossible to formulate an intui-
tively acceptable and consistent symbolization for
• It is natural to assume thatC(7)17 is
consistent, that it is not correctly symbol! zable
in KB and that this failure is a consequence of the
restricted range feature of KB.^
There is no disputing the fact that (3) and ( 6 ) are equivalent
in KB; but why should this convince us that (7) cannot be consistently
rendered in KB? Unless I am missing something obvious, it seems
apparent that we can use Hintikka’ s ploy once again and find the
consistent symbolization vje are looking for. In the case at hand
this would amount to
( 8 ) (Ex)((y)(x=y—:?Ka(Ez)(z=y)) & (y)(x=y->-(Sz)Ka(z=y))).
Like both (3) and ( 6 ), ( 8 ) is perfectly consistent in KB. And so
once again it appears that we have no English sentences v;hose failure
to be expressed in KB can be pinned on the Restricted Range feature.
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Castaneda s criticisms, though interesting, do not seem to amount
4
to anything in the end.
Further criticism of the Restricted Range feature is raised
by Romane Clark in his paper 'Comments’. His remarks arise out of
a set of comments directed at Hintikka' s semantics for perception,
but the point he raises applies to KB in precisely analogous fashion.
Consider Existential Generalization in the folloxijing form:
Perceives p(b/x) 4w
(Ex)(b=x) <2 v;
(Ex) (Perceives p(x)6v7.
Again suppose that 'p' contains no epistemic operators.
It will have been noticed that Hintikka' s account of
the nature of the premise x-Those addition reconsti-
tutes the validity of E.G. is different, and stronger,
than that given above. .. .Hintikka requires not merely
that the object of the agent's sensuous belief exists,
but (I think) that the agent perceives vrho he is
£T(Ex) (Perceives b=x)I7
. Are these stronger assxmiptions
essential; i,.£.
,
do the vjeaker versions of E.G. sanction
invalid inferences for the contejrts of belief and
perception? The ansx;er is "no” on at least one trans-
cription of the commonsense statements of belief or
perception into a semantics close in spirit to Hintikka'
s
own* • • •\'hy then does Hintikka require the stronger pre-
mise...? It is not, I thinkf part of commonsense to do
so. .. .Hintikka, it seems to me, is led to his stronger
requirement because of a stronger, and I believe doubt-
fxil, principle about hovj quantifiers are to be
understood. .. .This principles of "relative agent
omniscience" seems to me to be false. 5
Here Clark makes tvjo important claims: (i) The employment of
the vreaker version of E.G.
,
xrfiich for knovdedge amounts to
Ka p(b/x) e w
(Ex) (b=x) & \T
(Ex)Ka p(x) e w
produces an adequate system, and (ii) The system produced avoids the
principle of "relative agent omniscience" (as he refers to the Re-
stricted Range featxire), a principle which is "doubtful" and seemingly
"false"
.
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The first of these contentions we shall examine in the next
section. We shall discover the system he proposes which lacks the
principle of relative agent omniscience ("RAO" for short) is, while
perhaps in some sense reasonable, qvdte a bit less interesting and
powerful a system than KB. As far as his contention that the prin-
ciple of RAO seems false, Clark has this to say:
Nonetheless, this principle seems to me to be pretty
clearly unacceptable, for it precludes, or appears
to preclude, our saying quite ordinary things. Take
our freshman and Vercingetorix again. I want to say
that there was someone, namely V., v;hom our freshman
does not believe to have existed. But the natural
symbolization of this, read back into English, comes
out in Hintikka' s translation to be that there was
someone knovm to our freshman x-jhom he believed not
to exist.®
Here it is the belief version of Castaneda's (1) v/hich, given the
presence of the Restricted Range feature, seems to resist translation.
The most natural way to symbolize
(9)
There was someone our freshman does not believe to
have existed,
namely,
(10) (Ex)-Bf(Ey)(x=y),
turns out to be the symbolization for the longer sentence
(11) Someone knovm to our freshman is not believed by
our freshman to have existed.’'^
Clark's ciuticism differs from Castaneda's in that, vrfiile the
latter charged that the natural translation (2) of (1) is indefensible,
Clark argues that what one might expect to be the natural translation
of (9)» viz . . (10), is the translation already for an English
sentence (11) not equivalent to (9)» Nothing about consistency is
mentioned in his criticism. Therefore, Hintikka' s reply to Clark
O
that (C.EK. = *) has been dropped from KB seems beside the point.
Ill
Vhether or not one can prove that (10) is indefensible, the fact
remains that (10) is a fonnal translation of (11) and hence cannot
at the same time be a formal rendition of (9). What Ilintikka
should have pointed out is that the vjay to translate (9) is not the
way that strikes one as "most natural", but rather,
(12) (Ex)(y)(x=y-^-Bj(Ez)(y=z)).
And so, if the RAO principle is an undesirable feature of KB, it’s
undesirability does not lie, as far as Clark has sho't'jn, in precluding
our saying "quite ordinary things". Restricted Range has simply not
been shown to limit the expressibility of KB.
There is one further criticism of the Restricted Range feature
which has appeared in print, but vre shall note it only in passing.
Sellars, in his ’Some Problems About Belief’ levels the follo;d.ng
charge against KB:
When Hintikka offers a definition. .. .of a ’trans-
parent’ in terms of an ’opaque’ sense of ’believe’,
the definition does not achieve the above purpose,
for the range of the quantified variable is restricted
to individuals known to the person vihose beliefs are
under consideration. Hintikka’ s claim to have defined
’’Quine’s transparent sense" in terms of "the basic
(opaque) sense plus quantification" is simply
mistaken.^
It is obvious that a satisfactory discussion of a charge such as this
vrauld require a lengthy digression into a number of profound and con-
troversial areas relating to vrork done by Quine. Hence we shall not
evaluate the charge, noting only that (i) Sleigh argues that Sellars’s
criticism relies upon attributing to Hintikka a definition of
’transparent knowledge’ v^ich is "not an accxirate representation of
Hintikka’ s account of transparency", and (ii) Quine points out that
Sellars’ s own account of transparency leads to paradoxical results.
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* *
In this section we shall examine the highlights of several
variations of KB vrfiich avoid the Restricted Range feature. This will
include systems proposed by Fjillesdal in ’Knowledge, Identity, and
Existence’, by Tienson in ’The ’’Basic Restriction” inHintikka’s
Qu.antified Epistemic Logic’, and by Sleigh in ’Restricted Range in
Epistemic Logic'
.
As a preliminary to considering Fjillesdal’s system vxe shall
talk briefly of Clark’s claim, mentioned above, that an adequate
revision of a Hintikka-type semantics can be produced by employing
Existential Generalization in its ’’weak form”, which for knowledge is:
Ka p(b/x) ^ w
(Ex)(b=x) & w
(Ex)Ka p(x) 6 w.
Suppose we revise KB in such a way that (108) and (109) are replaced
by:
(108C) (Ex)Ka o(x) 6 w (109C) (x)Ka p(x) 6 V7
(Ex)(b=x) ^ v; (Ex)(b=x) 6 w
Ka p(b/x) 6: w Ka p(b/x) e w.
Clearly such a system vri.ll yield Existential Generalization in its
weak form. Is such a revision of KB promising?
At first glance it appears that exactly the opposite is the
case. Consider Existential Generalization. If Jones knows that the
tallest spy is a spy, and there is in fact a tallest spy, is it
plausible to conclude that the tallest spy is knovm by Jones to be a
spy (and hence that someone is knovm by Jones to be a spy)? Can we
conclude that Jones knows with respect to someone that he’s a spy?
It'
s
obvious that Clark does not intend to sanction such
inferences. Suppose v;e are able to draw a distinction between vrhat
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people have called re'» and dlcto» senses of knowing; then we
might say that Clark* s purpose is not to propose that ^ dicto know-
ledge together with an existence presupposition yields ^ ^ knowledge.
Then how might Clark avoid the inference in question? One method
would be to limit the constant terms in the language in such a way that
»the tallest spy* does not automatically qualify as a genuine constant
term upon vriiich one can generalize and instantiate. And another method
would be to assign English readings to formulas in such a way that
Ka(the tallest spy is a spy)
(Ex)(x i s the tallest spy)
(Ex)Ka(x is a spy)
comes out plausible. Of these, Clark chooses the second.
Consider * (Ex)Ka(x is a spy)’; by reading it "There exists
someone who is known by a to be a spy" the inference is quite im-
plausible. But I believe there is a reading of ’(Ex)Ka(x is a spy)*
according to which the inference is perfectly plausible; "There
exists someone x and a knows that the proposition that x is a spy
is true". We do not require for the truth of ’(Ex)Ka(x is a spy)*
that anyone be known by a, according to the latter reading. In
other words, we simply do not give *(Ex)Ka(x is a spy)* a de re
reading; rather, we read it ^ dicto. As unusual a practice as
this might be, it does, I believe, give us a way to make perfectly
good sense out of Clark* s proposal. By giving the conclusion of
the above inference a dicto reading, we move only from a de
dicto premise to a ^ dicto conclusion, and the inference is per-
fectly plausible. Given this way of reading * (Ex)KaFx' and *(x)KaFx*
there appears nothing wrong with the adoption of (108C) and (109C);
the rules themselves seem perfectly plausible.
Why then cannot one bypass the question of Restricted Range
altogether by assigning de dicto readings to formulas formed
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by quantifying in? Of course one can if all that's desired is a
semantics for ^ <^cto knovrledge. The system Clark seems to be
proposing is, as far as I can see, not of much interest at all.
By leaving no room for the ^ re sense of knovdng one is perhaps
able to produce a system that is in some sense perfectly acceptable.
But such a system appears to be only mildly interesting and
certainly a much less powerful system than KB.
Suppose take the opposite course and revise KB in such a
way that (i) (108) and (I09 ) are replaced by (108C) and (109C),
and (ii) To avoid implausible inferences we place a limitation on
terms upon v;hich one is allowed to instantiate and generalize in
such a way that 'the tallest spy' does not automatically qualify.
Just such a proposal forms the basis of a system proposed by
F^llesdal.
Consider the following well known difficulty,
(a) The man who is coming toward me = Corsicus
(b) I know that the man xdio is coming toward me is musical
(c) I knov: that Corsicus is musical
Although the principle of substitutivity of identity in epistemic
contexts licenses the inference from (a) and (b) to (c), the inference
is obviously implausible. In this connection F^llesdal observes;
It seems... that we are in a dilemma, on the one side
we have the prima facie implausibility of the principle
of substitutivity of identity in epistemic contexts,
on the other side we have the metaphysical and episte-
mological reasons for assuming the principle. Hintikka,
in his book, chooses to reject the principle. In this
paper, I shall choose the other alternative and accept
the principle,
To explain hox-j the acceptance of the principle is compatible with the
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failure of (a) and (b) to imply (o). F(«llesdal asks us to consider
(13) (Ey)Ka(x)(Fxi-?^(x=y)).
Ihe fact that the expressions *the man vrho comes to-
vjards me» and ’Corsicus’ change their reference from
world to world. .. should perhaps be taken as evidence
that they contain some descriptive element, and that
they shouldn’t be regarded as genuine names. The
descriptions that should be regarded as genuine
names are those >iiich keep the same descriptum in
every possible v7orld, that is, in symbols, a des-
cription ’ ( 7 x)Fx’ behaves like a genuine name if
and only
. it may be sho>m that we can
avoid all the difficulties that we have been dis-
cussing till now, if we require all names to satisfy
this condition, i..^., permit a name-like expression
a to be treated like a name only if it satisfies
’(Ey)Ka(x)(x a’ s<->(x=y) ) ’ . Only expressions vjhich
satisfy this condition should be permitted to flank
identity signs and be used in arguments t\irning on
existential generalization and universal instanti-
ation. All other name-like expressions should be re-
garded as hidden descriptions and be eliminated,
£•£•» by R'^ssell’s theory of definite descriptions.^^
We have, therefore, a system vzhich (unlike KB) preserves sub-
stitutivity of identity but avoids bad inferences by a restriction
on constant terms vjhich may occur in well-formed formulas. Let
’b' be short for 'the tallest spy’. Then ’(Ey)Ka(x)(x b’ s^>(x=y) ) ’
,
if true, enables us to symbolize knows that the tallest spy is a
spy” as 'Ka(b is a spy)'. On this s^miboli zation the inference goes
through. On the other hand, if ’(Ey)Ka(x)(x b’ s<r?(x=y) ) ’ is false,
then the first premise is symbolized ’Ka(Ey) (x) ( (x b’s<-^(x=y)) & y
is a spy)', a formula which contains no singular terras other than
variables, and with this symbolization the inference is blocked.
Similar remarks apply to the Corsicus example.
Does F^llesdal’s system (let’s call it 'F') lack the
Restricted Range feature? It is absolutely clear that F^Uesdal
intends F to avoid Restricted Range. On page 14 he indicates that
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’ (x)Ka(Ey)(y=x)» is to be read "Every object is such that everybody
knows that it exists". And on page 23 he points out that » (x)KaFx«
,
VThich is for Hintikka read, "Of each person which a knows, a knows
that it is F", is read in F as, "Each person is known by a to be F".
Thus ’ (x)KaFx’ and ’(x)(Ka(x=x)—
-7KaFx)’ vri.ll not be equivalent in F.
Given that Faille sdal intends F to lack the Restricted Range
feature, the question is vjhether this can be shorn to be the case
in F. The ansx'jer is "yes", provided certain natural assumptions
are made about F. These assumptions can be made explicit in what
we might call the "large-scope correlates" of (108C) and (109C);
(108F) (Sx)KaFx £ w
(Ex)(y)(x b‘ s <->(x=y) 6 v;
(Ex)(y)((x b’s'o(x=y)) & KaFx) e v;, for some predicate
»b»s»
(109F (x)KaFx ^w
(Ex)Cv)(x b* S<-»(xr:y)) fe-W
(Ex)(y)((x b‘ s<-)’(x=y)) & KaFx) 6 v;.
It is absolutely essential that F contain these rules; for vri.thout
them F is incapable of accounting for such inferences as;
Everyone is known by a to be F
The tallest soy is someone
The tallest spy is Knovm by a zo be F,
when a fails to know who the tallest spy is.
But given these rules it is easy to show that F lacks the
Restricted Range feature. To show this it is sufficient to show that
(x)KaFx ew
(x)Fx ew
is valid. Assume both that ’(x)KaFx’ 6-w and that ’ (Ex)-Fx’ ew. By
E.I., »-F( 7 x)(x b»s)» w. Now if »(Ey)Ka(x)(x b's<->(x=y))'e w, then
'-Fb' ev;, and hence »(Ex)(b=x)’6 w. So by U.I., ’KaFb’&vr, from vriiich
a contradiction immediately follows. On the other hand, if ’(Ey)Ka
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(x)(x b*S4^(x=y))t e w, then • (Ex)(y)((x b« s<^(x=y)) &
-Fx)'ew. Hence
»(Ex)(y)(x b*so(x=y))€ w; but by (109F) »(Ex)(y)((x b*s4^(x=y)) &
KaFx)*e w. And it can easily be shown that *(Ex)(y)((x b*so(x=y)) &
-Fx)* and *(Ex)(y)((x b»s^(x=y)) & KaFx)» entail a contradiction. So
in either case the assumption we began with entails a contradiction.
There is one rather surprising feature found in F. Although
»KaFx-4-Pa-Fx* is valid in F. *-Pa-Fx->KaFx» is not.^^ According to
F^llesdal, »KaFx* is true just in case »x is F* is true in every compatible
world; but in order for »x is F* to have a truth-value in a world, x must
exist in that world. If, therefore, there are some compatible words in
which X fails to exist, »KaFx* is false. Yet it may still be true that
in no compatible worlds is *x is F* false, and if so, *-Pa-Fx* will be
true. Hence *-Pa-Fx* and *-KaFx* may be imbedded in the same model set.
F^llesdal*s reasons for formally distinguishing *KaFx* and
*-Pa-Fx* in F arise out of the following difficulty. It would appear
that unrestricted substitutivity of identity would make formulas of
the form *b=c-»Ka(b=c)* valid. But by simple quantification theory
one can infer from *b=c-^Ka(b=c)* both ’ (x)(y)(x=y-»Ka(x=y))* and
* (x)Ka(Ey)(x=y)* And in a system lacking Restricted Range these
formulas have counterintuitive readings (more counterintuitive than
the already counterintuitive readings with Restricted Range). There-
fore to avoid the validity of * (x)(y)(x=y->Ka(x=y))' and »(x)Ka(Ey)
(x=y)*, F will require substitutivity of identity only insofar as it
requires the validity of the weaker condition *b=c-^-Pa-(b=c) * ; in
compatible worlds in which b and c both exist *b=c’ will be true,
and otherwise *b=c’ will lack a truth-value. Now we need only
accept the validity of the weaker formulas * (x) (y) (x=y-> -Pa-(x=y) ) ’
and ' (x)-Pa-(Ey) (x=y) ’ , formulas which Fjillesdal believes to have
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perfectly innocent readings.
The basic idea behind the solution is that vrhen
vje have now eliminated all spurious singular
terms and sit back vrith merely variables, then
vjhenever these variables, vjhich function approx-
imately like the ’it* of ordinary language, have
no reference, sentences vmich contain them have
no truth value. ^5
By admitting truth-value gaps and by not requiring the validity of
modal negation, therefore, Fj^llesdal believes he has produced an
adequate system of epistemic logic which, as it turns out, lacks the
Restricted Range feature. We return to F^^llesdal’s system in the
next section.
A rather interesting modification of F^illesdal’s F lies at the
heart of a system proposed by J. Tienson in ’The "Basic Restriction"
in Hintikka’ s Quantified Epistemic Logic’. In this paper Tienson
sets out to construct a system of epistemic logic using model sets
which "preserves Hintikka’ s insights concerning quantification into
epistemic contexrts but which does not contain the basic restriction
ri*— • » Restricted Range feature!/
"
Considered as a revision of Hintikka’ s KB, Tienson’ s system —
let’s call it F* — is succinctly described as follows:
I'Jhat is required is tx-ro different kinds of individual
symbols. . .Let us allow ordinary/- constants to continue
to represent ordinary singxxlar terms. Thus vre retain
C(109)^and drop £1(108)1/ , Let us then introduce a new
type of symbol, say axixiliary symbols, Xviiich can be
thought of as purely designative. All the rules vri.1
apply to formulas containing auxiliai’y symbols —
auxiliary formulas — but they need not be thought of
as having meaning in them.selves. Three new rxiles
dealing vdth auxiliary symbols are needed.
(C.E._^) If (Ex)A<&M, then A(‘< /x) di-' and (Ex)(x=c^)
^M, for at least one auxiliary symbol
(C.U.^) If (x)A^hU and (Ex)(x=^) M, then A(°C /x) M.
(C.=_^l) and M’*' is alternative to M, then
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In addition, Hintikka’s rules of substitutivity ofidentity in atomic formulas (C.=.), must be extended
to refer to auxiliary symbols as well as constants.
The case not yet covered is that of identity state-
ments involving one constant and one auxiliary symbol.
When these rules are added to Hintikka’s rules for
propositional epistemic logic the resulting system
does not contain any restriction of values of vari-
ables, but it does preserve Hintikka’s insights
concerning the relationship between constants and
quantified formula s.^'^
It appears to me that F* and F may be contrasted in the following way.
Where auxiliary symbols are employed in F*, genuine names are
employed in F; and xdiere ordinary constants are employed in F*, ex-
panded descriptions are employed in F. Furthermore, F* does not
contain truth-value gaps, and F* preserves the validity of modal
negation. But in other respects, however, F* and F do not seem to
differ at all. Unqualified substitutivity of identity is preserved
in F* (relative to auxiliary symbols), the Restricted Range feature is
absent, and existential generalization in Clark’s "weak form" is valid.
Tienson’s system, by eliminating truth-value gaps and preserving
the validity of ’-Pa-Fx KaFx’ does seem to be a more natural system
than F^llesdal' s F. But one must recall that FjZ^llesdal forfeits
modal negation for the sole purpose of avoiding certain "bad theorems"
which one encounters as a result of his basic approach. Since
Tienson’ s basic approach does not differ significantly from F^llesdal’s,
and since no attempt is made by Tienson to avoid bad theorems, it
would be reasonable to suppose that these theorems show up in F*.
As we shall see in the next section, this is indeed the case.
The final varient of KB minus Restricted Range we shall
consider is Sleigh’s system K which he sets forth in ’Restricted
Range in Epistemic Logic’ as well as ’Epistemic Logic, Again’. Sleigh
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sets out his system in the form of a model theory, but it can con-
veniently be compared to the theory of model sets of KB in a manner
we shall explain. The model theory itself (K) is very elegantly
desci*ibed in the following way:
Elements of a model
V/ - a non-empty set of worlds
D - a non-empty set of individuals
R - a reflexive and transitive relation defined over W
Q - a function assigning to each world a subset of D so that
Q(wj^) = Di
I and V - interpretation and valuation functions characterized
below
Interpretation fimctions must satisfy these conditions:
(i) For each variable x and each world w^, I(x,Wj^)=u for some
u in D vdth the proviso that I(x,w. ) = I(x,w.) for all
w. and W-.
k)
(ii) For each non-variable term t and each world w^, I(t,w. )=u
for some u in D. Here we allow for the possibility that
l(t,w ).
(iii) For each n-ary predicate (j> and each w^^, I(^,w^) = a set of
n-tuples from D.
Each interpretation function determines a unique va1 uation function
satisfying these conditions:
(i) Identities ; For any terms and and any world w^,
Vj(<^ ,Wj^) = 1 iff I(<< ,w^) = I(/5 ,w^).
(ii) Atomic formalas ; V/here
^
is an n-ary predicate ando(j^, ...
n are terms Vj(
^ ^
• • •
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Negations, implications, and epistemic statements are treated as one
would expect —
(iii) (a) Vj(Ka/^ ,w^) = 1 iff for every w. such that vr-Rw.,
VjO^,Wj) = 1.
(b) V (Pa/'^,w ) = 1 iff for some \i. such that v7 .Rw.,
J- X J 1 J
Vj(/^,w^) = 1.
(iv) Vj((x) = iff for any I* if
(a) I' is like I except (possibly) at x, and
(b) I’(x,Wj^) ^ Di, then
Vi(/',w^) = 1.
We may note then any tuple D, R, Q,I^ meeting these conditions is
a model for our simplified epistemic logic, that = 0 in case
Vj( ^ 1 and that /^is valid just in case for each I, Vj(/^,v7
^) =
1 for each world w^ in each model.
18
It is very easy to describe how K differs from KB. Form the
system H by the follovidng modification of K: When (and only vjhen)
the variable x occurs within the scope of an epistemic operator and is
bound from the outside by *(x)’, require not only that I' (x, w^) Di
but that I*(x,w-)^ Dj, for all V7
.
such that Rw.w.. In all other cases
J j 1 J
proceed as in K. According to Sleigh, "The model theoretic system H
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has the same theorems as the model set system KB".
It is easy to show that K lacks the Restricted Range feature.
We shovr that the move from ’ (x)KaFx’ to ’(x)Fx' is valid in K. Let w^^
be any member of VJ. If V^( (x)KaFx, v;^) = 1, then for any I’ just like I
except (possibly) at x, if I' (x,w^)^Di, then Vji(KaFx,w^) = 1.
Therefore, Vt,(Fx,v7
.) = 1, for all w, such that Rw.w.. But since Rv7-v7.
holds by the roflexivity of R, V^,(Fx,w^) = 1. Therefore, for any I’
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just like I except (possibly) at x, if I'(x,v^)eDi, then V^,(Fx,w. ) =
1. But this holds just in case V^((x)Fx,w^) = 1, which was to be
proved. Notice that a similar strategy fails in H. It can be shovm
that for any I’ just like I except (possibly) at x, if I» (x,w •) ^ Dj,
for all wj such that then Vj,(Fx,w ) = 1. But from this it
does not follow that Vj( (x)Fx,w’j^) = 1, For some I* just like I
except (possibly) at x may map (x,w^) to a member of Di, fail to map
(x,w ) to a member of Dj, vrfiere Rw.w., and be such that V (Fx.w ) = 0
It vdll then be false that for every I’ just like I except (possibly)
at X, if I« (x,w^)6Di, then V^,(Fx,w^) = 1.
Having taken a brief look at the systems proposed by F^lesdal,
Tienson, and Sleigh, we are now ready to say a few words about each.
Turning first to Fj^3-lesdal* s system F, we may note that there
certainly are no obvious difficulties to be fovind. His basic
approach, preserving unqualified substitutivity of identity by
eliminating from well-formed formulas any singular term ’b’ which
fails to satisfy '(Ey)(x)(x b' s<-^(x=y) )
* ,
is no doubt regarded by
many logicians as the most preferred approach to handling singular
terms in quantified epistemic logic. Furthermore, his proposal to
allow truth-value gaps together with his proposal to invalidate ‘-Pa-
Fx—>KaFx’ in F is, on the surface of things, not the cause of any
real difficulty. Finally, what one might expect to be theorems in F,
’ (x) (y) (x=y-^>Ka(x=y) ) ’ and ' (x)Ka(Ey) (x=y) ’ , form\ilas vdth coimter-
intuitive English readings, are not theorems at all.
In spite of all of this, Stine feels that all is not v;ell vdth
F^llesdal’s ?. Consider;
(a) (x)(y)(x=y-^-Pa-(3c=y))
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(b) (x)-Pa-(Ey)(x=y)
(c) For all x and all y, if x and y are identical, then it is
not compatible with
_a’ s knowledge that they are not
identical
(d) Everything is such that it is not compatible vrith a's
knowledge that it does not exist.
“
Given readings (c) and (d) of (a) and (b), respec-
tively, it is well that we do not require (a) and (b),
F^lesdal tries to justify (a) and (b) vdth the uni-
form reading of quantifiers, but his argument is
tortured. To make his point he must give up the con-
vertibility of "Ka" and "-Pa-" and hold that "a exists"
is not false, but without truth-value, if a does not
exist. The latter seems clearly objectionable; it is
one thing to deny that "Fa" has a truth-value if a
does not exist, but another thing to deny that it
is false that a exists.
I believe that Stine’s remarks point us in the direction tovrards
\incovering tx-jo features of F which do seem to be difficulties.
Stine’s first suggestion is that (even with the invalidity of
(a') (x)(y)(x=y_7Ka(x=y)), and
(b’) (x)Ka(Ey)(x=y)
in F) formulas (a) and (b), vAiich are valid in F, have English readings
vihich are themselves counterintuitive. This point seems to me to be
perfectly correct. Sentences (c) and (d) just are equivalent versions
of the sentences
(e) For all x and all y, if x and y are identical, then a
knows X and y are identical, and
(f) Everything is such that a knov7S that it exists,
respectively. So there is no reason in the claim that (c) and (d) are
not counterintuitive even though (e) and (f) are. \Vhy then does
F^llesdal think that (a) and (b), unlike their knowledge counterparts
(a’) and (b’)» have readings that are perfectly innocent?
The reason is quiite simple. The readings F^llesdal assigns
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to (a) and (b) are (roughly):
(g) For all X and all y, if x and y are identical in the actual
world, then in no compatible vrorld is ’x=y» false
(h) any X in the actual world, there is no compatible worldin vriiich ’x exists* is not true.
It is true that (g) and (h) are perfectly innocent, for (g) and (h)
are descriptions (in English) of the truth-conditions of (a) and (b)
in F, and these truth- conditions make perfectly good sense. But
vriiat is the relevance of (g) and (h) to the question v^hether (a) and
(b), like (a*) and (b*), have English readings which are counter-
intuitive? None as far as I can see. One must distinguish between
the English reading of a formula and a description (in relatively
casual English) of a formula's truth-conditions; just because (g)
and (h) are not counterintuitive, one cannot conclude that (a) and
(b) are no trouble to admit as theorems. It seems undeniable that
(a) and (b) are no better to admit as theorems than (a*) and (b*).
Hence it looks as though F has "bad theorems" after all.
Stine goes on to suggest that problems arise in connection vdth
sentences of the form "b does not exist". Let us identify an example
of such a problem. Consider:
(14) a knows that b does not exist
(15) Ka-(Ex)(b=x)
(16) So far as a knows, b does not exist
(17) Pa-(Ex)(b=x).
It is a peculiar feature of F that (15) and (1?) are inconsistent.
Formally speaking, of course, this feature is unproblematic, but one
is tempted to suppose that the inconsistency of (15 ) and (1?) may
raise problems in the expressibility of English sentences vrithin
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the reso\irces of F. In particular, one might suspect that (l4) and
(16) cannot bo consistently rendered in F.
It may be replied that, although (I 5 ) and (1?) are indeed
inconsistent, the follox'Ting are not;
(18) -Pa(Ex)(b=x)
(19) -Ka(Ex) (b=x).
Hence, it may bo urged, one may symbolize (14) as (18) and (I6) as
( 19 )* It is true that (18) is consistent, and thus one may regard (18)
as a perfectly adequate symbolization of (14). But (I9), on the other
hand, is not consistent in F. Therefore, one cannot consistently
render (I6) as either (1?) or (I9); thus it looks as though F is
incapable of handling sentences such as (I6), and if this is true
it' s a serious difficulty of F.
Tienson's system F* avoids both of these difficulties for the
very simple reason that the validity of modal negation is preserved
and truth-value gaps are not introduced. It viould seem, therefore, that
the problems i-Thich drove F^llesdal to the somevihat radical proposals
he made will not be avoided by Tionson. And this turns out indeed to
21be the case; the follox-dng are all theorems in F*:
(x)(Ey)Ka(x=y)
(x)(y)(x=y-^Ka(x=y)
(x)Ka((Ey)(x=y))
(x)Ka(x=x)
(x)Ka(Fx V -Fx)
And each of these has an English reading which is quite counter-
intxiitive. Consider, for example, ’ (x)Ka(x=x) ' . Suppose that for
some model set M, ' -(x)Ka(x=x) ' 6 M. Then ' (Ex)Pa(x/x) ' ^ M; so by
(C.E.^) there is an auxiliary symbol *o4 ' such that 'Pa(^^<)'6
M. Therefore, in some alternative M* of M, ^ M *• But
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this is impossible, and hence our initial assumption is false.
Proofs of other formiilas proceed along similar lines.
Sleigh's system too makes theorems out of the formulas
listed above (with the exception of ' (x)Ka(Ey) (x=y)
'
) . Consider,
for example, ' (x)Ka(x=x) '
. If V^( (Ex)Pa(x?^x)
,
vn) = 1, for some
function I and world w^^?W, then for some I' just like I except
(possibly) at x, I'(x,v7^)^Di and (Pa(x^x),w^) = 1. So
(x^x,w.) = 1, for some w. such that Rs^x.vj.. Hence I'(x,w.) ^ I'
J 3 1
^
* 3
(x,v7j), but this is impossible by the definition of an interpreta-
tion function in K. Proofs of the other formulas proceed along
similar lines.
Both F* and K strike me as very reasonable attempts to avoid
the Restricted Range feature. But it v/ould seem worthvrhile to
investigate whether one could not pursue an altei*native approach to
avoiding Restricted Range which did not involve the bad theorems one
finds in F* and K. In the next chapter I shall undertake such an
investigation and conclude that one can design a model set theoretic
system based upon KB which avoids Restricted Range but at the same
time avoids the unpleasant consequence that a has ^ re knovjledge
regarding everyone vrfio exists.
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APPENDIX
The general question v;e have been pursuing in this chapter is
the question whether one can take an approach to epistemic logic
similar to that taken by Hintikka and design a system lacking the
Restricted Range feature. F^llesdal, Tienson, and Sleigh appear each
to have shoxrm that this can be done. There is, however, a system of
epistemic logic proposed by Gail Stine in ’Quantified Logic for
Knowledge Statements’ which, though it lacks the Restricted Range
feature, may not be fairly called a "varient" of Hintikka’ s KB.
For this reason v:e shall consider it separately.
Stine’s idea is to propose an "alternative approach to
epistemic logic" vjhich lacks features "of at least debatable desir-
ability" found in KB, F^llesdal’s F, and Sleigh’s K. These features
are three in number: Restricted Range, Deductive Closure, and Knovdng
a Name (the feature a system has just in case an agent a knows vriio an
individual is only if, for some name ’b’,
_a knows vlio b is). According
to Stine, KB possesses all three of these features, K has the latter
tv;o, and F has the second. Stine’s system — let’s call it ’S’ —
22is designed to avoid all three.
It may raise some eyebrows to hear that Stine proposes to avoid
Deductive Closure, but the method she employs is relatively unspectac-
ular. Unlike all of the systems x-;e have considered, S is simply to
be thought of as a formal theory devoid of any intended interpretation.
In particular, S is not to be thought of as having an intended "possible
worlds interpretation".^^ By divorcing S from possible worlds in this
way, it can easily be sho'wn, S removes from itself the stigma of
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Deductive Closure. But clearly S is in this way a vastly different
kind of system from all of the others we have up until now considered.
Because one is not to think of modal formulas in S in terms of
possible worlds, it is almost impossible to develop more than the
most elementary of intuitions regarding the nature of S. Moreover,
in no place does Stine have much to say about the rules and axioms of
S. We are told that •(x)(x^x)«,
• (x) (y) (x=y->(Fx->?y) )
« ,
and • (x)
(KaFx->Ka(x=x)) » are axiom schemata. And rules for instantiation and
generalization are described (U.I. and E.I. are exactly as in KB
except that in E.I. a free variable is used in place of a new constant
to avoid the "Knovang a. Name" feature described above). But other than
just this, everything else remains pretty much unspecified.
A good deal of Stine’s concern in 'Quantified Logic for Knowledge
Statements' is directed towards a critique of F^iille sdal ' s F and
Sleigh's K. We have already made reference to some insightful
remarks Stine makes along these lines. It is, hov;ever, regrettable
that not more explanation is provided relative to her ovm system S.
It may seem irrelevant to our purposes to say anything more
about S. Nevertheless, Stine does include in her paper a list of
English translations for key formulas in S, and a few words about
these vn.ll, I believe, prove instructive towards an understanding of
the system we shall examine in the next chapter. The translations go
as follow’s:
(a) (x)KaFx Everyone is knovm by a to be f, and
Everyone is knovm to a and knovm by a to be F
(b) (x) (Ka(x=x)-^KaFx)
Everyone knovm to a is knovm by a to be F
(c) (Ex)KaFx Someone is knovm by a to be F, and
Someone is knovm to a and knovm by ^ to
be F
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(Ex)-KaFx Someone is not know by a to be F
(Ex)(Xa(x=x) & -KaFx)
Someone known to a is not known by a to be F
"(ExjKaFx No one is knovm by ^ to be F
-(Ex(Ka(x=x) & KaFx)
No one knovm to ^ is known by a to be F
The English readings Stine provides seem to make good
sense for a system vjhich lacks Restricted Range. However, there are
some apparent difficulties which deserve a word of explanation. It
may appear strange that the formula ’(x)KaFx» may be read either as
"Everyone is known by a to be F" and "Everyone is known to a and
know by
_a to be F". However, I believe this is as it should be,
for it seems quite clear that these two English sentences are equiva-
lent. Along the same lines, it turns out that formulas (f) and (g)
are equivalent in S, and it may seem objectionable that the former
is read "No one is know by a to be F" while the latter is read "No
one know to a is known by a, to be F". It's not obvious that these
sentences are equivalent, but to argue that they are non-equivalent
one must maintain that "Someone not know to ^ is know by a to be
P' can be true (the reading for the negation of Stine’s axiom ’(x)
(KaFx-^Ka(x=x) ) ’ , and it’s hard to see hovr that line might be defended.
Finally, it might be argued, if "Everyone is known to a and know by
_a to be F" is an admissible reading of (a), then by quantifier nega-
tion it would seem that (d) ought to be read not as "Someone is not
known by a to be F" but rather "Someone Is either not known by a by
_a to be F or not know to And once again Stine seems to be in
the clear. These latter tv;o sentences are perfectly equivalent once
we accept the truth of "Everyone knov.m by a to be F is knovm to £",
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
as I believe \ie must.
all» Stine* s readings seern perfectly correct and
acceptable, despite initial appearances. Hence, quite apart from
anything I have to say about Stine’s system S, it seems to me that
Stine’s lexicon is worth remembering. I believe that this lexicon,
or something closely resembling it, is quite inevitable for a
system which lacks the Restricted Range feature. We shall see
more of these readings in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER V
In this chapter I shall propose a modification of Hintikka*
s
system KB which lacks the Restricted Range feature. Vfe have already
looked at variations of K3 proposed by Ff^llesdal, Tienson, and Sleigh,
each of which lacks the Restricted Range feature, but we have found
that each of these systems is beset by a number of undesirable theorems.
In the system I propose all of these theorems are avoided by placing
certain constraints upon the instantiation of existentially quantified
formu3.as, constraints which we shall argue to be neither arbitrary
nor \mnat\iral.
We shall conclude that Restricted Range can be avoided in a
Hintikka-type semantics vri.thout creating any new difficulties not
present in KB. In closing, we return to Hintikka* s argument (pre-
sented in the last chapter) that Restricted Flange is an inevitable
consequence of his approach to epistemic logic, and we shall find
that the proof rests upon a faulty assumption regarding the role of
instantiation and generalization in epistemic logic.
V7e recall that the following formulas are theorems in both
Tienson’ s system F* and Sleigh's system K:
(a) (x)Ka(x=x)
(b) (x)(Ey)Ka(x=y)
(c) (x)(y)(x=y^Ka(x=y))
(d) (x)Ka(Fx V -Fx).
It can easily be shown that all of these formulas are provable in KB.
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But there is a significant difference in the way these formulas are
read in KB, on the one hand, and in F* and K on the other. In KB
these formulas are read, respectively, as
(1) Everyone knovm to a is knovm by a to be self-identical
(2) For everyone known to a there is someone kno\-m to a
such that they are knovjn by a to be identical
~
(3) Any two persons known to a are, if identical, kno^^n by
a. to be identical
(4) Everyone known to a is known by a to be either F or not-F.^
It may be a matter of dispute whether these readings are counter-
intuitive, Elsewhere I have argued that (3) is counterintuitive,
but it*
s
not at all clear that the same can be said for the others;
(2), for example, seems on the surface to be entirely plausible.
The story is much different, on the other hand, xdien we
contrast (l)-(4) vath
(1*
)
Everyone is knovm by a to be self-identical
(2*) For everyone x there is someone with whom a knov/s x is
identical
(3') Any two persons are, if identical, known by a to be
identical
(4») Everyone is known by ^ to be either F or not-F.
These are, respectively, the readings of (a)-(d) in F* and K. It's
absolutely obvious that (l')-(4*) are each entirely implausible.
Ivhile (3) is somewhat objectionable, its implausibility is mild in
comparison to (3’)» which, according to F^illesdal, says that ^
"...knows the right ansx^rs to all questions of identity".-^ And
it is a consequence of (1*), (2*), and (4*) that a has ^ £e know-
ledge regarding everyone who exists, not just those knovm to a*
It is, of course, the presence or absence of the Restricted
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Range feature which determines vrfiether (a)-(d) take on the troublesome
readings (l»)-(4») or the much less troublesome readings (l)-(4).
Since KB has Restricted Range the world-lines over which *(x)’
ranges do not pick up e\rery individual in the domain of the actual
v7orld; they pick up only that subset of individuals which Hintikka
describes as those who are ’’knox'jn" to a,. Loosely speaking, ’(x)’
might be described as ranging over that subset of individuals vrho are
known to a.. In F, F*, and K, on the other hand, the v7orld-lines over
which »(x)' ranges do succeed in picking up every individual in the
domain of the actual world. And in the same loose manner of sneaking,
’(x)‘ might be said to range wholesale over the individuals who
comprise the domain of the actual v7orld.
This phenomenon constitutes a good case for Hintikka’ s arg\iing
that Restricted Range ought to be present in a Hintikka-type semantics
for knovrledge (vriiether or not it must be present on independent
logical grounds). If the theoremhood of (a)-(d) is unavoidable in a
Hintikka-type semantics, then to avoid the highly counterintuitive
readings (l’)-(4’) of (a)-(d) it is greatly to one’s advantage (other
things being equal) to have Restricted Range.
Much the same goes for P’^llesdal’s F. Although none of (a)-(d)
are provable in F, the follovdng are:
(a’) (x)-Pa-(x=x)
(b») (x)(Ey)-Pa-(x=y)
(c’) (x)(y)(3c=y-^-Pa-(x=y))
(d’) (x)-Pa-(Fx V -Fx).
And while (a’)-(d’) are likewise provable in KB and have readings v;hich
are relatively innocent in KB, the readings are not so innocent in F.
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Again, the innocence of (a*)-(d*) in KB is solely attributable to
the presence of the Restricted Range feat\ire. Thus it is open for
Hintikka to argue that, given the theoremhood of (a’)-(d’), it is to
one’s advantage not to do away with the Restricted Range feature.
It looks, therefore, like there are good reasons not to
propose variations of KB v/hich lack Restricted Range as long as
either (a)-(d) or (a’)-(d’) are theorems.^
* *
Can a plausible system be produced after the fashion of KB
which not only lacks Restricted Range but vjhich fails to make theorems
out of (a)-(d) and (a’ )-(d’ )? Let us begin by investigating just
vrfiy systems based upon KB are so prone to make theorems out of
(a)-(d) and (a')“(d') in the first place. Suppose we concentrate
for the time being upon (a) and see how it’s proved in KB:
(a) -(x)Ka(x=x) a w Redog
(b) (Ex)Pa(x^x) W (a),(C,-U),(C,-K)
(c) Pa(b^b) £ v7^
(b),(108), for some ’b’
(d) (Ex)Ka(b=x)
(e) b/b £ v;* (c),(C.P*), for some w*
such that Ri-m*
(f) b=b e w* (C.self,=)
The crucial move in this proof is clearly the inference from
step (b) to (c) and (d) by v;ay of rule (108), Let us closely examine
the rule which allows this inference, Hintikka’ s rule (108) is usually
thought of as a license which allows one to move from formulas of the
form ’ (Ex)KaFx’ to ’KaFb’ and ’ (Ex)Ka(b=x) ’
,
for some ’b', in some
given model set w. But it is at the same time a license which
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allovjs one to instantiate upon formulas of the form » (Ex)PaFx« ;
(Ex)PaFx ^ w
PaFb ^
(Ex)Ka(b=x) 6 w, for some »b’
,
This latter consequence of rule (108) has been the object of
Tlenson, for example, writes;
But C(108)I/ also says that (Ex)PaPx holds, then
two other formulas hold, PaFb and (Ex)Ka(b=x) for
some constant b. And this is entirely unreasonable.
For it says that if there is someone who a does
not know to be non-F, then a has a unique way of
referring to that person. Since constant terms have
descriptive content for Hintikka, this means that
if there is someone of whom you are ignorant in some
respect, then you know something unique about him.
But I believe, by our ordinary understanding there
can be individuals of vriiom one knows nothing at all.^
And according to Sleigh:
VJhat C(108):7 seems to say when applied to ’ (Ex)-KaFx*
is that anyone a doesn’t know to be F is among the .
persons knovjn to a. This seems obviously unacceptable.
There is no doubt that the inference
(Ex)PaFx 6 V7
(Ex)Ka(b=x) 6 w, for some ’b’
(let’s call it »»(*)") ±s highly counterintuitive. But notice that the
proof of (a) does not rely upon this particular inference, A close
examination of the above proof shows that step (d) is a wet noodle;
erase it and the proof is not affected. Likex-dse, proofs of (c)
and (d) do not require (=**); it is only V7hen we try to prove (b)
that this inference is needed to reach a contradiction.
The other consequence of ’ (Sx)PaFx’ licensed by (108),
’PaFb’, is not (as far as English readings go) counterintuitive. But
it is this inference (let’s call it "(**)'») which is of concern in
the present context of discussion, for all of the formulas (a)-(d)
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depend upon it to be proven in KB. It is the crucial move by which
one is enabled to get rid of the quantifier(s) in order to eventually
reach the contradiction buried inside the scope of ’Pa‘.
Therefore, vri.thout (**) none of the formulas in question can
be proven in KB. And it is precisely this same inference vjhich
makes (a)-(d) theorems in Tienson’ s F* as well. There one is allowed
to infer *A(<=^ /x)'
M
from ' (Ex)PaAx’ ^ M, for some auxiliary symbol
'. And in Sleigh's K, although the whole of proof procedure is
couched in terms of interpretation functions, the result is the same.
If V^((Ex)PaFx, V7^) = 1, then for some I* which is like I except
(possibly) at x, I»(x,v:j_)^ Ei and V^,(PaFx,w^) = 1. There is an
assignment of x to an element in w ' s domain vrfiich makes 'PaFx'
1
true in w^. Thus one can peel off the quantifier just as in KB
and F* and eventually reach the contradictions vrhich suffice to
establish (a)-(d) as theorems.
In order, therefore, to find a v:ay to block proofs of (a)~(d), it
looks as though rules for instantiation of ' (Ex)PaFx' must be pretty
radically revised. According to Sleigh:
1/hat is required is one set of instantiating condi-
tions for formulas of the form '(Ex)KaJ2^' and a
distinct set for formulas of the form ' (Ex)Pa^ '
.
It is possible to develop a tenable model set
approach along these lines which is free of the
restricted range feature of KB but the resulting
system is surprisingly complicated.'^
A way must be found to grant instantiation upon '(Sx)PaFx' only
under certain specified conditions and not in the same indiscriminate
fashion accorded to ' (Ex)KaFx' . Can such a technique be found? And
would such a technique, if it could be found, make good sense not only
on a formal level but relative to an intuitive possible vjorlds inter-
pretation as vrell?
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I shall novr proceed to propose a system of model sets KB*
involving just such a technique.
Consider the follovdng quantifier rules for contexts in
which variables occurring inside the scope of a single epistemic
operator are bound from the outside by quantifiers:^
(ek) (Ex)KaFx 6 w
(Ex)Ka(b=x) 6 VJ
KaFb vr, for some »b'
(UK) (x)KaFx e w
(Ex)(b=x) (S. W
(Ex}(b=x & KaFx)6 w
(EPL) (Ex)PaFx ^ V7
(Ex)(b=x) 6 W
(Ex)(b=x & PaFx) e w, for some «b’
(EPS) (Ex)PaFx <£. W
(x)KaGx VJ
PaFb <£. W, for some »b»
(EPM) (Ex)(Gx & PaFx) a w
(x)KaHx 6 v;
Gc & PaFb £. W, for some •b‘.
(UPL) (x)PaFx ^ W
(Ex)(b=x) v;
(Ex)(b=x & PaFx) 6 \i
(UPS) (x)PaFx ^ w
(Ex)Ka(b=x) ^ v;
PaFb w.
We shall now form KB* in the follovdng v;ay. Begin vjith the
rules of KB. Replace (10 8) and (109) by the seven rules listed
above. Drop from KB the rules
(C.EK.=*) (Ex)Ka(b-x) 6. v;
Ka(Ex)(b=x) 6 w
(C.EK.EK.=*) (Ex)Ka(b=x) ^ VJ
(Ex)Ka(b=x) 6 v;*, for every w* such that Ri-jw*
Add the rules
( C.Inci.=.n) (Ex)(Ka)^(b=x)
(Ex) (Ka)^(c=x)
b=c
e w
c w
^ w
(Ka)n(b=c) £ VJ
(C.E-) (Ex)Fx e vr
-(x)-Fx e w
(c.u.-) (x)Fx e vr
-(Ex)-Fx G w
(C.K-) Kap
€ w
-Pa-p £ w
(C.P-) Pap £ vr
-Ka-p
€ w.
And to all of this vje add a set of rules, to be described in what
follows, to govern formulas formed by quantifying in contexts tvro or
more layers deep of epistemic operators.
Our first order of business is to establish that our
system lacks the Restricted Range feature. For this it suffices to
show that
(x)KaFx ^ w
(x)Fx
€ w
is provable in KB*:
(a) (x)KaFx ^ w
1
Redog
(b) “(x)Fx
€
V7 ]
(c) (Ex)-Fx e w (b),(c.-U)
(d) -Fb
€. W (c),(C.Eq), for some ’b'
(e) (Ex)(b=x)
€
W (c),(C.E ), for some *b'
o
(f) (Ex)(b=x & KaFx)evr (a), (e), (UK)
(g) b=c & KaFc e w
^
(f),(EK)
(h) (Ex)Ka(c=x)
€
Wj
(i) KaFc £ W (g),Simp
(j) Fc e TfT (i), (C.K*),Reflexivity
(k) b=c
*(1) “Fc
£ w
141
(g),Simp
(d).(k),(C.=)
Notice that a similar proof cannot be produced in K3; one may proceed
as far as step (e), but the move from (a) and (e) to (f) is not
allowed in KB.
As far as instantiation on ' (x)KaFx’ is concerned, our system
is actually more liberal than KB. Our rule (UK) allows instantiation
on '(x)KaFx’, in a sort of large-scope fashion, vdth the auxiliary
clause *(Ex)(b=x)»; KB has no such provision. At the same time,
Hintikka’ s ( small- scope) instantiation rule
(x)KaFx c w
(Ex)Ka(b=x) e w
KaPb) C vr
is a consequence of our rules:
(a) (x)KaFx £ wA
(b) (Ex)Ka(b=x) £ Redog
(c)
-KaFb C wj
(d) (Ex)(b=x) C w (b),(C.0{. = )
(e) (Ex)(b=x & KaFx) e w (a), (d), (UK)
(f) b=c & KaFc e
1 (e).(EK)(g) (Ex)Ka(c=x) e w )
*(h) KaFc c w (f),Simp
(i) b=c c w (f),Sirap
(j) Ka(b=c) e w (b), (g), (i), (C.Ind.=n)
*(k) -KaFc £ w (c),(j),(97)
At the other end of the spectrum, hoviever, our instantiation
r\iles for ’Pa' are much less liberal than in KB. This, of course,
is all a part of our attempt to block proofs of formulas (a)-(d)
142
and (a«)-(d»). If we try, for example, to prove (a) by assuiTiing
that »(Ex)Pa(x^x)« belongs to a model set w, we can infer both
’ (Ex) (b=x) » e w and » (Ex) (b=x & Pa(x^x) )
» e w. But we can infer
nothing that yields a contradiction; we lack the means to peel off
the quantifier and get at what* s inside the epistemic operator.
Thus our rules succeed very nicely in blocking the proofs of
the unwanted theorems by making at least one of Hintikka's key
quantifier rules drastically weaker. But an important objection arises
here. Mght not the weakening of (108) be an ad hnc formal maneuver
vrhich fails to make good sense relative to an intended possible worlds
interpretation of formulas in KB*? Perhaps the natural intuitions
which underlie Hintikka* s rules taken as a vrhole vrill be, once these
rules have been tampered with, gone for good and we shall be left
with a new set of rules vjhich are artificial, contrived, and unable
to be backed vjith the authority of an intuitive model.
In reply to this objection we now proceed to the arduous task
of showing that while it is true that the intuitions underlying
Hintikka* s rules are gone for good, we can show that underlying our
rules is a set of intuitions every bit as natural as Hintikka's.
Therefore, let us turn our attention tovrards a possible vrorlds inter-
pretation M of the formulas in KB* and examine our rules in the light
of this interpretation. Rather than simply describe our model M,
however, vre shall follow Sleigh's lead and construct an interpreted,
higher-order theory W which "talks about" M in that the truth-
conditions for formulas of K3* relative to M are made explicit.
9
In this way we can judge with a good deal more precision the adequacy
of the rules of KB*. Following Sleigh, we shall call W the "vjorld
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theory” of KB*, and a formula in W which describes the truth-conditions
in M of a formula 'A». Having done this, it will be very easy to
judge whether KB* is an adequate system. Any inference
A w
B e- w
must be provable in KB* if and only if *A*-^B*' is provable in W,
vjhere 'A*» and «B*» are the respective world theory transcriptions of
*A« and 'B».
The theory v;e shall utilize is in its essentials due to E.
Gettier. The language of W can be described as follows;
(i) Every symbol in KB* except »Ka» and 'Pa' belongs to the
language of W;
(ii) In addition:
'I*' is a one-place predicate constant in W
•E’ is a tvro-place predicate constant in W
'R' is a two-place predicate constant in W
•Bjl', *62’* etc. are two-place predicate constants in W
’^2** ®"tc. are two-place predicate variables in W
'w.
', ’w.’, etc. are variables in W
'Wj,' is a constant in W;
(iii) Atomic well-formed formulas are as follows:
(a) If 'A’ is a wff in KB*, then if 'A’ contains no
occurrences of 'Ka'
,
'Pa', or individual constant
terms, ' (A)w^' is a wff in W, for any i
(b) 'I*P^' is a wff in W, for any i
(c) 'Exvr^^' is a wff in VJ, for any i and any variable or
constant x in W
(d) 'Rv-7^w^' is a wff in W, for any i, j
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(e) 'P^xv^y is a vrff in V7, for any i, j and any variable or
constant x in W
(f) ’Bixvjj’ is a wff in W, for any i, j and any variable or
constant x in W
Intuitively, atomic form\ilas in V/ are to be understood in the
following way. '(A)w^’ asserts that a formula »A» of KB* is true in
world w^ (relative to M). »I*P^» asserts that a world-line P^ is
‘privileged’ in the sense that quantifiers in KB* reaching into
epistemic contexts range over a set of world-lines of which P^ is a
^
10
member. ‘Ext-j^’ is understood to say that x exists in world w^.
‘P-jXvr.’ asserts that vrorld-line P, picks up object x at world w..
' Rvj, vr ’ asserts that world vr. is compatible viith world w. . And ‘B.
J J
xvr ’ is understood to say simply that x is B- at w-. In vjhat follows
J J
we shall refer to the ‘B^’ predicates as "Badge Predicates".
I believe vie now have the machinery to express in the
language of V7 the explicit truth-conditions of any formula in KB*
relative to our intended model M. V7e now give a recursive procedure
to show how to derive, for any formula ‘A’ in KB*, the viorld theory
transcription ’A*' of ‘A’ in W. We begin by defining the notion
‘Immediate V7-translation’ ( ‘IW-translation’ for short). For purposes
of abbreviation vie shall shorten ‘wj’ to ‘j’ throughout, and for
convenience vie shall assume that ’&’ and are the only truth-
connectives in ‘A’.
(i) If F is atomic, the IW-translation of F is ’(F)i’
(ii) If F is of the form '3 C’
,
the IW-translation of F is
‘(B)i & (C)i’
(iii) If F is of the form ’-B', the IW-translation of F is
‘-((B)i)'
(iv) If F is of the form »KaB» then
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(a) If every free variable in B is bound in B by at least
one epistemic operator, the IW-translation of F is
* ( j)(Rij -^(B) j)»
(b) If . . • , occur free in B outside the scope of all
epistemic operators in B, the IW-translation of F is
'(j)(Rij-^(Ey^)...(Ey^)(P^y^j & ... & P^y^j &
(B(y^/x^))j))«, where F occurs within the context
»...(EPj^)((I*P & P.X;.i) & ... (EP^)((I*P & P xi) &
-L IJ- n"nnn
...F..
(v) If F is of the form *PaB». the IW-translation of F is *-Ka-B»
(vi) If F is of the form » (Ex)B»
,
then
(a) If »x> doesn't occur free in B, the IW-translation of F
is '(B)i*
(b) If »x» occurs free in B but never within the scope of an
epistemic operator, the IW-translation of F is
*(Ex)(Exi & (B)i)»
(c) If *x' occurs free in B and for at least one occurrence of
'Ka' not directly preceded by an odd number of negation
signs, 'x' occurs within its scope and it (the 'Ka*
)
occurs within the scope of no epistemic operator, then
(i) If B is of the form 'C & D* or '-(C & D)» and *x*
occurs only within the scope of epistemic operators,
then the IW-translation of F is '(Ex)(Exi & (EPj^)
(I*P, & P,xi & (C)i) & (EP^)(I*P^ & PpXL &
(D)i))* or '(Ex)(ExL & -((EPj^Kl+P^ & P^xi &
(C)i) & (EP2)(I*P2 & P2^ & (D)i)))', respectively
(ii) Otherwise the IW-translation of F is »(Ex)(Exi &
(EP^)(I*P^ & P^xi & (B)i))».
(d) In all other cases the IW-translation of F is *(Ex)(Exi &
(P^^Kd^P^ & Pj^xi)-^(B)i))'
(viii) If F is of the form »(x)B», the IW-translation of F is '-(Ex)-B'
Here we let «i» be a raeta-linguistic variable whose value is determined
as follows. If *F* is *A*, the *i* stands for *r'. And if *F' is
*E* in the procedure described below, then «i» stands for the variable
*j* in the quantifier *(Ej)' or *(j)’ most directly binding *E*. If
•F* is *E‘ and there is no such quantifier, then »i» stands for »r».
We now say that a formula »G» is the »W-translation* of a
formula *F* if and only if (i) There is a finite sequence of formulas
F^, ...,Fj^ such that F^^ is the IW-translation of F, F^_^^ is the IW-
translation of F
,
for all i, and G is the IW-translation of F
,
and
^ n
(ii) For every subformula in G of the form *(A)i*, »A» is atomic. On
the basis of all of this we now calculate *A*' in the following way.
Let *A]_* be the Immediate W-translation of *A'. Now let *D* be the
leftmost subformula in ’A^’ which is of the form '(E)i' for some i
and non-atomic formula 'E*. Ihen 'A-,* is the formula obtained byj+±
replacing *D* by the W-translation of *E', if it has one, and by its
Immediate W-translation otherwise. When a formula ’A ' is reached
in vdiich there is no such subformula *D’, the *A ' is *A’*'*.
Let us now look at some examples of basic formulas and their
respective world theory transcriptions in W. From now on we shall
often abbreviate *(B)i* as 'Bi*.
(i) KaB:
(i)(Rri-»(B)i)
14?
(ii) (Ex)KaBx:
(Ex)(Exr & (EP^)((I»P3^ & P^xr) 4 (l)(Rri->(Ey)(Pj^yi & Byi))))
(iii) (x)KaBx:
(x)(Exr^(EP^)((I.p^ & P^xr) & (i)(Rri-^ (Ey)(Pj_yi & Byl))))
(iv) (Ex)(Cx & KaBx):
(Ex)(Exr & (EP3_)((I*P^ & p^xr) & Cxr & (i)(Rri->(Ey)(P-.yi &
(v)
(vi)
(vii)
(viii)
(ix)
(Ex)PaBx;
(Ex)(Exr & (P^)((I*P^ & P^xr)^(Ei)(Rri & (Ey)(P^yi & Byi))))
(Ex) (KaBx & PaCx)
(Ex)(Exr & (EPi)((I*P & P xr) & ( (i) (Rri-^(Ey) (P^yi & Byi))
& (Ei)(Rri & (Ey)tPiyi^& Cyi)))))
(Ex)KaKaBx:
(Ex) (Ext & (EPi)((I*Pt & Pnxr) & (i) (Rri^( j) (Rij->(Ey)
(P^yj & Byj)))))
(Ex)(Ka(Ka(Bx & KaCx))
(Ex)(Exr & (EP.)((I*P3_ & P.xr) & (i)(xRri-^((Ey)(Piyi & Byi)
& (J)(Rij~-XEy)(Pij & 4yJ))))))
(Ex)PaKaBx:
(Ex)(Exr & (Pi)((I*P-, & Pnxr)->(Ei)(Rri & ( j) (RiJ-><Ey)
(PiyJ & Byj)))))
Before moving on, there is one technical difficulty which
remains to be corrected in the procedure we have just presented.
Constant singular terms in KB* are capable of referring to different
individuals in different worlds, but constant singular terms in VJ
have a fixed reference (always designate rigidly). Therefore, to
make sure wobbly terms in KB* do not metamorphize into rigid terns in
the course of our procedure, we must make the folloi^ng revision.
If *B* is a formula in KB* having no constant singular terms
(as in all of the above examples) let ’B’ be ’A* in the above pro-
cedure, If ’B* contains constant singular terms we derive *A’ as
follows. Since KB* is a system of our own making there is no problem
in assuming that for each constant singular term *b' in KB*, there is
a badga predicate in KB* «hioh holds xiniquely of b. Replace every
subformula '(Ex)C' in >B' by >(Ex)(Ex& C)'. every subformula
*(x)C* in *B* by *(x)(Ex-^C)', and every atomic subforraula 'D* in
*B» vdiich contains a constant singular term »b» by *(Ex)(D(b/x) &
Bjx)», vrfiere is the badge predicate of »b' in KB* and »E» is
not a symbol in KB*. VJhen all singular terms have been eliminated
the result is *A*. Now go to the recursive procedure outlined
above with the following revision of » IW-translation *
. Add to
the first line of (vi), '•...if B is of the form *Ex & C
,
then",
and add "(vii) If F is of the form *(Ex)B* and B is not of the
form *Ex & C*, then..." followed by (a.)— (d) of (vi) with the
clause *Exi* deleted everyvrfiere it occurs.
It is a simple matter, incidentally, to assign world-
theory transcriptions in W to formulas in Hintikka* s KB. Wo need
to make only two alterations to our definition of ‘IW-translation*
as follows: Replace * ( j)(Rij-^Ey^) . . . (Ey^)(P^yj_j & ... & p^y^j &
(B(yk/xj^))i))* by & ... & P^y^j) &
(E^^j & ... & Ey^j) & (B(yj^/x^))i)))*, and delete part (vi)-(c).
llie differences in the intuitions underlying the rules of KB and
those underlying the rules of KB*, therefore, are twofold.
Privileged world-lines in KB pick out individuals in worlds only
if they happen to exist in such worlds.^ And the truth of ' (x)KaFx'
in a world does not in KB necessitate that every existent individual
in that world is picked up by a privileged world-line, as is the
case in KB*. It is hard to see that either set of intuitions is
in any profound way simpler or more natural than the other.
So far we have spoken only of the language of W. In order to
149
tell whether our rules for KB* are adequate, however, we must
specify the axioms and rules of inference of W. As far as the
logical axioms and rules of VJ are concerned, we can simply treat
W as a second-order theory (W having no modal operators).^2
V/hat requires specification is the set of non-logical axioms of W.
These shall be as follows:
(i) (i)(Rii)
(ii) (i)(j)(k)((Rij & Rjk)^Rik)
(iii) (P3_)(i)(Ex)(P^xi & (y)(P^yiH P^xi))
(iv) (Pi)(P2)(x)(y)(i)(j)((Pj^xi & P^xi & Rij)-^(p^yj3 P^yj))
(v) '"(EP^)(i)(x)(P3_xi-= (C^x)!)"* is an axiom, for any badge
predicate
Let us now take a closer look at our system KB* through the
eyes of W. We look first to see how the issue of Restricted Range
is handled relative to world theory transcriptions in W. In Ehglish
the world theory transcription of » (x)KaRx» (see above) may be
read, "Anything which exists in the actual world is picked up by a
privileged world-line vriiich in every compatible world picks up
something idiich is F in that world". The vrorld theory transcription
in W of the same forra\ila in KB, on the other hand, reads, "Anything
which exists in the actual world and which is picked up by a
privileged vrorld-line is picked up by a world-line which in every
compatible world picks up something vriiich exists and is F in that
world". Thus while *(x)KaFx* e w holds in KB* only if every individual
in w* s domain is picked up by a privileged world-line, only a re-
stjricted class of w* s domain needs to be picked up by a privileged
worid-line for the same condition to hold in KB. In this way the
150
lack of a Restricted Range feature in KB* is made explicit through
the world theory transcriptions assigned to formulas in KB*.
To veid-fy that this is indeed the case we now show that the
demonstration produced above to show that ' (x)KaFic* virtually implies
* (x)Fx* can be paralleled in
X& ) (x)(Exr-HEPi) ((I*Pi & Pj^xr) & (i)(Rri-;'(Ey)(Piyi & pyi))))
(b) Ebr-^EP-|L)((I*P3^ & Plbr) & (i) (Rri-^(Ey)(P,yi & pyi)))
, ,
(a),U.I.
f^(c) Ebr Ass.
(d) (EPi)((I*Pi & P^br) & (i)(Rri-^(Ey)(P^yi & ?yi))) (b).(c),MP
r> (e) (I*P & Pbr) & (i)(Rri->(Ey)(Pyi & ?y±)) Ass.
(f) (i)(Rri^(Ey)(Pyi & Fy±)) (e),Simp
(g) Rrr-^(Ey)(Pyr & F^r) (f),U.I.
(h) Rrr Ax. (i)
(i) (Ey)(Pyr & Fyr) (g).(h).MP
?(j) Per & Fcr Ass.
(k) I*P & Pbr (e),Simp
(1) Pbr (k),Simp
(m) Per (j),Simp
(n) (b=c)r (l),(m). Ax.
(o) Fcr (j),Simp
(p) Fbr (n), (o),Id
(q) Fbr
(r) Fbr
(s) Ebr->Fbr
(t) (x)(Exr^Fxr)
(j)”(p).EI
(e)-(q).EI
(c)-(r).CP
(s). UG
\Je are now in a position to justify our instantiation rules for
*(Ex)PaFx*. We first argue that (**) ought not be provable in KB*.
151
We assume '(Ex)(Exr & (P^^Kd*?^ 4 PiXr)^(Ei)(Rri & (Ey)(Pj^yi &
FVl))))' and try to deduce '(Ei)(Hrl 4 (Ey)(Fid 4 B.yl))>, for some
Bj’-
t(a) (Ex)(Exr 4 (P^)((I*P^ 4 Pj^xr)-^(Ei)(Rri 4 (Ey)(Pj^yr 4 Fyi))))
rt (b) (Ebr 4 (Pj^)((I*P
3_
4 Pj_br)-^ (Ei)(Rn 4 (Ey)(Piyr 4 Pyi))))
Ass
(c) (P
3
_)((I*P^ & Pibr)->(Ei)(Rri & (Ey)(P^yr & Fyl))) (b).Sjiip
(d) (I*P & Pbr>^(Ei)(Rri & (Ey)(Pyr & F^i)) (c),UI
Here we run stuck. To obtain »(Ei)(Rri & (Ey)(Fyi & Bjyi))» it is
absolutely essential to fish out the >Rri' and »Fyr' clauses in the
consequent of step (d), but there is no way on earth to get at
these. And so the proof is blocked.
In like fashion the inference ( ) cannot be backed up by the
world theory. There is no way to infer »(EPi)((I*P^ & P^br) & (i)
(Rri-5^(F^) (P^yi & (E«((y=«)i & Bj«i))))’ from \diat we have in step
(d) above. Neither (d) nor any step \diich precedes it guarantees
that some privileged world-line actually does pick up b at the real
world. Hence there is no hope in reaching the world theory
transcription of ' (Ex)Ka(b=x)» ; the proof is blocked.^^
On the other hand, the two instantiation mles for ' (Ex)PaFx'
we introduce in KB*, (EPL) and (EPS), are justified in W. The
case of (EPL) is obvious; it is only a question of showing that from
» (Ex) (Ext & (P2^)((I*P^ & Pixr>^(Ei)(Rri & (Ey)(P^yi & Fy±))))^ we
can deduce *(Ex)(Exr & (Pi)((I*P;l ^ PiXr)-'^((Sy)((y=x)r & B^xr) & (Ei)
(Rri & (Ey)(P-j^yi & F^i)))))', for some and »(Ex)(Exr & (Ey)
((y=x)r & Bj3a*))>, for some 'Bj'. And both of these are easily
proven.
The proof of (EPS) goes as follows;
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-^(a) (Ex)(Exr & (P^)((I*P^ 4 PlXr)-^(El)(Rri 4 (EyjCP^yi 4 FVi))))
(b) (x)(Exr^(BPi)((I»P
3^
4 Pj^xr) 4 (i)(Rri-^(Ey)(P;^yi 4 Gyl))))
^
(c) Eor 4 (Pj_)((I*P
3^
4 P
3
_or)^(Ei){Rrl 4 CBy)(Pj^yl 4 FVi)))
As^
(d) Ecr-:^(EP
3
_)((I*P
3
_
& p^cr)^(i)(Rri-^ (Ey)(P^yi & Gyi))) (b),Ul
(c),Simp
(f) (EP
3
_)((I*P^ & P^cr) & (i)(Rri-^(Ey)(Piyi & Gyi))) (d).(e),MP
[>(g) (I*P & Per) & (i)(Rri-^(Ey)(Pyi & Gyi)) Ass.
(h) (Pi)((I*P^ & P
3
_cr)-^(Ei)(Rri & (Ey)(P^yi & ?y±))) (c),Simp
(i) (I*P & Pcr)-7(Ei)(Rri & (Ey)(Pyi & ?y±))
(j) I*P & Per
(k) (Ei)(Rri & (Ey)(Pyi & Fy±))
^(1) Rrw & (Ey)(Pyw & pyw)
(m) (Ey)(Pyw & Fyw)
> (n) Pbw & Fbw
(o) Fbw
(p) Rrw
(q) Bjbw (for some ’Bj*)
(v) (Ei)(Rri & (Ex)(Fxi & B.xi)
( lor some * Bj
’
)
(w) (Ei)(Rri & (Ex)(Fxi & B.xi)
^ ( for some • B ^ *
%}
(x) (Ei)(Rri & (Ex)(Pxi & B^xi) (for some ’B^’)
(h),UI
(g),Simp
(i).(j).MP
Ass.
(l),Simp
Ass.
(n) ,Simp
(l),Simp
(o)
(r) Fbw & BjW (for some *Bj’) (o), (q),Conj
(s) (Ex)(Fxw & BjXw) (for some 'Bj’) (r).EG
(t) Rrw & (Ex)(Fxw & B.xw)
tfor some *B.')
tj
(p),(s),Conj
(u) (Ei)(Rri & (Ex)(Fxi & B.xi)
(for some 'Bj')
(t),EG
(y) (Ei)(Rri & (Ex)(Fxl & B.xi) ( for some ' B . •
(n)-(u),EI
(D-(v).EI
(g)-(w),EI
(c)-(x),EI
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It is now apparent that blocking the proofs of formulas (a)-(d)
by rejecting () and () in favor of alternative rules which are
substantially weaker is not an a^ hoc syntactic device. Rather, it
is a move backed up by the full authority of an intuitive possible
worlds interpretation of the formulas in KB* as made explicit
in the world theory W.
According to this particular interpretation, ’(x)KaFx» can be
true in a world w only if every individual in the domain of w is
attached to a world-line over which *(x)» ranges. And so we under-
stand » (x)KaFx» as asserting, for any x in the domain of w, not only
that every privileged world-line picks up something in every compatible
world which in that world is F, but that x is picked up by exactly
one of those vrorld-lines. Therefore, »(x)-Ka~Fx» must be regarded as
true in w just in case for any x in the domain of w either not
every privileged world-line in every compatible world picks up
something which is not-F or x is not picked up by one of these
vrorld-lines. And this gives us precisely the world theory transcrip-
tion of * (x)PaFx* generated by our recursive procedure. By the same
token, ’ (Ex)PaFx* is true in w just in case for some x in the domain
of w not every pirivileged world-line in every compatible world picks
up something which is not-F or else x is not picked up by one of
these world-lines. Given this interpretation it is easy to see why
(*) and (**) fail in KB* and hence why it is fitting that (a)-(d)
shoiald not be pirovable in KB*.
It is at this point that Stine's English readings for epistemic
formulas become instructive. Given that an individual x in the
domain of w can be said to bo "known to a" in w just in case one of
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»• s privileged vorld-lines picks up x in w, it is now apparent why
Stine m-ges that *(x)KaFx» be read
(5) Everyone is known to a and kno^-m by & to be F.
It is understood to make a two-fold (conjionctive) assertion about
each individual x in the domain of the world in question. Consequently.
*(x)PaFbc» must be understood to make a disjunctive assertion about
each such individual, and hence it is read
( 6 ) Everyone is either not knovm to a or not known by a to be not-F,
which is equivalent to
(7) No one is known to a and known by a to be not-F.
In the same way, * (Ex)KaFx' makes a conjunctive assertion about
a single individual, and this fact is reflected in Stine* s reading for
*(Ex)KaFx*, viz ..
( 8 ) Someone is known to a and known by a to be F.
And by the same token, * (Ex)PaFx* makes a disjunctive assertion about
a single individual and is read
(9) Someone is either not known to a or not known by a to be not-F.
Therefore, Stine* s readings for *(x)KaFx*. *(x)PaFx*, *(Ex)KaFx*,
and *(Ex)PaFx*, which are (respectively) ( 5), ( 7 ), ( 8 ), and (9),
parallel the world theory transcriptions of these formulas which we
have introduced.
It is true, nonetheless, that while Stine lists (5) as a reading
for *(x)KaEx* and ( 8 ) as a reading for *(Ex)KaFx*, * (x)PaFx* is
actually listed as having as a reading not ( 7 ) but rather
(10) No one is known by a to be not-F,
and * (Ex)PaFx* is officially given as a reading
(11) Someone is not known by & to be not-F
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rather than (9). As we pointed out in the last chapter, however, if
wo accept the truth of
(12) Everyone known by a to be F is known to a
(as Stine does), then it is easily proven that (7) is equivalent to
(10) and (9) is equivalent to (11). Moreover, if we assume (12), it
can be shown that (5) is equivalent to
(13) Everyone is known by a to be F
and (8) is equivalent to
(14) Someone is known by a to be F.
Therefore, not only are we justified in reading > (x)KaPx* as
(5)t * (x)PaFx* as (7)$ ' (Ex)KaFx’ as (8), and ' (Ex)PaFx* as (9).^^
But if we accept (12) we may actually go a step further and adopt the
folloiTing much simpler English lexicon:
(x)KaFx
(Ex)KaFx
(x)PaFx
(Ex)PaFx
’’Everybody is known by a to be P’
’’Someone is knovm by a to be P’
”No One is known by ^ to be F”
’’Someone is not known by a to be not-F”.
It would be very nice to adopt this set of English readings. But
there is no justification in doing so until we can first justify
accepting the truth of (12). To do this it suffices to show that
the world theory transcription in W of the formal rendition of (12)
in KB* (which is Stine’s axiom, * (x) (KaFx-^Ka(x=x) )* ) is a theorem
in W. And this can be done as follows:
Ass.^ r^(a) Ebr
->(b) (EP3^)((I*P^ & P^br) & (i)(Rri-^(Ey)(Piyi & F^i))) Ass.
n>(c) (I*P & Pbr) & (i)(Rri">'(Ey)(Pyi & F^i)) Ass.
(d) (i)(Rri—7(By)(Pyi & Fyi)) (c),Simp
w
(e) RrwsKEy)(Pyv & Fyw)
r^(f) Rrw
(g) (Ey)(Pyw & ?yw)
(h.) Pew & Few
(i) Pew
(J) (c=c)w
(k) Pew & (e=c)w
(l) (Ey)(Pyw & (y=y)w)
(m) (E^)(Pyw & (y=y)w)
(n) Rrw-^(Ey)(Pyw & (y=y)w)
(o) (i)(Rri-/'(Ey)(Pyi & (y=y)i))
(p) I*P & Pbr
(q) (I*P & Pbr) & (i)(Rri-^(Ey)(Pyi & (y=y)i)) (o).(p).Conj
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(d) .UI
Ass.
(e) ,(f).MP
Ass.
(h) ,Simp
»Id.»
(i) t(J).Conj
(k),EG
(h)-(l),EI
(f)-(m).CP
(e)-(n),UG
(e),Simp
(r) (EP]_)((I*P^ & Pibr) & (i)(Rri-;^(Ey)(Piyi & (y=y)i)))
(q).EG
(s) (EP^Cd’^P & Pbr) & (i)(Rri-^(Ey)(Piyi & (y=y)i)))
- (c)-(r).EI
(t) (EP,)((I*P-, & P,br) & (i)(Rri-^(Ey)(Piyi & F^)))^
(EPn)t(I*Pn & P-.br) & (i)(Rri-:7(%)(PT^yi & (y=y)i)))
= = (b)-(s).CP
(u) Ebi-> ((EPi )((I*Pn & P-.br) & (i)(Rri-? (Ey)(Pnyi & Fyi)))—
^
(EPi)((I*Pn & Pibr) & (i)(Rri-;?^(^7(Piyi & (y=y)i))))
(a)-(t).CP
(v) (x)(Exr->((EPi)((I*PT & P.xr) & (i)(Rri-:^(Ey)(Piyi & Fyi)))-:^
(EPnTCd^Pn & P-,xr) & (i)(Rri-^(Ey)(Piyi & (y=y)i)))))
(a)-(u).UG
So far we have introdueed a world theory W on the basis of which
the set of nales of our system KB* may be tested for adequacy. We
have discovered that at the crucial point at which our rules diverge
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from those of KB (as well as F* and K). the instantiation rules for
*(Ex)PaFX», W lends full support to the rules of KB*. Thus we have
not only a system in which proofs of (a)-(d) are blocked, but we
have a system whose means of blocking these proofs has the full
authority of a natural, intuitive possible worlds interpretation of
the formulas of KB*. Finally, we have seen that this same inter-
pretation allows us to adopt a set of English readings for formulas
in KB* ;just like those introduced by Stine for her system.
Yet so far we have said nothing about rules for KB* governing
contexts in vrfiich variables within the scope of two or more epistemic
operators are bound from the outside by quantifiers. We give first
a complete set of rules covering cases which involve two epistemic
operators. Then on the basis of these together with the original
seven quantifier rules we listed, we shall propose a concise set of
rules general enough to cover all cases in which variables occur
within epistemic operators and are then bound from the outside. The
resulting set of rules we shall officially adopt as our quantifier
rules.
The following is a complete set of rules governing formulas
formed by quantifying in past two epistemic operators;
(E2CK) (Ex)KaXaFx w
(Ex)KaKa(b=x)
KaKaFb
(Ex)KaFx
& w
^ w
6 w, for some *b*
(UKK) (x)KaKaFx ^ w
(Ex) (b=x) ^ w
6
(Ex)(b=x & KaKaFx)^w
(x)KaFx 6 w
(EPPL)
^ w
(Ex)(b=x & PaPaFx)t^w
(Ex)PaFx w, for some 'b’
w
(EPPS) (Ex)PaPaFx ^ w
(x)KaGx ^ w
PaPaFb ^ W, for some »b«
(UPPL) (x)PaPaPx ^ w
(Ex)(b=x) 6 w
(Ex)(b=x & PaPaFx) ^ w
(UPPS) (x)PaPaFx ^ w
(Ex)Ka(b=x) w
PaPaFb ^ w
(EKP) (Ex)KaPaF>c w
KaPaFb < w
(Ex)KaPa(b=x) e w
(Ex)PaFx 6 w. for some 'b*
(UKP) (x)KaPaPx .£ w
(Ex)(b=x) e w
(Ex)(b=x & KaPaFx) ^ w
(EPKL) (Foc)PaKaFx <£• w
(Ex)(b=x) w
(Ex)(b=x & PaKaRx) <5. w
(Ex)PaFx 6 w. for some »b'
(EPKS) (Ex)PaKaFX ^ w
(x)KaGx ^ w
PaKaFb <6 w. for some 'b*
(UPKL) (x)PaKaFx <£ W
_LEx)_Cb=x) W
(Ex)(b=x & PaKaFx) 6 w
(UPKS) (x)PaKaFx 6 w
(Ex)Ka(b=x) ^ w
PaKaFb ^ w.
In applying rules (EPPS), (EKP), and (EPKS) the following
qualification must be observed. In any clause bound by '(Ex)’
\diich contains free 'x' but fails to fall within the scope of two
epistemic operators the 'x* may be instantiated upon but not by
the constant already chosen for free 'x's* which do fall into the
scope of two epistemic operators. A new constant must be used
for each such clause; two clauses, however, with the same modal
17
profile may share constants. By way of example;
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(Ex)((Bx & Pa(Cx & PaDx) & Ax) w
^(x)KaFx ^
Be & Pa(Cd & PaDb) & Ac TIT
Now let »Qa* and »Q»a« be short for arbitary (Possibly empty)
strings formed by concatenating »Ka« and »Pa». We may then formulate
the official version of our quantifier rules for KB* as follows:
(EK) (Ex)KaQaFx w
(Ex)KaQa(b=x)
KaQaFb
6 w
<£ w, for some *b'
(EKM) (Ex)KaQa(Fx & Q»aGx) <£ w
KaQa(Fc & Q’aGb) ^ w
(Ex)KaQa(c=x & Q»a(b=x))6; w, for some *c*,’
(UK) (x)KaQaFx
(Ex)(b=x)
^ w
^ w
(Ex)(b=x & KaQaFx) <£ W
(EPL) (Ex)PaQaPx ^ W
(ExKb=x)
(Ex) (b=x & PaQaFx)
W
6 w. for some ’b’
(EPS) (Ex)PaQaFx
(x)KaGx
£ w
6 w
PaQaFb w. for some *b'
(EPM) (Ex)PaQa(Fx & Q’aGx)
(x)KaGx
^ w
<c- w
PaQa(Fc & Q»aGb) cS. W, for some *c*,»b’
(UPL) (x)PaQaFx
(Ex)(b=x)
^ w
e w
(Ex)(b=x & PaQaFx) ^ w
(UPL) (x)PaQaFx
(Ex)Ka(b=x)
6 vr
<£ W
PaQaFb £= w
(EPE) (Ex)QaPaPaQ’ aFx 6. w
(Ex)QaPaQ' aFx 6 w
(EKE) (Ex)QaKaQ>aFx /£ W
(Ex)QaQ' aFx e w
(EKI) (Ex)QaKaQ’ aFx 6 w
(Ex) QaKaKaQ' aFx <£ W
(EPI) (Ex)QaPaQ' aFx 6 W
(Ex)QaPaPaQ' aFx W
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Roles (EKM) and (EPM) are to be treated as qualifications to
(EK) and (EPS), respectively. The latter may be applied only under
special circumstances; When and only when every ’x’ bound by ’(Ex)'
occurs within the scope of 'KaQa', in the case of (EKM), and ’PaQa’,
in the case of (EPM). In every other case whatever we automatically
go to (EKM) or (EPM) and make use of distinct constant terms, a new
terra for each distinct modal profile.
Unforttjnately, this set of qualifications is too strong and
will have to be modified. Suppose we wish to instantiate upon ' (Ex)
(Fx & KaGx)»; by (EKM) we are allowed to infer 'Fc & KaGb', for some
*b» and *c', but our world theory indicates that ’Fb & KaGb' ought
to be deducible, for some 'b'. Therefore we must attact a qualifi-
cation to our qualification. We shall say that in applying the
rules (EKM) and (EPM) we may assign the same constant terra to any
pair of free *x's* provided there is no occurrence of 'Pa* which
binds one and not the other; in all other cases a new terra must
be assigned for each distinct modal profile. Similar remarks apply
to the qualifications of (EKP) and (EIPKS) described above.
One final word about applying these rules. There may be
uncertainty at times as to which rules a given formula falls under
when it contains modal clauses sealed off from one another; for
exainple, it is not at all clear in the case of '(EIx)(KaFx & PaGx)'
>diether or not (EK) may be employed. Therefore, we shall adopt the
sort of convention described in footnote % and say that rules (EK),
(EKM), and (UK) apply to any contexts in which 'x' occurs free
within the scope of some 'Ka' operator itself not bound by any
epistemic operator; only in cases where this condition is not met
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>dll rules (EPL), (EPM), (EPS), (UPL), or (UPS) apply. Thus '(Ex)
(KaFbc & PaGa)’ does indeed fall under (EK).
*
In the last chapter we took notice of a "proof" offered by
Hintikka to show that Restricted Range is an inevitable consequence
of his model set approach to epistemic logic. Since we have now seen
that Hintikka’ s approach is perfectly compatible with giving up the
Restricted Range feature, let us diagnose Hintikka’ s argument and
see exactly vrfiere it breaks down.
The argument, wo may recall, proceeded in roughly the following
manner. Suppose that all the rules of KB have been formulated except
for those governing formulas formed by quantifying in. Then (i)
Restricted Range is inevitable in KB if it is inevitable that ’ (Ex)
Ka(b=x)’ is the weakest formula required to instantiate and
generalize upon formulas formed by quantifying in exactly one layer
of epistemic operators, to an arbitrary singular term ’b’. But (ii)
It is easily shown to be inevitable that ’ (Ex)Ka(b=x) ’ or something
\diich entails it is required to instantiate and generalize upon such
formulas. Therefore, (iii) Restricted Range is inevitable in KB.
What can be said of this argument? The following diagnosis is
offered by Sleigh in ’Epistemic Logic, Again’;
A difficulty with this argument is the assumption that
ZI(108)J7 and C ( 109)^ exhaust the conditions we might
wish to impose on instantiation and generalization
in simple epistemic contexts. This assximption seems to
me unfounded. Consider instantiation. Bearing in mind
that b ranges over definite singular terms including
definite descriptions it is clear that there are exactly
two distinct formulas containing b which have equal
right to be regarded as instantiations of ’(x)Ka^ ’
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I
small-scope instantiation
>rf^le (Ex)(x=b & Ka$2^ )» is the large-scope instanti-
yields the appropriate ruleslor sm^-scope instantiation, vathout aiming forgener^ty we might expect something like the followingas a start toward covering the cases of large scope
^
instantiation: -
(x)Ka 6 w
__(Ex)(b=x)^w
(Ex)(b=x & Ka/)
With this condition (and no other changes made)
we can now offer a proof that '(x)KaFx» implies
(x)Fx*. This shows that Hintikka’s argument for
the necessity of restricted range is mistaken
and suggests that the restricted range feature
of KB is avoidable.^®
Sleigh takes issue with premise (ii) of Hintikka»s argument
(in the form we have just restated it). It is true that ' (Ex)Ka
(b=x)» is required to generalize and instantiate upon the formulas
in question, but it is true only with regard to one of two types of
instantiation and generalization: small-scope instantiation. Ihe
much weaker condition '(Ex)(b=x)* suffices to do the job when we
perform large- scope instantiation upon quantified formulas. Thus
it is not in general true that ’ (Ex)Ka(b=x)’ is required to generalize
and instantiate upon formulas formed by quantifying in (\diere one
epistemic operator in concerned); yet it is the general form of
this claim upon which the argument depends. Hence the argument is
mistaken.
The same criticism of Hintikka’s argument seems to have occurred
to Tienson. Consider:
(C.E)* If (Ex)Fx^M, then Fb fi'M and Qb6M for at least one
constant b
(C.U)’ If (x)Fx<^M, and Qb^M, then Fb<s-M.
• ••we can take (Ex)Ka(b=x) as formulating the ad-
ditional information we need for existential gener-
alization and universal instantiation in the scope
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of Ka and Pa, and we can substitute it for Qb in
(C.E)* and (C.U)’, This gives us ^(108)Jand ZT(109)J
,
It is clear that Hintikka takes this as establishing
that the basic restriction [Restricted Ranged is
necessary. He does not mal<e it clear why he does so.
Presumably it is because he takes this as establishing
that the rules £"(108)J and t’(109pare necessary, and
in turn takes this as establishing the necessity of
the basic restriction. Such reasoning, however,
would be fallacious. .. .Although Hintikka constructs
a system in which the inferences in question hold
which contains the basic restriction, it is not
necessary that a system in which these inferences
hold contain the basic restriction as the argument
requires, for the addition of further rules concerning
quantification removes the restriction while leaving
the inferences intact. 1^
It seems to me that what Sleigh and Tienson have to say cannot
be disputed. Premise (i) seems true, but its truth depends upon
reading "instantiate and generalize" as "instantiate and generalize
both large and small- scope'*. Premise (ii) seems true, but it
truth depends upon reading the same phrase as "instantiate and
generalize small- scope". There is no reading according to vrtiich
both premises are true. Therefore the argument, at least in the
form we have stated it, seems to turn on an equivocation of the
phrase "instantiate and generalize". Hence either (i) or (ii) is
false, and the argument is unsound.
It should therefore come as no surprise that a number of systems
have been produced which are modelled after Hintikka' s but which lack
the Restricted Range feature. It is inevitable in all of these systems
that * (Ex)Ka(b=x)* or something vdiich is equivalent to it be required
for small-scope instantiation and generalization; this is precisely
vjhat Hintikka* s argument shows. But the argument shows nothing about
the inevitability of Restricted Range in epistemic logic.
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FOOTNOTES
Formula (c) is actually provable only with the rule (C,Inc.=)
which Hintikka did not add to his system tintil I967 .
2As we have done in previous chapters, let us assume for the sake
of simplicity that our concern throughout is with domains
consisting of persons
.
^Fjillesdal, ‘Knowledge Identity, and Existence*, p. I5 .
4
Bearing in mind, of course, that the formulas in KB ^^hich are
the formalizations of (1* )-(4* ) are not theorems in KB.
^Tienson, »The "Basic Restriction" in Hintikka* s Quantified Epistenic
Logic*, pp. 5-6.
^Sleigh, *Epistemic Logic, Again*, p. 6 .
"^Ibid.
,
p. 6 . Hintikka himself discusses this possibility in
Knowledge and Belief
, p. I55 , n. 12.
®A word of explanation must accompany these rules. First, \je assume
there are no epistemic operators in *F*. Second, ;^e assume for
purposes of simplicity that negation signs have been driven through
epistemic operators. Third, we regard (EK) and (UK) as applying
context in idiich *x* occurs within the scope of any ’Ka*
operator. The other rules apply to all contexts in which ‘x*
is bound by *Pa* but not *Ka*. In this way, *(Ex)(Fx & KaGx)*,
*(Ex)(KaFx& KaGx)*, and *(Ex)(KaFx& PaGx)* fall under (EK)
while *(Ex)(Rx & PaGx)* and *(Ex)(PaFx & PaGx)* fall under rules
other than (EK).
^Sleigh, ‘Restricted Range in Epistemic Logic*, pp. 71-73. In
doing so we shall in effect specify only the features of M which
are relevant to the task of semantically evaluating our rules.
^®It might be felt desirable to regard *I*P]_* as asserting that P^ is
a rigid world-line. We leave ourselves uncommitted as to whether
privileged worid-lines in M are all and only the rigid worid-lines
in M.
^Hintikka later dispensed with this restriction.
will not be a standard second-order theory in the sense that
Existential Generalization on predicate constant terms is valid
without restriction.
^^For proofs in W we use straightforward Copi-type rules with one
modification; If * (^ * is of the form *Fbw*, then from * yS* may be
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inferred *B.bw
,
provided (i) *B.' does not already appear inthe proof, tod (ii) The restriction "for some »B.»" is attached
to every formiila in the proof containing 'B.*. ^
14_
^
Tienson worries that without () there is no hope in proving suchinferences as ^ i
(x)KaFx w_
-(Ex)Pa-Fx w.
However, for us this is no worry since we have rules (C.P-) and(C.E-) idiich make all such inferences provable.
^%erhaps it may be felt that no justification is needed to accept
one set of English translations over another, and perhaps this is
true. In any case, it is ray x-dsh to preserve a sort of iso-
morphism (which could be easily specified) between a formula'
s
world theory transcription and its official English reading, at
least for quantified formulas. If we accept the simpler set of
English translations we accept them only in the capacity of
non-official readings (readings obtained from official readings
by equivalences), (5), (7). (8), and (9) remain the official
readings and preserve the isomorphic relation between world
theory and English,
^^Since the world theory transcription of * (x) (KaFx-^^Ka(x=x) )
»
is a theorem in W, it better turn out that » (x)(KaFx-^Ka(x=x))»
is a theorem in KB*, It is.
17Hintikka defines 'modal profile' in 'Existential and Uniqueness
Presuppositions'
,
p, 122.
^®Sleigh, 'Episteniic Logic, Again', pp, 5-6.
^^Tienson, Op cit ., pp, 4,9,
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